PROMOTING CONFLICT PREVENTION
AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION
THROUGH EFFECTIVE GOVERNANCE:
A CONCEPTUAL SURVEY AND LITERATURE REVIEW
Management Development and Governance Division
Bureau for Development Policy
Table of Contents
I UNDP’s Mandate, Role and Responsibilities in the Context of Conflict and Governance Related Issues
II Major Conceptual Trends in the Fields of Conflict Prevention and Resolution
 In search of general
theories of conflict
[a] Basic human needs and deep-rooted conflict.
[b] Power inequalities and asymmetries and conflict.
[c] Ethnicity and ethnic conflicts.
[d] Interpersonal and psychological dimensions of conflict.
[e] Structural conflict.
[f] Inter-state conflict: regimes, regions and wars.
Between theory and practice
[a] Monitoring conflict escalation.
[b] Pre-negotiation settings.
[c] Conflict and negotiations.
[d] Post-negotiation implementation.
[e] Peace processes and conflict transformation.
[f] Civil-military interface.
towards an Uncertain Future
[a] Control and complexity.
[c]Security issues and the state.
III The Art of Governance: Concepts, Models and Practice
Parameters of the Art of Governance
[a] The cosmopolitan-communitarian debate.
[b] The consociational versus integrative power-sharing debate.
[c] The structural consequences of governance institutions and methods.
systems and structures
[a] Models, systems and structures in review.
of Liberal- Democracy-based Governance
[a] The dominance of liberal democracy in governance.
[b] Liberal democracy and Neo-Conservatism.
[c] Preconditions of liberal democracy.
[d] Old Orthodoxies and New.
Governance and Country–Specific
[a] Country-case studies on governance.
[b] Specific country analyses.
[c] Issues of global governance.
IV Conflict Prevention and Resolution
In the Context of Good Governance
Governance, Conflict Management or Conflict Resolution
Governance and Conflict-Related Phases
Governance and Four Key Areas of Conflict
[a] Deep-rooted conflict.
[b] Power Inequalities and Asymmetries.
[c] Ethnic Conflict and Governance.
[d] Multicentrism in a fragmented world.
V A Survey of Relevant Research
The universe of relevant research organisations
[a] By Region
North America [including Canada & USA
South and Central America
South, Central and South East Asia
Far East Asia and the Pacific
[b] Global institutions
United Nations & UN Agencies and Programmes
Global non-governmental actors
[c] Governments’ official development assistance [ODA] to conflict analysis and governance
VI Conclusions Arising from the
Gaps in Governance-Related Conflict Prevention and Resolution Literature and Research
[a] Relating governance, conflict analysis and development.
[b] Synthesising lessons-learned.
[c] Relating governance systems to power inequalities.
[d] Global transitions, conflict and governance.
The survey’s relevance for the policy-maker and practitioner
The belief that conflicts can be prevented and resolved is part of the zeitgeist of the late 20th century. Sustainable human development, economic growth, security and conflict prevention and conflict resolution as well as good governance are all intricately intertwined. With this in mind, the United Nations Development Programme has embarked upon an extensive review of the most effective means to prevent or resolve conflict through appropriate governance. The ultimate objective of this effort from UNDP’s point of view is to promote suitable environments for sustainable human development.
The Conceptual Survey and Literature Review* reflects UNDP’s commitment to a deeper understanding of the inter-relationship between development, poverty alleviation, good governance and conflict prevention and resolution. The survey is intended to establish a conceptual baseline, and suggest the intellectual premises that underpin theoretical and practical approaches to the ways that governance can be used as an instrument to resolve or prevent conflict. More specifically, the survey attempts to achieve four specific objectives, which are reflected in the overall structure: [a] to provide an overview of the major theories of conflict resolution and prevention [b] to review major issues, trends and practices in the field of governance [c] to analyse potential intersections between [a] and [b], above, that could relate to UNDP’s specific mandate in pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis settings and [d] to provide an overview of institutions and research organisations that could support the conceptual objectives of the survey.
I - The Survey in the Context of UNDP’s Role And Responsibilities
UNDP’s mandate is to promote sustainable human development, and, as stated in its mission statement, "at the request of governments and in support of its areas of focus, assists in building capacity for good governance, popular participation, private and public sector development and growth with equity." A major challenge to this mission stems from threatened or actual conflict that can fundamentally destroy the very conditions that foster sustainable human development. In the context of UNDP’s role and responsibilities, the survey should give UNDP the conceptual bases for assessing previous and present efforts to deal with conflict through governance programmes and projects. At the same time, the survey should help UNDP to assess the relevance of such experiences to at least some of the challenges of the next century.
II - Conceptual Trends in the Field of Conflict Prevention and Resolution
Throughout most of classical and modern history, conflict had been regarded as inherent in human nature, while at the same time based upon rational choice and pursuit of interests. The study of conflict as a distinct discipline per se arose out of the First World War. Over the past 80 years there have emerged literally thousands of research institutes, non-governmental organisations, university courses and web sites that focus upon conflict prevention and resolution over a range of issues and on many different levels of analysis. These recent developments, however, reflect still unresolved classical debates, including the inherent nature of man, the structural nature of violence, and the pursuit of power as a dominant determinant of conflict.
The emergence of social science disciplines since the beginning of the 20th century has, to a very significant extent, altered the instruments with which the roots of conflict as well as conflict prevention and resolution are analysed. Attempts at correlating aggression and frustration with basic human needs theory resulted in hypotheses and conceptual constructs that were potentially more testable than those emanating from moral philosophy and traditional historical explanation. Psychology, social psychology, sociology, organisational analysis as well as the mechanisms for generating, processing and interpreting large amounts of data underpinned attempts since the 1970s to understand the nature and process of conflict.
The interpretation of and contexts in which conflict took place also changed. Traditionally, conflict predominantly concerned inter-state behaviour, and domestic or family conflict was relegated to the category of aberrant or even immoral behaviour. With amongst other theoretical constructs, human needs theory and subsequently the World Society paradigm suggested that all conflict had basic patterns and characteristics. Conflict has to be understood as potentially endemic in all systems, and prevention or resolution of conflict at one level may suggest conflict resolution or prevention solutions at other levels.
The literature points to six broad sources of conflict. These are applicable to conflict sources at the personal, institutional, intra-state and inter-state level: [i] deep-rooted conflict, reflecting long-held feelings of alienation [ii] power inequalities and asymmetries that range from perceived gender, religious and racial inequality to economic asymmetries [iii] ethnicity which can reflect power inequalities as well as alternatives to failing states [iv] interpersonal and psychological dimensions of conflict that reflect the consequences of perceptions and misperceptions [v] structural sources of conflict that reflect the effects of institutional and organisational behaviour and [vi] future multicentrism that may well lead to conflict based upon fragmentation of interests and authority.
Social scientists, based in no small part upon theoretical constructs, have been able to assist the practitioner in at least six ways: [i] developing more effective systems to anticipate conflict [ii] providing greater awareness about the importance of pre-negotiation settings [iii] proffering alternative strategies to traditional "zero-sum" negotiating techniques [iv] developing analyses on post-negotiation implementation criteria [v] developing typologies of appropriate peace processes and preferred outcome analyses and [vi] providing analyses on the interface between the perpetrators of violence and civil authorities.
III - The Art of Governance: Concepts, Models and Practice
The art of governance is circumscribed by three major issues, as reflected in [i] the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate: [ii] consociational power-sharing versus integrated power-sharing debate and [iii] the structural presumptions of governance. The first goes to the core issue of individual rights and the right to govern. The second focuses upon the ways that power is exerted and shared, including the power to allocate resources, while the third issue looks at the ways that different structures can be inclusive or exclusive.
The literature on governance models, systems and structures revolves around three basic assumptions: [i] maximum participation of the governed in governance is a positive governance attribute [ii] there is no single model or system of governance that has universal applicability and [iii] despite #ii, liberal democracy has paradoxically emerged as the most singularly acceptable construct for institutions of government and governance.
While acknowledging the predominance of the liberal-democratic paradigm, the literature reflects a growing concern that liberal democracy has become synonymous with market-driven, neo-conservatism. Furthermore, there is considerable doubt about the number of nations that have the necessary requisites or so-called preconditions to advance towards liberal democracy. And, related to the issue of preconditions is that of old orthodoxies and new, or, the extent to which development is a precondition of liberal democracy or vice versa.
Within the context of governance and country-specific analyses, the survey identifies a range of literature that extends the issue of governance well beyond the confines of the nation-state. State governance, as has been recognised for more than two decades, is increasingly determined by an ever-widening range of external factors. However, a whole new dimension of global, regional and regime issues are changing the conception of not only sovereignty but also the dimensions of externalities that affect governance.
IV - Conflict Prevention and Resolution in the Context of Good Governance
Over the years the literature on conflict has reflected tensions between conflict management and conflict resolution. Now, however, the two issues seem to have been joined by the general acknowledgement that the process of conflict management can be an effective route towards conflict resolution. In a related context, it has been suggested that different phases of conflict, eg, pre-crisis, conflict and post-conflict stages, may require different governance structures and systems. Following the limited amount of literature available on conflict resolution and prevention in the context of governance, this survey has concluded that the structures and systems of governance need not be different during different phases, but rather that the issues that such systems and structures must address will certainly be different.
Four broad sources of conflict have been identified as the test of effective conflict prevention or resolution for governance structures and systems. These four are "deep-rooted conflict", power inequalities and asymmetries, ethnic conflict and multicentrism in a fragmented world. There is a rather substantial literature that suggests practical steps towards developing governance structures and systems that can resolve or prevent conflict. However, the steps between developing structures and systems and actually bringing contending forces or groups "to the table" have many gaps. This is particularly the case when dealing with power inequalities and ethnicity.
There has been relatively little work done to date that relates types of future conflicts that may arise in what has been called a fragmented world order and governance. It is increasingly apparent that states’ capacities to govern are being increasingly influenced by externalities. Perhaps even more important, governance for individual states may be judged on the ways that they handle regime issues, regional issues and issues of global governance. To that extent, the ways that governments and governance structures deal with new types of conflict may depend upon their abilities to deal with the externalities as much as "domestic factors."
This survey has identified four broad gaps in the literature. There are few if any works that really bring together governance and conflict-related issues with issues of development. Secondly, while there is a growing literature on governance systems and ways to address conflict, there is a very real need for a major text that synthesises the disparate lessons of individual cases into some broad sets of conclusions. Thirdly, and related to the first two gaps, there is a dearth of works that go deeply beyond the rhetorical and give practical guidance on ways that governance systems and structures can address power inequality, or asymmetries.
Finally, few if any works have attempted to bring the major transitions so rapidly transforming the global community into the context of future governance. Nor for that matter, do those few works that give some sense of what the future might hold give any idea of how future governance might relate to future sources of conflict. And, there seems no effort to see what sorts of development – as an aspect of governance and perhaps as a means to mitigate conflict – might be required amidst the turbulence of change.
The survey, in the final analysis, underscores the growing importance of ensuring that the concepts, theories and analyses of researchers benefit from the insights, experience and wisdom of practitioners. Practitioners have to feed into the world of the researcher and vice versa.
The belief that conflicts can be prevented and resolved is part of the zeitgeist of the late 20th century. Sustainable human development, economic growth, security and conflict prevention and conflict resolution are all intricately intertwined. It is for this reason that it behoves the United Nations Development Programme to determine how best to relate its own mandated mission to the wider concern of conflict prevention and resolution.
Towards this end, UNDP continues to develop and promote guidelines to link development and good governance with conflict prevention and resolution activities. More specifically, the task is to determine how UNDP’s extensive experience in matters of capacity-building and governance can relate to overall conflict prevention and resolution concerns. The end objective is to define specific and practical proposals on ways to use capacity-building and governance-related development activities to prevent or resolve conflicts, and to establish criteria for assessing conflict prevention and resolution impacts of development projects and programmes.
UNDP’s initiatives on conflict prevention and resolution in the context of good governance will be based upon a process of consultations and analysis involving a broad range of individuals and institutions. These initiatives will benefit from a series of case studies based upon previous as well as on-going conflicts and responses they will reflect the findings and experiences of those from UNDP, the UN in general and other relevant institutions and ultimately they will seek to relate key global trends to new types of potential conflicts and new types of possible conflict prevention and resolution approaches and methodologies.
In formulating its initiatives, UNDP felt that it was important undertake an initial "mapping exercise", designed to provide a general overview of conceptual issues and approaches and bibliographical resources on conflict related issues and governance. The mapping exercise, to be called "the survey" for the sake of brevity, is also intended to identify some of the major institutions within and outside the UN system that could lend expertise to the overall project.
The survey therefore will include in
At the end of each subsection of the first four main sections, there will be a list of additional readings that will supplement the articles and books noted in the main body of the text. The vast majority of the articles to which the text refers are cited in footnotes. This has been done in order to ensure that the main elements of the conceptual discussion are not lost in a welter of names and titles.
I – UNDP’s Mandate, Role and Responsibilities in the Context of Conflict and Governance Related Issues
UNDP’s mandate is to promote sustainable human development. Based upon this mandate, UNDP’s role and responsibilities are circumscribed by its mission statement that, "at the request of governments and in support of its areas of focus, [UNDP] assists in building capacity for good governance, popular participation, private and public sector development and growth with equity, stressing that national plans and priorities are the only viable frame of reference for the national programming of operational activities for development within the United Nations system."
Sustainable human development is viewed by UNDP as development that empowers the poor and generates growth that is equitably distributed. UNDP supports initiatives dealing with its thematic areas comprising the establishment of an enabling environment for good governance, poverty eradication, employment and sustainable livelihoods, gender equality and the advancement of women, and environmental protection and regeneration.
UNDP defines governance as the exercise of economic, political and administrative authority to manage a country’s affairs at all levels, comprising the mechanisms, process and institutions through which that authority is directed. Good governance is, among other things, participatory, transparent, accountable and efficient. It also recognises that governance is exercised by the private sector and civil society, as well as the state, all of which have important roles to play in promoting sustainable human development.
Bearing these views of sustainable human development and of good governance in mind, UNDP increasingly finds itself at the sharp end of a growing number as well as types of conflict situations within so-called "countries and regions in crisis". Such conflict situations all too often compromise UNDP’s own ability to promote sustainable human development, and frequently suggest that UNDP’s efforts to build capacity to enhance good governance have gone awry. In all this, UNDP is also more than aware that conflict situations also undercut the developmental activities of its sister agencies, and affect its own ability to support such activities.
Until recently UNDP had assumed that the consequences of conflict might mean that development would have to be subordinated to the exigencies of humanitarian assistance or relief. Development in the context of what had been described as "the relief-to-development continuum" would be substantially reduced or curtailed in order to make way for relief activities. Only when the need for the latter receded and the environment for returning to development improved could development be brought into full play.
However, the "relief-to-development continuum" has been replaced by an approach that stresses the need for "continuing development" not only for purposes of development, per se, but also as part of a more system-wide peace-building process. Continuing development seeks to maintain economic activity to the extent possible in conflict situations, and also to provide protection for those without any economic security. It also opens opportunities to promote peace-building initiatives. There is increasing hope that on-going development can in the midst of conflict at least foster "islands of stability" and improve incentives for warring factions to consider the benefits of peace. In addition, continuing development offers practical opportunities to advance post-conflict recovery.
As the steward of the United Nations Resident Coordinator system, UNDP also is responsible for supporting the UN system’s efforts to mitigate the humanitarian consequences of conflict. In the aftermath of conflict, UNDP plays a principal role at the in-country level in promoting post-conflict recovery programmes and activities. Even during conflict the Resident Coordinator’s role should offer general coherence and consistency to the overall efforts of the UN system.
UNDP’s multifaceted role before, during and after conflicts has been recognised by its Executive Board through the resources made available for conflict prevention, resolution and post-conflict recovery through, for example, TRAC 1.1.3. At the same time, UNDP has expended a considerable portion of its overall resources [ie, 51 percent from 1992 to 1996] for projects designed to promote good governance and public resource management (or, in a larger sense, to create bases for peace and stability). Such projects include support for judicial systems, human rights programmes, national and local elections, protection for the environment, reintegration of demobilised soldiers and rebuilding physical infrastructure.
Over half that amount goes directly into governance-related projects. UNDP regards one of its comparative advantages as the bringing together of government, civil society and the private sector during and after crises. In such circumstances UNDP can support both macro and local planning and reconciliation initiatives through various participatory techniques. However, given the growing need for conflict-related governance initiatives, UNDP must ensure three things:
II – Major Conceptual Trends in the Fields of Conflict Prevention and Resolution
You knew when you had successfully ‘arrived’ in academia: others adopted your ideas, misunderstood them, presented them as their own and then made extravagant claims for their relevance and their effectiveness." In that context, it is worth noting that much of the language, theories, concepts and approaches that comprise the field of conflict analysis and research are becoming part of the patina of the pundits, the media, political leaders and policy advisers. "In short," notes Mitchell, "the field [of conflict research] has ‘arrived’ at the centre of academic and political attention, and at least some of its central ideas, hopefully not too distorted, will affect the way in which people think about this world and its problems, at least for a time."
This section explores the main theoretical and conceptual conflict prevention and resolution approaches that have begun in various ways to enter the vocabulary of the policy maker and practitioner. It also suggests new issues and approaches that might soon be making the trek from the periphery of abstraction to the policy centre. In so doing, it outlines some of the core constructs, looking, for example, at the paradigms and underlying assumptions of the conflict research field, and then analysing some of the field’s sub-components.
 In search of general theories of conflict
While there was no formal field of "conflict research" until well after the Second World War, earlier views of conflict seem to reflect three fundamental assumptions. In the first place, a distinction was made between what one might call interpersonal conflict and inter-state conflict. The former was regarded as not necessarily rational, and could to some extent be understood in terms of what social psychologists have called "individual differences". The latter was regarded as inherently rational. In other words, conflict at the inter-state level was assumed to be based upon a "win-lose" calculation of interests and cost-benefits.
A second assumption was that conflict was inherent in human nature. Although 18th and 19th century philosophers from Locke, Rousseau, Hegel and Marx as well as the utilitarians such as Mills and Owen had assumed the eventual "perfectibility" of mankind, human beings as they existed in their present state were for all intents and purposes essentially Hobbseian.
Finally there was an issue of perceived legitimacy that separated inter-state conflict from intra-state conflict. Scholars accepted that there were "just" and "unjust" inter-state conflicts, or, wars, but legitimacy had not until relatively recently been extended to the sort of intra-state conflict that stemmed from ethnic, religious and economic oppression. One might argue that since the Treaty of Westphalia, that concept of sovereignty – with all its presumptions of legitimacy and inviolability – was regarded for almost four centuries as a right equivalent and, more often than not, surpassing that of so-called "human rights".
The growth of the social sciences such as psychology and sociology, the calamities that triggered substantial interest in the behaviour of states at a broad systemic level of analysis and a slowly emerging sense of global interdependence began to challenge the three assumptions. Non-rationality or indeed irrationality was regarded as perhaps as relevant an explanatory factor for state behaviour as it was for personal behaviour. Human behaviour could not necessarily be explained from solely Lockeian or Hobbseian perspectives, but could be analysed and could possibly even be tested based upon a complex set of inter-active variables and conditions. And the natural legitimacy of states and even the concept of sovereignty began to be called into question as the state-centric system moved from a small, relatively homogenous "club" to a more diverse, heterogeneous collection of accidents and impositions.
Since the early 1960s, the conventional assumptions about power, rationality and sovereignty were increasingly challenged. Fundamental to such challenges was the emergence of a profound discourse on the very nature of knowledge itself. This endeavour to explain "how we know what we know" was led by scholars such as Popper, Ravetz, Lakatos and Kuhn. Hand in hand with this epistemological debate emerged a group of scholars ready to go well beyond the traditional disciplines of history, the classics and moral philosophy to explore the roots and dynamics of conflict. Rapaport, Brickman, Gunn and Lorenz, for example, introduced a range of social scientific disciplines into the study of conflict, including psychology, sociology and anthropology. In addition, Boulding, Nicholson and Runciman were among a growing group of conflict analysts who were using relatively sophisticated social science methodology, methodology that perhaps might open the way to testable hypotheses about conflict.
Ironically, the state-centric school of rational power-politics was challenged by an event that ostensibly reflected all the traditional rules of power calculations, namely, the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. The complexities of world politics were becoming more evident at the same time they seemed to become more inter-dependent. Regime issues – be they concerned with the law of the seas, patents and copy rights or the environment – could no longer be regulated by the manipulation of conventional power alone. More and more actors were affecting what increasingly became referred to as the world, or global system. Multinational corporations, multilateral organisations, religious and ethnic groupings, non-governmental organisations were all directly impacting upon what heretofore had been seen as a system of sovereign, holistic state actors.
The challenge for policy-makers as well as scholars was to explain the dynamics of this emerging global order and the threats facing it. Allison, Halperin, Jervis, Steinbruner and Wohlstetter were among the growing number of analysts who saw that the Cuban Missile threat – and conflict in general – could be interpreted in terms of the ways in which organisations functioned internally the interactions between organisations the interplay between domestic and inter-state politics and, indeed, in terms of the very processes by which human beings make decisions. Not only was the rational actor model that underpinned classical conflict analysis ripe for a major rethink, but perhaps even more worrying for many was that the very mechanisms designed to make rational decisions [eg, ministries of foreign affairs, defence departments] could be themselves the inadvertent, non-rational source of conflict.
To what extent were, for example, the factors that led up to the super power stand-off over Cuba unique? Could they explain the sorts of potential confrontations one might face in the future, or even the conflicts that one had suffered in the past? And in posing such questions, to what extent could one generalise about the nature of conflict not only over time, but also at various levels of the system – within communities, within the state, between and among states?
Eventually, as these questions were posed, intricately related issues emerged. If one understood the nature of conflict, could one also resolve or prevent it? In a world in which there seemed to be an increasing belief that one could understand the complexities of human-beings and those forces that led to violence, could one in turn transpose such understandings to other types of structures and systems? In so doing, could conflict be prevented? To what extent could one generalise about the nature of conflict, conflict prevention and resolution, and to what extent could such generalisations serve a practical use?
As a major "conflict researcher" notes:
…conflict researchers continue to employ a wide variety of approaches but hold to a common belief that a general understanding (if not a general theory) of all social conflicts is possible. It can be attained by seeking common patterns and processes in conflicts in all social arenas, from the local community to the international system, and transferring findings between different areas (or levels) to increase understanding of this complex and universal phenomenon.
GENERAL THEORIES AND APPROACHES TO CONFLICT, CONFLICT PREVENTION AND RESOLUTION
Avruch, K. et al., Conflict Resolution: Cross Cultural Perspectives, Greenwood Press, New York, 1991
Azar, E., The Management of Protracted Social Conflict, Dartmouth Publishing Co., Aldershot, 1990
Blacock, H.M., Power and Conflict: Towards a General Theory, Sage Publications, London, 1989
Elster, J. Ulysses and the Sirens: Studies in Rationality and Irrationality, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988
Fromm, E., The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness, Penguin, Middlesex, 1982
Galtung, J., "A Structural Theory of Aggression", Journal of Peace Research, 1, 1964
Gurr, T.R., Handbook of Political Conflict: Theory and Research, Free Press, New York, 1981
Hardin, R., One for All: The Logic of Group Conflict, Princeton University Press, NJ, 1995
Isard, W., International Conflict and the Science of Peace, Blackwell, Cambridge, 1992
Jabri, V., Discourses on Violence: Conflict Analysis Reconsidered, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1996
Kaye, E. [ed], Peace Studies: The Hard Questions, Rex Collings, London, 1987
Pruitt, D.G., and Syna, H., Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate and Settlement, Random House, New York, 1986
Rapaport, A., The Origins of Violence: Approaches to the Study of Conflict, Paragon House, New York, 1989
Ross, M.H., The Management of Conflict: Interpretations and Interests in Comparative Perspective, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1993
Sandole, D., and Sandole-Staroste, I. [eds], Conflict Management and Problem-Solving: Interpersonal to International Applications, New York University Press, NY, 1987
Schelling, T., The Strategy of Conflict, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1960
Smoker, P. et al, A Reader in Peace Studies, Pergamon Press, Oxford, 1990
Vayrynen, R., New Directions in Conflict Theory: Conflict Resolution and Conflict Transformation, Sage Publications, London, 1991 A number of learned journals specialise in the field of peace and conflict studies. Among those that frequently carry general discussions on theories and approaches to conflict are The Bulletin of Peace Proposals, International Security, The Journal of Alternatives, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, the Journal of Peace Research, Mediation Quarterly, Negotiation Journal and Peace and Change.
[a] Basic human needs and deep-rooted conflict.
"Basic human needs" theories about the nature of conflict and conflict prevention and resolution have endured as a major paradigm for more than half a century. In essence, the origin of this theoretical construct owes much to Maslow’s 1954 work in which human motivation is based upon a "hierarchy of needs", moving from basic physical requirements up to psychological requirements such as recognition, attainment and fulfilment. Failure to satisfy such needs leads to frustrations, which in turn can result in aggression and, hence, forms of violence and conflict.
Burton, one of the core contributors to the "world society" perspective of conflict, viewed the relevance of basic human needs theory upon conflict in this way:
After observing major powers being defeated in wars with small nations, and central authorities failing to control religious and ethnic conflicts within their boundaries, it became clear to me that conflicts of this kind were not generated primarily – or even at all – by shortages of material goods, or even by claims of territory….The power of human needs was a greater power than military might. The conditions that explained conflict and, therefore, suggested means towards its resolution were frustrated human needs, not human lawlessness or character deformities. Needs theory moved the focus away from the individual as miscreant and aimed it at the absence of legitimisation of structures, institutions and policies as the primary source of conflict….Conflicts are not just interests but also human needs. The study of conflict pays attention to human characteristics that are ontological and universal.
Scholars have used this approach to look at conflicts such as those between the Israelis and the Palestinians. Most inter-state conflicts from this perspective are viewed as clashes over attempts to perpetuate certain values and the prospect of gratifying such needs based upon these values. It is important to note that this same body of scholars also sees conflict at the "micro-level" as driven for all intents and purposes by the same set of factors. Household violence or conflict in the workplace can be analysed from the same needs theory approach.
Critics of the basic needs approach to understanding deep-rooted conflict argue that the approach’s focus upon "the self" and the individual reflects an essentially Western perspective. Other societies and cultures are far more group-oriented, and suggest that rather than the individual per se, "the deepest most human of our needs is the need for social attachment and psychological purpose". Most critics, however, do not necessarily call for abandoning the needs approach, but rather for testing the premises in the context of other cultures. Even for some who support basic human needs as a gateway to conflict resolution and prevention, there is an inherent contradiction between such culturally specific norms such as human rights and human needs. The former, Bay has argued in an older treatise, is lower on the scale of needs than that of "self esteem" which depends upon community solidarity rather than individual liberty.
For theorists and practitioners alike, it has become increasingly important to understand that the sources of conflict are not reflected solely in the clash over stated interests and values. Interests and values may have deeper roots, and reflect profoundly held mistrusts, sense of wrong-doings and hatreds. In this context, there is the well-recognised distinction between conflict resolution and conflict management. The former is concerned with the deep-rooted, underlying causes of conflict, an understanding of which is essential for creating durable peace. The latter is what many peace and conflict researchers regard as the superficiality of traditional diplomatic methods, namely, dealing with the ostensible though not basic source of conflict.
BASIC HUMAN NEEDS AND DEEP-ROOTED CONFLICT
Davies, J., Human Nature in Politics: The Dynamics of Political Behaviour, Greenwood Press, London, 1978
Doyal, L. and I. Gough, A Theory of Human Needs, Macmillan, London, 1991
Fitzgerald, R., Human Needs and Politics, Pergamon, Oxford, 1977
Kriesberg, L. et al [eds], Intractable Conflicts and their Transformation, Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, 1989
McGarry, J. and B. O’Leary, Explaining Northern Ireland, Blackwell, Oxford, 1995
Midlarsky, M., The Internationalisation of Communal Strife, Routledge, London, 1992
Ramsbotham, O. and T. Woodhouse, Humanitarian Intervention in Contemporary Conflict: A Reconceptualisation, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1996
Sieghart, P., The Lawful Rights of Mankind, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1986
Sites, P., Control: The Basis of Social Order, Dunellen, New York, 1973
Smith. A., National Identity, Penguin, Middlesex, 1991
Sollenberg, M. [ed], States in Armed Conflict 1996, Report #46, Uppsala University, Uppsala, 1997
Thompson, J., Justice and World Order: A Philosophical Inquiry, Routledge, London, 1992
Vincent, R.J., Human Rights and International Relations, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986
[b] Power inequalities and asymmetries and conflict.
Depending upon one’s starting point, the needs approach either incorporates or in many instances at least relates to other broad theoretical analyses of conflict. Works on the relationship between unequal power and social conflict offer a good example. In its most modern – or most post-modernist – sense, disequalibrium in power relationships has been used to explain the way gender, poverty, race and other reflections of imposed or re-enforced social inequalities can lead to conflict. In other words, as Smith, Carroll, Glad, Fraser and others have proposed, the need for recognition, self-fulfilment and self-actualisation is fundamental in one way or another for all human beings. The frustration that arises from the failure to empower or from the process of disempowering can lead to various types of conflict.
Unequal power relationships have been seen by various writers as sources of frustration which in turn engender conflict at various levels – organisational, inter-state as well as inter-personal. Galtung, for example, uses this sort of analysis to explain general patterns of conflict, while Brock-Utne uses the concept of unequal power relationships to focus upon the consequences of specific types of power imbalances [ie, gender inequality].
In this context, gender issues are not only symbolic of the power inequality approach to conflict, but also symptomatic of the wide range of variables that has to be taken into account to explain the origins of conflict and to devise means to prevent or resolve it. The example of gender issues with regard to power imbalances and conflict also posits that very fundamental issue, ie, the extent to which one can assume so-called universals [eg, hierarchical status of women] in developing broad conflict theories. Finally, gender issues in this context also seem to support the idea that conflict at a variety of levels [eg, at the individual and community level and conflict at inter and intra-state levels] share similar characteristics.
Of course, gender inequality is but one of many sorts of power imbalances that have been identified within the human needs context or at least related to it as potential sources of conflict. Racial, religious and ethnic discrimination reflects a similar form of power imbalance. Perhaps of all such explanations based upon power relationships, the most consistently used analytical framework stems from the realm of economics and economically-related issues such as class and the resource allocation process.
The majority of economically-related explanations for conflict begins with the assumption that conflict itself is endemic and inherent within and across societies and states. It is the result of asymmetric relations of power, wealth and income, and invariably results in forms of imperialism, dependency and suppression. The consequences of asymmetry, whether it be from the perspective of Chalmers Johnson’s classic work or that produced more recently by Shannon, are an inevitable hostage to conflict.
A considerable body of scholarly opinion sees the interaction of state and essentially capitalist economics as the mechanism for control and the source of resistance to that control through conflict. Giddens speaks for many when he notes that "the sphere of ‘private freedoms’ in regard to both labour and capital, which excluded the forcible plunder of labour products or resources, became institutionally distinguished from ‘public’ authority bolstered by the means of violence."
Despite the perceived failure of various 20th century experiments with socialism and communism, many conflict researchers appear loath to abandon some of the most basic elements of economic structuralism as explanations for conflict. Brown, Linklater, Rosenberg and Wallerstein point in one way or another to capitalist-led structural suppression as both a failing of modern capitalism and source of conflict.
POWER INEQUALITIES, ASYMMETRIES AND CONFLICT
Afshar, H. [ed], Women, Development and Survival in the Third World, Longman, New York, 1991
Brewer, A. Marxist Theories of Imperialism, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1980
Bush, R. et al, The World Order Socialist Perspectives, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1987
Charlton, S., Women in Political Theory: From Ancient Misogyny to Contemporary Feminism, Lynne Rienner, Colorado, 1993
Coser, L., The Functions of Social Conflict, Collier-Macmillan, London, 1956
Cox, R., Production, Power and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History, Columbia University Press, New York, 1987
Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1959
Elson, D., Male Bias in the Development Process, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1993
Held, D. and A. Giddens [eds], Classes, Power and Conflict: Classical and Contemporary Debates, Macmillan, London, 1982
Mann, M., The Sources of Social Power, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986
Mommsen, W., Theories of Imperialism, Allen and Unwin, London, 1979
Oldfield, S., Women Against the Iron Fist, Blackwell, 1990
Rosenau, P., Post-Modernism and the Social Sciences: Insights, Inroads and Intrusions, Princeton University Press, NJ, 1992
Walerstein, I., The Politics of the World Economy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1984
[c] Ethnicity and ethnic conflicts.
As Sisk states, "Scholarship and journalistic reporting on ethnic conflict have ballooned since the end of the Cold War." Ethnicity and ethnic conflicts had until quite recently been treated as sub-national phenomena, part of the same conceptual framework as nationalism and nation-state building. Events in Eastern Europe, Central Asia and Africa, however, have spawned a very distinctive literature that looks at ethnicity itself as a source of conflict not necessarily confined to within state boundaries. In effect, as Banks, Burton and Enloe suggested over the past quarter of a century, peoples of distinct ethnic origins need their own recognition, identity and autonomy: a need that goes counter to some of the core assumptions of nationhood and nation-state.
There is a growing body of literature that sees the rise of ethnicity as a result of what has been described as the "security dilemma". In other words, in an anarchic world where states had traditionally been the ultimate providers of security, the certainties of state protection have decreased. The absence of such assurances now has led to greater reliance upon the ethnic group within polyethnic states or linked to ethnic groups across state boundaries for security and protection. Browne, Gurr, Hannum and Posen all recognise this sort of transformation that could result in conflictual tensions between so-called sovereign regimes and ethnic groupings.
Ethnicity as a source of conflict also relates to other aspects of conflict theory such as those associated with psychological and social psychological factors. Stereotyping – ie, attributing particular personality, character, physical or intelligence traits to a group (and, in an extreme form, "demonisation") – is used as means to justify the sorts of societal asymmetries and structural oppression (eg, economic) cited above and, as Janis had noted almost two decades ago, as a means to belittle a potential enemy in order to avoid conflict and gain consensus within a particular group.
Linked to ethnicity is an emerging interest in "civilizations" as a source of potential and prolonged conflict over time. The most recent manifestation of this concern and certainly the one that has dominated recent debates is that triggered by Harvard’s Samuel Huntington in his Clash of Civilizations. Beyond the nation-state and beyond the consequences of any ethnic conflict will be the real battle ground for the future, suggests Huntington, that among seven historical and enduring civilizations.
More often than not, deeply divided societies have resulted in authoritarianism, subjugation and mass displacement. Military rule, as Horowitz argues, is all too often a mask for ethnic dominance. Yet, as Wolpert suggests, there have been mechanisms in the past such as those used under colonial rule that have helped mitigate communal violence up to a point, without resorting to overt oppression. And various post-colonial African regimes, according to Rothchild, have tried different forms of "balancing acts" to deal with potential ethnic conflicts. Few of these initiatives, though, have addressed the basic challenges that ethnic discontent poses to pluralistic governance over time, and few in the long run seem to offer any alternative to the prospects of ethnically-generated violence.
In another section of this survey [see: Conceptual parameters of the art of governance, below], types of power-sharing arrangements are explored as elements of appropriate governance systems and structures. There is no more apparent need to study the comparative benefits of such alternative arrangements than the possibility that they might offer means to resolve the difficulties posed by ethnic groupings in deeply divided societies. Most of the solutions put forward, suggests Sisk, are based upon some form of liberal democracy, for he believes as does Lijphart that "not only have non-democratic regimes failed to be good nation-builders, they have not even established good records of maintaining order and peace in plural societies."
ETHNICITY AND ETHNIC CONFLICTS
Buchanan, A., Secession: The Morality of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec, Westview Press, Oxford, 1991
DeSilva, K.M. and R.J. May, Internationalisation of Ethnic Conflict, Pinter Publications, London, 1991
Daniel, D.C. and B.D. Hayes [eds], Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping, Macmillan, London, 1995
Diamond, L. and M. Platner [eds], Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict and Democracy, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1994
Esman, M.J., Ethnic Politics, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1994
Fein, H. [ed], Genocide Watch, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1992
Halperin, M. et al, Self-Determination in the New World Order, Carnegie Endowment, Washington, DC, 1992
Human Rights Watch, Playing the Communal Card: Communal Violence and Human Rights, Human Rights Watch, New York, 1995
Keating, M., State and Regional Nationalism: Territorial Politics and the European State, Harvester-Wheatsheaf, Brighton, 1988
Lemarchand, R., Rwanda and Burundi, Pall Mall Press, London, 1970
Licklider, R. [ed] Stopping the Killing: How Civil Wars End, New York University Press, New York, 1993
Rabushka, A. and K. Shepsle, Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory of Democratic Instability, C. Merrill, Ohio, 1972
Salem, N. [ed], Cyprus: A Regional Conflict and Its Resolution, St. Martins Press, New York, 1992
Samarasinghe, S.W. and R. Coughlan, Economic Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict, St. Martins Press, New York, 1991
Scott, J.C., Domination and the Arts of Resistance, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1992
Smith, M.G., The Plural Society in British West Indies, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1965
[d] Interpersonal and psychological dimensions of conflict.
The relationship between interpersonal and more general psychological approaches to conflict is that both in different ways reflect conflict researchers’ general assumption that conflict has common patterns and processes at different levels, eg, from the local community to the international system level.
Traditionally, interpersonal and psychological dimensions of conflict have been discussed in terms of cognitive psychology, or concerns with images, perceptions, stereotyping and group processes. The relationship between cognitive psychology and conflict has been particularly evident in the literature on decision-making and in analyses of conflict as a non-rational process.
The assumption that conflict might stem principally from more "subjective" psychological dynamics continues to be part of a broader debate between subjectivists and objectivists. The latter views conflict as "real" and independent of perception, though the former may also see conflict as real but not "true".
However, psychological and inter-personal studies are increasingly impacting upon conflict analyses in other ways. Elements that appear to be inherent parts of conflict such as the sense of victimization are adding potential understanding to the field, as is the growing attention given to the issue of entrapment. Among other things, entrapment helps to explain ways in which conflicts are maintained over long periods of time.
Perhaps surprisingly, given the seeming centrality of its importance, the psychological dynamics of conflict resolution have only recently become a core issue in the armory of conflict analysis. Under this overall rubric, various scholars have introduced such concepts as framing as a means to understand "what a conflict is really about", and "non-rationality" as an issue to address in promoting peace.
INTERPERSONAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS OF CONFLICT
Deutsch, M., "Subjective Features of Conflict Resolution: Psychological, Social and Cultural Features", in Vayrynen [ed], New Directions in Conflict Theory: Conflict Resolution and Transformation, Sage, London, 1991
Eyerman, R. and A. Jamison, Social Movements: A Cognitive Approach, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1991
Fisher, R.J., The Social Psychology of Intergroup and International Conflict Resolution, Soringer Verlag, New York, 1989
Hindle, R., and J. Groebel [eds], Cooperation and Prosocial Behaviour, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991
Kelman, H., International Behavior, Holt, Rineheart, Winston, New York, 1965
Montagu, A., Man and Aggression, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1973
Rieber, R., The Psychology of War and Peace: The Image of the Enemy, Plenum, London, 1991
Ross, M., The Culture of Conflict: Interpretations and Interests in Comparative Perspective, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1993
Singer, L., Settling Disputes: Conflict Resolution in Business, Families and the Legal System, Westview Press, Oxford, 1994
Vertzberger, Y., The World in their Minds: Information Processing and Perception in Foreign Policy Decisions, University of California Press, Stanford, 1990
Volkan, V., The Need to Have Enemies and Allies: From Clinical Practice to International Relationships, Aronson, NJ, 1988
[e] Structural conflict.
The term structural crosses over into various approaches to conflict analysis. Marxism, for example, has been interpreted as fundamentally a "structuralist" approach to the analysis of class, economic determinism and conflict. On an equally as metaphysical scale, structure and agency reflect part of a continuing academic debate about the nature of "large-scale historical change", and to some extent the role of the state as an agent of such change.
Structure, in Bloom’s conception, links personal identity, national identity and international relations, in part to explain the origins of conflict. The so-called fundamental structuralists acknowledge the autonomy and independence of structural factors over which human actors have relatively little if any control. The neo-realists, or at least Keohane, on the other hand use structuralism to reassert that structures can be used. In this case, he sees the structure of the state as a means in part for resolving the contending forces within the state that lead to conflict.
Structure has also been used to describe the impact of institutional dynamics upon the creation and perpetuation of conflict. Analysts such as Steinbrunner have argued that conflict can be generated by the rigidity of institutional perspectives and procedures. Institutions "interpret" communications and "feed back" from their external environment in terms of what will enhance their own survival, normally at the expense of others. Institutional survival means that those who in turn are to survive in institutions by necessity must adopt such perspectives. While institutional perspectives, procedures and norms may not necessarily reflect human values, per se, they inevitably mould overall behaviour.
The relative rigidity of institutional behaviour has been viewed as the source of conflict at local council levels as well as at inter-state levels. Allison’s seminal work on the Cuban Missile crisis is but one early example of how standard operating procedures, repertoires and information closure as well as institutional survival were seen as potentially heralding a catastrophe of global proportions.
VARIOUS INTERPRETATIONS OF STRUCTURALISM IN THE CONTEXT OF CONFLICT
Ahmed, I, "State and Foreign Policy: A Theoretical Abstraction", BIISS Journal, 13 , 1992
Amin, S., Imperialism and Unequal Development, Harvester, Hassocks, 1977
Amin, S., Delinking, Zed, London, 1990
Augelli, E. and C. Murphy, America’s Quest for Supremacy and the Third World: A Gramscian Analysis, Pinter, London, 1988
Doran, C., Systems in Crisis, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992
Ergas, Z., The African State in Transition, Macmillan, London, 1987
Fagowora, O.O., Pressure Groups and Foreign Policy: A Comparative Study of British Attitudes and Policy Moves in the Congo and in Nigeria, Heinemann Educational, Ibadan, 1990
Gill, S., and D. Law, The Global Political Economy: Perspectives, Problems and Policies, Harvester, London, 1991
Kay, C., Latin American Theories of Development and Underdevelopment, Routledge, London, 1989
Mandaza, I. [ed], Zimbabwe: The Political Economy of Transition 1980-1986, CODESIRA, Harare, 1987
Mazrui, A., Cultural Forces in World Politics, James Currey, London, 1990
Nabudere, D.W., The Crash of International Finance Capital, SAPES Books, Harare, 1989
Raftopoulos, B., Beyond the House of Hunger: The Struggle for Democratic Development in Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe Institute of Development Studies Working Paper #17, Harare, 1991
Shivji, I.G., Fight My Beloved Continent: New Democracy in Africa, SAPES Books, Harare, 1992
[f] Inter-state conflict: regimes, regions and wars.
For more than 20 years, scholarship has sought to put the state and traditional inter-state relations into a more sophisticated framework. As noted earlier, a range of social science disciplines has been used to provide that more sophisticated framework, and one of the beneficiaries of these sorts of inter-disciplinary analyses has been the field of conflict research and analysis.
That said, the state as a central element of conflict has on more than one occasion slipped from the analytical screen. Traditional inter-state conflict had been consigned to the realm of the strategist, the historian and the regional specialist. Yet, perhaps ironically, it is the relative decline in the capacity of states to project their force capabilities that has led to new interest in states as sources of conflict and conflict resolution.
One perspective has been that of the state in the context of so-called regime issues, or those issues that require a consensus over matters that are part of "the global commons". Law of the sea, outer space and the environment are but three types of regime issues in which the state is both the source of potential conflict and conflict resolution. Indonesia’s spate of environmentally damaging fires during late 1997 and their serious impact upon neighbouring states reflect the sorts of potential state-centric conflict that may become increasing foci of attention. Similarly the regime approach to resolving such conflict will also become an area of increasing concern and interest to scholars.
The state in the context of conflict, conflict prevention and resolution also has been the subject of growing interest in regional contexts. Events in Kosovo and the role being played by NATO Western proposals to capacitate an African peace-making/peace-building force and the attention given to the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), all reflect growing attention to the ways in which regional structures can limit individual states’ abilities to promote conflict and the instruments available to states to resolve or prevent conflict.
EMERGING DIMENSIONS OF INTER-STATE CONFLICT
Drucker, P., Post-Capitalist Society, Harper-Collins, New York, 1993
Hettne, B. and Inotai [eds], The New Regionalism: Implications for Global Development and International Security, World Institute for Development Economics Research, Helsinki, 1994
Hirst, P. and G. Thompson, Globalisation in Question, Blackwell, Oxford, 1996
Kegley, C.W. [ed], The Long Post-War Peace: Contending Explanations and Projections, Harper-Collins, New York, 1991
McGrew, A.G., et al [eds], Global Politics: Globalisation and the Nation-State, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1992
Mueller, J., Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War, Basic Books, New York, 1989
Risse-Kappen [ed], Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995
Rosenau, J.N., International Aspects of Civil Strife, Princeton University Press, Pinceton, 1964
Tarrow, S., Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994
Walker R.B.J., One World, Many Worlds: Struggles for A Just World Peace, Lynne Rienner, 1988
Between theory and practice
The past two decades have witnessed an explosion of interest in theories of conflict, conflict resolution and conflict prevention. Despite the energy expended and the tantalising research undertaken, some of the most basic issues in the field remain fundamentally unresolved. Conflict’s "grand theory" still remains illusive. That said, many of the insights that have emerged out of general conflict studies have linked into the immediate concerns of the practitioner. The following suggests some of the ways that the theoretical perspectives have actually made their way into practice:
[a] Monitoring conflict escalation.
"There can be no conflict prevention [or to be more precise prevention of conflict escalation]," suggest Professor A.P. Schmid, "without anticipation of where and when and what is likely to happen." Schmid and many in the world of conflict prevention have concentrated upon methods, criteria and indicators for anticipating conflict.
There have been various efforts at establishing early warning indicator systems, and UNDP’s Human Development Reports, though not directly intended to do so, have considerable potential for relating various social indices to the build up of social grievance and discontent. The European Union’s Conflict Prevention Network since its creation in 1997 also has developed a capacity to analyse and monitor potential conflict threats. Lund and West have produced what they call a "tool box" to monitor and prevent conflict, using a combination of official diplomacy and non-official conflict prevention methods.
[b] Pre-negotiation settings.
No matter how skilled a negotiator might be, a conflict situation is not likely to move towards resolution unless, in the words of Richard Haas, the situation is "ripe". Determining ripeness has brought the theoretician and the practitioner closer together, and if one reviews recent literature, it would seem that the Norwegian inspired Israel-Palestinian negotiations seem to have been a convenient "case study" for both.
As opposed to many of conventional diplomatic assumptions about diplomacy and diplomatic procedures, both the practitioner and the conflict analyst, or theoretician, look for less formal ways to explore how to break deadlocks, to explore possible negotiation frameworks rather than negotiate. The key in such circumstances is to facilitate or at least anticipate changes in the perceptions of contending parties, particularly when one adversary sees another as capable of cooperative behaviour. Ultimately, the objective of pre-negotiation settings should not be seen as preliminary negotiations over a specific issue, but rather a process in which problems are defined, a commitment to negotiate is made and arrangements for eventual negotiations are broached.
Linked to the issue of the "ripe moment" is a continued interest in the question of de-escalatory moves. This is an issue that Zartman has considered extensively as well as Haas, the latter in the context of Cyprus, South Africa and Northern Ireland. Also the "rules of the game" that will be central to any negotiating process have occupied the attention of various scholars. Two examples are de Nevers and Horowitz.
There is a growing interest in the role of informal and unofficial intervention in pre-negotiations as well as in the negotiation process itself. This sort of informal or unofficial involvement in gaining the consent of contending parties to begin negotiations is all part of what has become known as "Track Two" diplomacy. McDonald in a US State Department publication outlines the assumptions that underlie Track Two measures, and Pettigrew provides some interesting insights on how certain organisations, eg, the Quaker Movement, can help move pre-negotiation processes along. Saunders, Cohen and Curle all add different perspectives on the advantages as well as the limits of Track Two methods.
[c] Conflict and negotiations.
The predominant literature in the field of conflict and negotiations concerns third party mediators, facilitators or, less frequently, third party arbitrators. Anstey, Deng and Ury all give valuable points about what such negotiators need to do and the barriers that they can anticipate. This by no means is to ignore the stream of "getting from ‘no’ to ‘yes’" type studies and more popular literature that seek to demonstrate that one-on-one, or bilateral negotiations, can result in "win-win" outcomes. Yet, the ways that third parties can move the negotiation process preoccupies the academic literature, and also the practitioner and negotiator at the international level, faced with inter and intra-state conflict from the Balkans to Cyprus, from the Middle East to Indonesia.
Three broad issues appear to dominate recent studies on third-party intervention, ie, who intervenes, how and when. Various typologies have been developed to correlate appropriate types and levels of intervention to types of conflict situations. Within such typologies, it is interesting to note the focus of many upon "peacekeepers" and indeed "peace-makers" as intermediaries in conflict negotiations. Cost-benefit analyses have been considered by scholars such as Jabri in order to determine the types of interest calculations that bring third party interveners to assist in negotiations.
Under the rubric of the hows of intervention, there are four essential considerations that emerge out of the analysis of third party intervention. The first concerns the different impacts upon negotiations of a bargaining versus problem-solving approach. Cultural determinants upon third party intervention are…represents another area of considerable interest, as are analyses of intentional or unintentional bias in third party interveners. Finally, there is a great deal of analysis, found mainly in what is called the decision-making literature, about the sorts of individuals who are effective as third party negotiators, analysis which relates in some respects to the typologies of who intervenes.
When to intervene incorporates a variety of concerns, including pre-negotiation settings, post-negotiation implementation as well as the negotiating process, itself. As Keashley and Fisher point out, the whens of intervention have to be viewed against two critical factors, ie, stage and intervention sequence. The former encompasses such factors as discussion, polarisation, segregation and destruction, while intervention sequences range from arbitration, power mediation to consultation and violence control.
[d] Post-negotiation implementation.
There is a growing interest in the links between negotiations and compliance, or implementation. In a recent "network newsletter" of PIN [Processes of International Negotiation], it was noted that at the inter-state level the traditional diplomatic means of ensuring that states comply with their international obligations are no longer adequate. The effects of such non or inadequate compliance may nevertheless generate misunderstandings and conflict, and ways to monitor and deal with "post-negotiation" implementation become themselves means to prevent or resolve conflict.
PIN has proposed that a practical starting point to deal with some of the complex dimensions of an increasing number of international agreements, etc., is to focus upon two essential issues. e first relates to possible ways to use international organisations to promote state compliance with its obligations. The second entails "post-negotiation" processes of re-negotiation. Whether these starting points are adequate in and of themselves is a moot point. However, the far more important point is that this and related research have clearly uncovered an area of considerable need for the practitioner as well as what should be an area of conceptual interest for those relying upon regime solutions and international legal agreements to avoid conflict.
Post-negotiation implementation also indirectly underscores the fact that conflict resolution, peace-building and conflict prevention frequently requires a process of review and re-enforcement. Peace in that sense is indeed a process.
[e] Peace processes and conflict transformation.
The issues that fall under the heading of peace processes and conflict transformation could also be labelled peace-building. To some extent, conflict transformation – like the issue that it seeks to replace, namely, deep-rooted conflict – assumes a commitment to a process of building and sustaining peace over an extensive period of time. To that extent, there is a sense that peace-building, per se, is regarded from a shorter-term perspective and perhaps a bit more mechanistic.
Peace processes and conflict transformation normally are viewed in the context of confidence-building measures, reconstruction of civil society and re-building of communities. How this actually is to be done is an issue that has triggered considerable debate. After reviewing means of dealing with conflict in multi-ethnic societies [eg, partition, succession, power-sharing], Lijphart, for example, opts totally for power-sharing as the only choice for creating enduring peace. Lembarch argues, however, that the reason power sharing works is because of certain cultural differences, including acculturated attitudes towards compromise, and McRae concludes that power-sharing does not work in situations of intractable conflict.
The conclusion that one should draw from such debates is not their own intractability, but rather the fact that an array of practical variables are being drawn into the debate which could result in very useful typologies of appropriate peace processes and preferred outcomes.
[f] Civil-military interface.
The interaction between civil and military authorities has a well-established niche in the predominantly American-led decision-making literature. In that context, it has many linkages with conflict, including conflict as an outcome of organisational behaviour, the dynamics of the "military-industrial" complex and military attitudes and perceptions. Yet, the consequence of such issues ultimately spills over into explanations of inter-state behaviour, particularly at the level of international strategy and security.
However, as opposed to any other group within conventional state systems and structures, the military has a virtual monopoly of coercive resources. For that reason, the military’s role as a "political contender", a potential source of violent conflict and an important factor in conflict resolution and prevention is a subject of growing importance in the world of conflict studies. In the words of Almond and Powell,
If the legitimacy of the government breaks down and all groups feel free to use coercion and violence to shape policies, then the united military can usually be decisive.
Thompson’s very suggestive 1973 work, The Grievances of Military Coup-Makers, notes that in the 1960s around two-fifths of the nations of the world had been confronted with military coup attempts, and these were partially successful in changing leaders or policies in about one-third of the nations. Less than half of these coup attempts, however, were concerned with general political issues and public policy. Most coups seemed motivated by grievances and fears that the professional or career interests of the military would be slighted or overlooked by civil authorities.
When peace agreements fail or violence continues to threaten, either through democratic or authoritarian systems, the military may emerge by default as the only power to maintain stability. Ghana, Chile, Indonesia, Pakistan, Guinea, Zaire, Argentina and numerable other countries found soldiers underpinning the personal rule of a civilian president or military council. Military rulers may use control of the state to create military and or bureaucratic versions of authoritarian corporatism, warns Almond. They may undertake "defensive" modernisation in alliance with business groups or even undertake more radical restructuring, as so often happened in Latin America.
At the same time, the military of other states is used by the international community to assist individual states in the resolution of conflict through peacekeeping and peacemaking initiatives. Here, too, an important literature is emerging about the ways that military intervention can be used to prevent or resolve conflict. Winnefeld, Haas, Kagan and, of course, Boutros-Ghali have all made important contributions in this area.
BETWEEN THEORY AND PRACTICE
Monitoring Conflict Escalation
Charny, J.W. [ed] Strategies Against Violence: Design for Non-Violent Change, Westview Press, Boulder, 1978
Edmead, F., Analysis and Prediction in International Mediation, UNITAR, New York, 1971
Groom, A.J.R., "A Dip into the Conflict Researcher’s Toolbag", in J. Darby and A. Gallagher [eds], Comparative Approaches in Community Relations, Ulster University Centre for the Study of Conflict Papers #4, Coleraine
Berman, M.R. and J.E. Johnson [eds], Unofficial Diplomats, Columbia University Press, New York, 1977
Saunders, H., "We Need a Larger Theory of Negotiation: The Importance of Pre-Negotiation Phases", Negotiation Journal 1, 1985
Montville, J.V., "Track Two Diplomacy: The Development of Non-Governmental, Peace Promoting Relationships", Foreign Service Institute, US Department of State, 1987
Zartman, I.W., Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa [2nd edition], Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1989
Conflict and Negotiations
DeBono, E., Conflicts: A Better Way to Resolve Them, Harrap, London, 1985
Drabo, G. and M. Alassane, "Nord Mali: Le processus du paix et de reconciliation. Etude d’une Demarche Exemplaire", OXFAM et AMAP, Bamako
Hoffmann, M., "Third Party Mediation and Conflict Resolution in the Post-Cold War World", in J. Baylis and J. Rengger [eds], Dilemmas of World Politics, Oxford University Press, New York, 1992
Holbrooke, R., To End a War, Random House, New York, 1998
Princen, T., Intermediaries in International Conflict, Princeton University Press, NJ, 1992
Stedman, S., "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes", International Security, 22 , 1997
United Nations, Handbook on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, UN, New York, 1992
Farer, T., Beyond Sovereignty: Collectively Defending Democracy in the Americas, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1996
Jeldres, J.A., "Cambodia’s Fading Hopes", Journal of Democracy, 7 , 1996
Halperin, M. and K. Lomasney, "Toward a Global Guarantee Clause", Journal of Democracy, 4 , 1993
Halperin, M. and K. Lomasney, "Guaranteeing Democracy: A Review of the Record", Journal of Democracy, 9 , 1998
Peace processes and conflict transformation
Munk, R., Latin America: The Transition to Democracy, Zed Books, London, 1989
Peck, C., Sustainable Peace: The Role of the United Nations and Regional Organisations in Preventing Conflict, Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict. Washington, DC, 1998
Linz, J.J. and A, Stepan [ed], The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1978
O’Donnell, G et al, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986
Luckham, R., "Faustian Bargains: Democratic Control Over Military and Security Establishments", in R. Luckham and G. White, Democratization in the South: The Jagged Wave, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1996
Nordlinger, E., Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments, Prentice Hall, NJ, 1976
Perlmutter, A, Modern Authoritarianism: A Comparative Institutional Analysis, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1981
Ware, A., Citizens, Parties and the State, Princeton University Press, NJ, 1988
Looking towards an Uncertain Future
The "post-Westphalian transition", the end of the modern state construct, is much discussed, but there seems to be no dominating conclusion about its end-point. That end-point will inevitably depend upon assumptions about the continued capacity of the nation-state to reconcile contending interests within and across boundaries. And part of that success or failure will be reflected in the nation-state’s capacity to deal with new and traditional sources of conflict.
Economic pressures and a concomitant reduction in governments' involvement in conventional state functions have led some to prophesy a more restricted view of state-dominated governance. Traditional welfare functions of the nation-state that had been generally a universal given during much of the 20th century are assumed to declining. Economic and financial direction and control will diminish even further, and even more than a considerable portion of standard domestic security functions are forecast to be outside the day-to-day functions of the state.
[a] Control and complexity.
States during this century have sought in varying ways to balance the dynamics of economic growth with the economic security of its citizenry. This balancing effort has over the years increasingly escaped the ability of states to manage individually. Since the end of World War One and certainly following the Second World War, international organisations and international agreements, led by a few dominant powers, have established a kind of global economic construct, which to a very significant extent influenced the course of states' individual economic decisions. In the 1970s, with growing attention upon multinational corporations, the prospect of economic management "shared" with non-state actors began to emerge as the new reality.
Now as one looks towards the new millennium, a considerable body of opinion assumes that the ability of states to control their own economic systems will diminish even further, and that the numbers of actors and the technologies that will drive them in part explain that trend. The state will find itself dealing with an increasing number of contending interests and, perhaps more importantly, with a feature that will mark much of the first quarter of the 21st century, unmanageable complexity.
States, unable to reconcile contending societal interests in an increasingly complex environment, are presumed to rely more and more upon mechanisms of control. A principal but by no means sole target of such controls will be the disadvantaged. Instruments of control, created to protect life and property and preserve social order, will inevitably be directed against those who perceive themselves as having the least to lose. Perceived repression will draw the disadvantaged into the realm of the disaffected – those with little attachment to society – and the alienated – those who are hostile to it.
Yet, the disaffected and the alienated will not be without their own potential coalitions and their own potential alternative economies. Crime, be it at international or national levels, will at least give a small proportion of the disaffected and alienated temporary and tenuous access to an existence that goes beyond marginal survival. Urban areas in both the developed and developing worlds will be the centres for such coalitions.
The disaffected and the alienated also will find themselves in groups based more along ethnic and religious lines than on nationalism. Such alignments will in part reflect Huntington's "seven or eight major civilizations". These alignments may have self-determined sub-state boundaries, including portions of urban areas, or boundaries that extend across conventional state limits. Generally, though, most such alignments will reflect two common characteristics:  the propensity for minority, or, communal groups in many countries to seek alternatives to the nation-state in which they exist and  the tendency for governments to resist such propensities by resort to greater controls, intensified attention to the security of the majority and increased willingness to use unusual levels of violence.
Ethnic and religious alienation does not necessarily suggest a new type of political construct, though they might eventual lead to alternative systems based mainly upon cultural links and functional activities. The dominant trend in ethnic and religious radicalisation merely offers the prospect of new states arising out of old ones. In other words, the present nation-state system will most likely find over the coming years that there will be growing pressures from within for ethnic, religious and other culturally-based devolution, autonomy or total independence. And, externally, a greater number of older states may be faced with external threats, ethnically or religiously based, and fuelled further by new ethnic and religiously based states.
In states’ efforts to control, human rights will necessarily be sacrificed to what the majority will argue as the "common good". And, while the majority may well spend as much privately on ensuring its security as the state, a sizeable portion of state resources will nevertheless be expended upon protection.
One of the principal tasks of governments over the next 15 years will be "regime management", or, trans-state arrangements for the use of material, land and water-based resources. Up through the latter half of the 20th century, efforts at inter-state consensus-building on a range of regime management issues have proliferated. Many of the issues covered during regime negotiations have taken on a "developed versus developing world" perspective.
The capacity to dominate regime management will be in the hands of a relatively few governments and a great many non-state entities, the last principally but not solely from the corporate sector. Kissinger suggests that the international system will contain at least six major powers – the United States, Europe, China, Japan and Russia, and probably India – as well as a multiplicity of medium-size and smaller countries."
The consequences of a looser form of sovereignty offer some very basic advantages and disadvantages. However, the net effect will be that for the vast majority of states the ability to ensure adherence to agreements affecting regime management will be less certain. Authority within the conventional confines of nation-states will become more diffuse and more unpredictable. Over the next decade and a half, nation-states will work more and more through various fluid alignments and arrangements to compensate for their individual loss of control.
It is in the context of more flexible arrangements and alignments that one will see a more "fluid regionalism" emerge. In other words, the vision of a world order subdivided into massive economic and nascent political blocs is less and less likely. Far more probable is a world in which regional groupings will ebb and flow depending upon economic prospects and fluctuations as well as upon regime management requirements.
[c]Security issues and the state.
Access to arms of all sorts has become increasingly easy. Over the past two decades, interested groups or individuals have become able to purchase Stinger surface-to-air missiles and for less than ten thousand dollars can actually buy some key components for a nuclear weapon. Government supported firms sell to dissident groups, and indeed governments provide the funds to arms brokers to supply whomever is in need.
None of these trends is new in and of itself. The significance of these trends, however, lies in the fact that they will increase at a time when greater alienation and extremism will intersect with increasing fragmentation of authority and a growing inability to enforce controls effectively. In that very basic sense, portability and availability mark a threatening trend for the future.
There is an emerging consensus in the academic and research institute world that private armies, under the more acceptable label of private security firms, are an inevitable result of greater and more complex threats to non-state actors [eg, corporations, aid agencies] and the concomitant downsizing of state capabilities. The question for the state and for those who view its post-Westphalian transition is the extent to which this trend foreshadows a viable alternative to state security functions. Furthermore, and perhaps more disconcerting, is the question of if and when such alternatives to state security systems also begin to define the legal boundaries in which they operate.
III – The Art of Governance: Concepts, Models and Practice
"The current rapid, accelerating, and sometimes unpredictable, political, economic and social change creates enormous challenges for political and governmental institutions," states a UNDP study on Reconceptualising Governance. "In developed and developing countries, the state is increasingly being compelled to redefine the role of government in all spheres of social and economic activity…."
This reflection to a very significant extent circumscribes the central governance issues that link present governance assumptions and structures to the future. It is more than evident that technology-driven economic globalisation, communications, bio-technology and, to a lesser extent, communications will affect some of the fundamental relationships that result in social structures, resource allocation systems and what still are called nation-states.
In one dimension, governance is concerned with anticipating the consequences of such trends upon future structures, be they concerned with responsibilities within the state or within the global commons. In another dimension, it involves determining ways to develop, implement and sustain appropriate internal [eg, states, civil society] or external [eg, regime management, regional concerns] governance structures. This latter dimension has inevitably brought the scholar and the practitioner into very basic issues of cultural and social relativism.
Both dimensions – that concerned with trend analysis and that with the creation of appropriate governance systems and methods – are linked by common efforts to assess where governance has been and what might be useful to imitate, maintain and eliminate in the future.
These two dimensions at the same time go to some of the most central issues of UNDP’s own mandate and responsibilities. In seeking to enhance the capacity of many governments around the world to perform their governance-functions UNDP must address time and again the relationship between structures of governance and the governed. UNDP’s advice and support inevitably reflects a mix of those approaches that are sensitive to local conditions while at the same time based upon more abiding principles and assumptions.
Too rarely, however, are these principles and assumptions revisited or challenged. Democracy, community participation and similar phrases are – to use Albert Wight’s term – "apple pie topics" for many institutions concerned with capacity-building, governance and development. Such topics may indeed be virtuous, but at the same time ill-defined or lacking in any practical bases for support or implementation.
The governance portion of this mapping exercise, therefore, will begin by considering some of the core assumptions about the nature of governance. Under the first heading, Conceptual parameters of the art of governance, it will review the main theories and literature concerned with the [i] cosmopolitan-communitarian debate, [ii] consociational power-sharing versus integrative power-sharing and [iii] the structural presumptions of governance.
Consciously or unconsciously, the assumptions that underpin these conceptual paradigms have led to various models of state and local governance structures. These will be explored under the second heading, Models, Systems and Structures, by no means in an all-inclusive way, but in a way that relates paradigmatic assumptions to the models that organisations concerned with capacity-building, governance and development proffer to governments and communities in general.
One of the main models that has been promoted with seeming universal conviction is that of liberal democracy and democratic-based governance structures. However, as will be considered under the third heading, Attributes of democracy-based governance, there is a growing number of scholars who appear uncomfortable about the seemingly facile way that "democracy" is promoted as a hand-maiden to economic growth, development, ethnic harmony and, certainly in the context of this exercise, conflict avoidance and resolution. There may be alternatives to democratic models, but that depends upon the way that democracy, per se, is defined and the conditions that make it an acceptable form of governance.
The growing attention that has been paid to governance issues – including the assumptions and models that underlie them – has also generated a very rich literature on country-specific analyses of state, local, community, ethnic and religious as well as corporate governance structures. The range of this literature, discussed under a fourth heading, Country-specific analyses, is wide and voluminous, and full justice to its scope cannot be done in the short amount of space devoted to it here. Yet, it would be remiss to attempt to cover this area without some reference to at least three rapidly growing areas of intellectual and practical concern: regional governance, global governance and regime management.
Many of the assumptions and models of governance upon which this literature review is based are inherently "state-centric". That is to say that, while the review reflects more than just Western political philosophy and analyses, there is a continuing assumption that the nation-state construct – in some form of Post-Westphalian guise – will continue to be the building block upon which governance in the future will be built. This assumption is considered in the last portion of this review of governance, ie, Governance in a medium-term perspective. Under this heading, this review will reflect on an emerging literature, which suggests that – based upon trends such as technology-driven economic globalisation, environmental developments and security dynamics – different types of governance structures, viz, non-state-centric, might have to be considered for the future.
Conceptual Parameters of the Art of Governance
Of fundamental concern in virtually all the literature and analyses of governance is the relationship between the governing body and the body politic. It is perhaps a rather obvious point, until one considers some of the fundamental complexities as well as practical implications that underlie the point. To what extent can and should a governing institution, eg, a state, be seen as something beyond a collectivity of peoples? And, depending upon one’s response, what authority does that entity have? Given and revoked by whom? Do the answers in turn imply that there are universal values and principles that define that entity’s authority vis-à-vis the governed, or are there equally as principled though culturally relative limits based upon the particular characteristics of peoples, social traditions and resource allocative systems?
In one way or another, these issues are inherent in at least three of the overarching conceptual bases of governance: [a] cosmopolitan-communitarian debate, [b] consociational power-sharing versus integrative power-sharing and [c] the structural presumptions of governance.
[a] The cosmopolitan-communitarian debate.
Governance concerns a fundamental issue of both individual rights and the right to govern. Both are part of the so-called cosmopolitan-communitarian debate, and both have increasingly practical implications for societal and resource allocation structures now and in the future. This is particularly so in light of emerging debates about the durability of the state system, the consequences of ethnicity and religious extremism, the ineffectiveness of "regime management" dealing with issues such as the environment, poverty gaps and economic alienation and disaffection, anti-culture criminalisation, "stateless zones" and the privatisation of conventional security functions, eg, private armies.
Communitarianism assumes that governing entities (normally the state) have a right – indeed a moral authority – over the individual. The individual is a member of a particular community, and that community creates and possesses a moral value which is distinct from that attributed to the individual within the community. It is within the community-as-sovereign-state that rights, duties, obligations and even identity of the individual emerge and are realised. However, at the same time the main body of communitarians also argues that not all states are necessarily sovereign since there must be a coincidence between the ethnical claims of the state as the basis for the realisation of the individual. Hence, states that fail to establish this coincidence are at best quasi sovereign.
Cosmopolitanism, to the contrary, argues that the issue of governance is not about the inherent moral qualities of particular political arrangements, but instead whether governance arrangements serve to promote the realisation of universal values such as justice and human dignity. They argue that these values entail a prior set of universal rights that override state autonomy. Cosmopolitanism, therefore, is concerned with governance that pursues those structures and institutions of politics that create greater scope for human agency.
Castells points out in his discussion on "the crisis of democracy" that the state and other conventional institutions of governance are increasingly unable to sustain the assumptions inherent in cosmopolitanism. He suggests that "the construction of political meaning on the basis of specific identities fundamentally challenges the very concept of citizenship.
The state could only shift the source of its legitimacy from representing peoples’ will and providing for their well-being, to asserting collective identity, by identifying itself with communalism to the exclusion of other values and of minorities identities. That is indeed the source of fundamentalist nationalist, ethnic, territorial or religious states, which seem to emerge from current political crises of legitimacy. I contend that they cannot, and will not, sustain democracy [that is, liberal democracy] because the very principles of representation between the two systems [national citizenship, singular identity] are contradictory."
While wrapped in abstractions, the cosmopolitan-communitarianism debate offers some very practical challenges for those concerned with governance. It is interesting to see these sorts of assumptions at play within the context of the United Nations. The Secretary-General of the United Nations only recently spoke of the need to make human rights a cross-cutting feature of all UN activities, and indeed the organisation, itself, has in the middle of 1998 begun a review of how best to reflect "universal principles" [viz, Charter of the United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International Humanitarian Law] in its activities in so-called "countries in crisis." This perspective emphasises democratic processes, individual rights and, in a related vein, capitalism and free-market forces.
Whether these elements in the final analysis reflect the bases for governance for all human beings sustains in no small part the continuing communitarianism-cosmopolitan debate. Cultural relativism is not to be ignored, insist the communitarians, particularly when so many assumptions and models about rights and governance reflect essentially a Western cultural ethos. Communitarians point to the considerable political, cultural ideological and religious differences between Western models and those, for example, of Asia and Africa as evidence that there are alternatives to the emphasis upon individualism and free markets. Those concerned with issues of governance cannot but help to become engaged in the debate.
[b] The consociational versus integrative power-sharing debate.
So much of governance concerns the way that power is exerted and shared and the ways that resources are allocated within society. Two major schools of thought have been identified by Arend Lijphart as reflecting that reflect the parameters of the debate. One school, referred to as the consociational power-sharing approach, assumes that separate groups of peoples [for example, ethnic groupings] act as blocks which in turn are components of an overall society. The other school assumes that the most effective form of government is an integrative or more pluralist model in which various types of separate groupings move out of their respective blocks in order to achieve more overarching interests.
The debate has particular relevance today. The age of the nation-state, in which, for reasons subjective, objective and perceptual, one assumed that the concept of state would cohere with that of nation, is in quite fundamental transition. Those who still see the state as an essential building block for governance may have to find other ways for dealing with emerging realities such as ethnic, religious or cultural assertiveness than the vision of American cross-cutting democracy described by Lipset in Political Man. Such an alternative is offered by the consociationalists.
Consociationalism according to Sisk, relies above all on the political cooperation of elite leaders. That is to say that even if there are deep communal differences within a state, elite cooperation can reconcile contending interests and views. Nevertheless, the emphasis placed on the importance of elites is not to ignore the principal basis for consociationalism, namely, that governance is dependent upon coalitions, coalition-building and the inter-action of coalitions. Individual coalitions develop to promote and defend a particular set of interests. These groups in turn form the basis of political inter-action, in this context, at the state level.
The basic principle underlying such communal autonomy, suggests Sisk, referring to Lijphart, is "rule by the minority over itself in the area of the minority’s exclusive concern." Various societies and states are organised in this way. Some view Malaysia, Lebanon, Northern Ireland, Nigeria, the former Yugoslavia and the former Czechoslovakia as examples of power-sharing and power protection along consociational lines.
Consociational approaches to power-sharing and the allocative process have their critics. Horowitz feels that this form of power-sharing has a negative effect on developing a more broadly based society, that in the end it is fuelled by the constraints of protecting interests rather than expanding them. There, too is the criticism that consociationalism is in the final analysis about power manipulation by elites – for good or evil, for stability or conflict – and that it merely re-enforces the isolation of one societal block from another.
The other spectrum of the power-sharing debate is that of the integrationist. The characteristics that underpin this approach are that stable systems are dependent upon means that do not rely upon serving the interest of a particular grouping over time. "Constituency-based moderation" is Horowitz’s term for a system that allows for the development of fluid alignments and alliances that promote different interests at different times, resulting in a web of overlapping and on occasion mutually-supporting interest groups. Power-sharing, in other words, is not tied to relatively rigid blocks, but rather is based upon an amalgam of different interests at different times over different issues.
The net result of this more integrative approach in terms of governance is that in theory it expands the possibilities for developing coalitions that will result in more issues and resources to be shared throughout a society of ever more mutually interested groupings. The downside is that, depending upon the methods of coalition building, one may have a system that utilises interests of overlapping majorities to suppress the rights and interests of minorities.
[c] The structural consequences of governance institutions and methods.
Access to those institutions and means that determine the structure of society and its allocative process is one of the abiding concerns of governance. This preponderant concern has been reflected in a core literature that has focused upon ways that structures of governance can be exclusionary and also upon ways that such exclusionary barriers can be eliminated.
Offe suggests that the state has become an arena where officials conduct their real business more or less behind closed doors, and experts administer policies with a technical know-how that bears little relation to normative objectives. This is a theme developed by Habermas who sees states and institutions developing their own technical rationality, which has become "uncoupled" from the every day life of cultural and social interaction. According to Habermas in the Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, many new social movements – including the growing attention to "civil society" [See: Section III 2/a/i, below] – can be interpreted as an attempt to open greater opportunities for collective choice and to limit the influence of systemic power.
This is not to suggest that the literature on governance now only reflects the assumption that there is an irreversible divide between the structure of state and the structure of civil society. Some do see that the state structure does not inhibit the state’s intention to become engaged in an ever-expanding social realm. Rather, as Canovan interprets Arendt, the state more often than not becomes overwhelmed with the complexities of balancing broad public policy with social need.
Generally speaking, the ways in which access for three groups – the poor [also in terms of the literature, read "class"], women and ethnic minorities – has been promoted or prevented have served as the litmus tests for oppressive or inclusive governance systems.
A good portion of the analyses that fall under this rubric begins with the assumption that access is structurally determined, that is to say, access is determined by the self-perpetuating dynamics of established systems. This assumption is clearly reflected in such works as Kazemi’s Power, Society and International Relations, Hafiz’s Socio-economic Approach to Peace and Stability and Kay’s Latin American Theories of Development and Underdevelopment. Governance, since it ultimately concerns access, therefore also reflects certain structural imperatives, and to that extent, perpetuates aspects of inclusion or exclusion. The position of the poor is regarded as symptomatic of the dynamics of exclusion, but the analytical perspective applies to all forms of "class", including race.
Twentieth century analyses of the excluded have been rooted to a very significant extent in various forms of structuralist frameworks, mainly either Marxist-oriented or based upon liberal assumptions about the process of transitions. When it comes to analysing issues of access and poverty, the utility of traditional Marxist thought is increasingly seen as less relevant within conventional state boundaries, and more useful when put in the context of Wallerstein’s "world systems approach". Wallerstein employs what has been called a "neo-Marxist perspective" in which centres of influence and control are linked to ever-expanding commercial markets. Like Latin American "dependencia", Wallerstein’s analysis views power as vested in transnational elites across societies. Within societies – and here he also means within states – the gaps between the elites and the impoverished inevitably are widening.
The liberal school assumes that access will never be gained unless mutuality of interests is established between those with access and those without. Functional needs will be the determining factor, and these can be manipulated at local as well as trans-national levels. The preponderance of power is in the hands of those who already have access but as Castells has suggested through his investigations into Mexico’s Zapatistas, Japan’s Aum Shinrikyo and America’s extremist "patriots" of the 1990s, functional interests can be manipulated even by those who seem initially not to have a preponderance of power and influence.
From this perspective, access is a trans-national phenomenon, and governance in terms of societal structures and the allocative process is determined outside a state-based framework. There are alternatives to such trans-national structural views, and one example of such alternative perspectives can be seen in the case of gender issues. Gender issues, more specifically [but not all inclusively] the role of women, continues to be linked to national and state constructs. That is not to say that women may not regard exclusion as a universal pattern, but rather to say that the literature mainly reflects the impact of specific – normally state bound – societal behaviour upon women’s roles.
To that extent, even Boserup’s seminal work on women in development accepted that industrialisation and development affected women differently in different societies. Yet, that said, gender inequalities or exclusion are seen to persist for other sorts of structural reasons. For example, Mies speaks of the ways that systems of modernisation perpetuate patriarchy. The argument goes that modernisation tends to consolidate behaviour that continues to assert one class over another. In the case of gender, low wages and structural adjustment policies perpetuate the "feminisation of poverty", according to Ashfar and Dennis. This sort of pattern of structural re-enforcement applies in similar ways, according to Skocpol to economic and ethnic classes.
Conceptual Parameters of the Art of Governance
Ackerman, B., Social Justice in the Liberal State, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1980
Kant, I, Kant’s Political Writings [trans by H. Nesbit], Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1977
Ezorsky, G., Racism and Justice, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1991
Leonard, S., Critical Theory and Political Practice, Princeton University Press, NJ, 1991
Linklater, A., Men and Citizens in International Relations [2nd ed], Macmillan, London, 1990
Saivetz, C. and Jones, A.H. [eds] In Search of Pluralism, Westview Press, Colorado, 1994
Sandel, M., Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992
Wallach, J., "Liberalism, Communitarians and the Tasks of Political Theory", Political Theory, 15, 1987
Consociational-Integrative Power-sharing Debate
Bohman, J., Public Deliberation, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1996
Brass, P., The Politics of India since Independence, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990
Hannum, H., Autonomy, Sovereignty and Self-determination, University of Pennsylvania Press, Phil., 1991
Steiner, J., "Research Strategies beyond Consociational Theory", Journal of Politics, November 1981
Structural Consequences of Governance
Gurr, T.R., Why Men Rebel, Princeton University Press, NJ, 1979
Krasner, S., Structural Conflict, Princeton University Press, NJ, 1985
Pye, L. and Verba, S., Political Culture and Political Development, Princeton University Press, NJ, 1965
Sen, A.K., Inequality Reconsidered, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1992
Strange, S., "The Defective State", Daedalus 124/2, 1995
Weaver, R.K. and Rockman, B.A., Assessing the Effects of Institutions, in Institutions Do Matter, Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, 1993
Models, systems and structures
The assumptions that define the conceptual parameters of the art of governance have led to a variety of models of state and local governance systems and structures. The literature that pertains to these and that is reviewed below is concerned with two issues. The first and most obvious is to identify some of the key works in the literature that reflect major, state of the art governance models, systems and structures.
The second issue concerns that body of literature that relates principles of governance, power-sharing and the structural implications of governance systems to capacity-building and development for both capacity-building and development, as will be discussed, clearly intersect with conflict prevention, mitigation and resolution.
Grindle begins her analysis of the "good government imperative" by referring to Joao Guilherme Merquior’s statement that "we have simultaneously too much state and too little state." While Grindle uses this quote to open up a discussion on the state and intervention, here the quote is borrowed to reflect upon types of states as instruments for local as well as country-wide governance.
Leftwich’s view, at least from a developmental perspective, is that asking about the best form of government, or, governance is not the right question to pose. The type of state is the issue that counts for him, but his definition of "type" is not necessarily the formalistic one implied in models, systems and structures, and it certainly is not judgmental in the sense that one form is better than another. Leftwich assumes that the main criterion is the way that "politics" is done in particular situations and particular countries, or, in his words
…all the activities of conflict, cooperation and negotiations involved in the use, production and distribution of resources, whether material or idea, whether at local, national or international levels, or whether in the private or public domains.
What makes this sort of politics work, suggest Cornell and Kalt, is not necessarily institutional. It stems as much from what has been called "the new social contract theory." Cornell and Kalt use the idea of new social contracts as a means to explain why similar constitutional arrangements and systems work in one country and not in another. Their answer depends upon an unwritten and unstated "extraconstitutional cooperative agreement" that "glues individuals together." In other words, an assumption of shared interests, values and inter-dependence lubricates those institutions reflected in more formal models, systems and structures. The literature increasingly reflects a kind of post-modern relativism which is similar to Putnam’s "social capital", comprising an intangible network of reciprocity, trust and cultural norms.
New social contracts and concepts of social capital all intersect with an older though equally as important concept, namely, that of legitimacy. Legitimacy, as Gotlieb reminds one, is not a question of particular models, systems or structures, but rather is an abiding principle, one which assumes that – whatever the form or type of government – the will of the people is the basis of authority and the legitimacy of all government.
[a] Models, systems and structures in review.
The models of governance that the literature cited below principally concerns, revolve around three assumptions: [i] maximum participation of the governed in governance is a positive governance attribute [ii] there is no single model or system of governance that has universal applicability and [iii] despite #ii, liberal democratic forms of government paradoxically have emerged as the most singularly acceptable means of government and governance in the aftermath of the Cold War.
[i] Participation and governance. Participation and governance concern more than just interactions between systems of government and the governed. Governance includes the ways that peoples and civil society engage and overlap. In other words, the effectiveness of governance structures and models goes beyond analysis of voting systems and presidential or parliamentary forms of government. Civil society in that sense cannot be modelled, per se, but it does become a component in the environment in which democratic institutions can be fostered and promoted. The multiplicity of strains between and among different groupings, or, in other words, the maximum degree to which interests are linked to various networks within a society, suggests Lijphart, afford the greatest degree of nation-state loyalty and stability.
There has emerged over the past two decades a variety of new forms of social movements and civil society which claim not only civil or welfare rights, but also include group-based movements of national resistance and cultural pride. Over the last few years, there have been various assessments of such movements, including works by Melucci and Mooers and Sears. In general, the importance of these movements is that they tend to be networks of more local groups, each with their own principles and styles, which nevertheless act in concert en masse. They are seen to add social rationality, improve the quality of normative values and enhance democratic participation.
[ii] Systems and some alternatives. The governance literature points consistently to four central systems issues when considering the relationship between the governed and those who govern: federalism, power-sharing, decision-making and electoral systems.
Federalism for Horowitz suggests distinct advantages over what can only be described as centralist systems. Federalism can serve to disperse conflict away from the centre to the periphery. Sub-systems as a part of overall federalist structures can serve as training grounds for those who aspire to national politics, and as importantly federalist systems serve as constraints upon efforts to seize hegemonic power. However, at the same time, Horowitz points out that federalism can also undo any sense of system-wide harmony, and can exacerbate ethnic conflict. "…Much depends on the number of components, the number of states, boundaries and ethnic composition."
Federalism has various permutations, as Duchacek notes. Confederalism and semiconfederalism are but two points on a spectrum of decision-making levels, areas of relative independence and power-sharing.
Sisk considers power-sharing along three lines. He expands Nordlinger’s typology which identified six consensus-building and conflict regulating political methods and practices, and groups these power-sharing variables under three headings: divisions of power, decision rules and defining state/ethnic relations. The first, divisions of power, is principally concerned with the range of options that are available in addressing issues of territory. The second, decision rules, focuses upon means for determining the threshold of consensus that is needed for some members of the society to take decisions that apply to all members of society. Finally, defining state/ethnic relations, is an issue that is principally about the degree to which public policies are regarded as deliberately biased against certain groupings within a state and the extent to which state policies are undertaken to redress perceived imbalances.
Decision-making takes various forms, depending upon the extent to which political elites are integrated and whether political positions cut across ethnic or other social divides. The more that political positions do cut across such divides and that political elites relatively cohere, so-called majoritarian decision-making should work. The problem, however, is that in societies that are prone to conflict, these sorts of characteristics – almost by definition – do not apply. Conflict regulating practices must be built into the decision-making processes of governance, as Walker, Lijphart and Grofman conclude.
Electoral systems are to a very great extent the critical factor in determining the legitimacy of government structures and systems. As Sisk and Lijphart both note,
For multiethnic societies, the central issue is whether a majoritarian system (or the less demanding plurality systems) is the best or some type of proportional representation system is best. Underlying the debate is the clear understanding that electoral system choice, over time, has a strong effect on the type of party system that emerges.
[iii] Structures and the menu of options. According to Harris and Reilly, there are three basic systems that states can adopt to fulfil their governance functions, viz, parliamentary systems, presidential systems and semi-presidential systems. Each holds out clear advantages and disadvantages, and these are noted in the subsequent section, Section IV//[a].
Some of the important literature that reflects further on the relative merits of each is noted in the box that immediately follows.
Models, Systems and Structures
Boggs, C., Social Movements and Political Power, Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1986
Bowie, N. [ed], Equal Opportunity, Westview Press, Boulder, 1988
Carroll, W. K. [ed], Organizing Dissent, Garamond Press, Toronto, 1992
Dryzek, J., Discursive Democracy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990
Fishkin, J.S., Deliberative Democracy, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1991
Fraser, N., Unruly Practices, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1989
Grady, R., Restoring Real Representation, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 1993
Green, P., Retrieving Democracy, Rowman and Allenhead, NJ, 1985
Hirst, P., Representative Democracy and Its Limits, Polity Press, Oxford, 1990
Jones, K., Compassionate Authority, Routledge, New York, 1993
Keane, J., Democracy and Civil Society, Verso, London, 1988
Kukathas, C. and D. Lovell, "The Significance of Civil Society", in Kukathas et al, The Transition from Socialism, Longman, Sydney, 1991
Lefort, C., The Political Forms of Modern Society, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986
Mansbridge, J., Beyond Adversary Democracy, Basic Books, New York, 1980
Pefer, R., Marxism, Morality and Social Justice, Princeton University Press, NJ, 1990
Phillips, A., Engendering Democracy, Penn State Press, Pittsburgh, 1991
Shugart, M.S. and Carey, J.M., Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Systems, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992
Wartenberg, T.E.[ed], Rethinking Power, State University of NY Press, Albany, 1992
White, S., Political Theory and Postmodernism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991
Yeatman, A., Postmodern Revisionings of the Political, Routledge, New York, 1994
Attributes of Liberal Democracy-based Governance
The dominant prescription for governance and government, as one approaches the end of the 20th century, is liberal democracy. It is liberal democracy that has been heralded as the means best suited to promote maximum popular participation and effective power sharing. Those debates that were identified earlier under the heading of the Conceptual parameters of the art of governance can be interpreted not as paradigms for different forms and types of governance, but simply as different approaches towards sustaining the liberal-democratic paradigm. Even the different models, systems and structures that were noted in the previous section might be viewed as different forms and processes of attaining and sustaining liberal democracy.
Yet, it is worth noting that the acclaim for the principles and values of liberal democracy is neither as certain nor as universal as it may seem. A growing proportion of the literature on governance – particularly that which focuses upon liberal democracy – reflects various degrees of disquiet. This disquiet centres around three major issues. The first concerns what might be described as a certain political uneasiness with the possibility that liberal democracy may really be nothing more than a metaphor for "neo-conservatism". The second issue concerns the necessary preconditions for liberal democracy, preconditions that may be a long time in coming or not even consistent with the social values and norms of various non-Western societies.
Such issues, doubts and concerns, though, remain (relatively speaking) minority concerns, and the focus on governance literature is the value of liberal democracy and how best to make it work.
[a] The dominance of liberal democracy in governance.
"’Democratic good governance’ refers generally to a political regime based on the model of a liberal-democratic polity, which protects human and civil rights, combined with a competent, non-corrupt and accountable public administration." Liberal democracy’s emergence as the predominant governance paradigm is sustained by a wide array of practitioners and theoreticians alike. The former include the recent Secretary-General of the United Nations, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the United Nations Development Programme, the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Inter-American Development Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the OECD. All in one way or another have joined in the chorus of promoting the values of liberal democracy.
The more academically-oriented literature that supports the merits of liberal democracy is extensive, from the East and South as well as the West. From the Western world, Huntington, Farer, Diamond, Crawford and Nelson are just a few of many major scholars who see liberal democracy as the way forward. The Eastern world, principally South and East Asia in this context, has also found a bedrock of liberal democracy supporters. Kaviraj’s view of democracy’s "instrumentality", Chaterjee’s "assertive identity groups" to overcome discrimination [not poverty], Khilnani’s assumptions of contingent and transient majorities, all in the context of the Sub-Continent support the democratic vision. In a similar vein, Choi’s Theory of Korean Democracy and McCormick’s assumptions about China’s future reflect particular cultural and social settings, but at the same time also assume that the liberal-democratic ideal can be incorporated into those settings.
In the southern context, African support for liberal democracy is also considerable. Ake, Horowitz, Rueschemeyer, Johnson, Ekpo and others all accept that the principle needs to be fostered, and that the lack of liberal democracy in no small part explains the corruption, the bureaucratic inertia and the distorted economic growth that have become African hallmarks over the past two decades. Similarly in Latin America, the assumption that liberal democracy does hold answers to the many ills facing developing or newly industrialising countries is taking hold. Analyses by Dominguez, Foweraker and Joseph of Mexico’s democratic struggles reflect this trend, as do the works of Alvarez, Geddes and Hagopian concerning Brazil.
While these and a host of other writers support the principles underlying liberal democracy, the parameters of liberal democracy – or what liberal democracy actually is – remain loose and fluid. In part, as those scholars noted above suggest, liberal democracy inevitably must fit into the individual contexts of specific societies and cultures. Putnam’s Making Democracy Work, Shin’s Cultural Origins of Public Support for Democracy, Klingemann’s Citizens and the State and Chu’s Crafting Democracy in Taiwan represent further evidence of the efforts made to incorporate the broad conception of liberal democracy into particular cultural and social contexts.
And in part, the parameters of liberal democracy are fluid and loose because liberal democracy is going through a "third period of democratic ferment." It is a ferment which in Dalton’s words must incorporate political demands of environmentalists, the pressures of ethnic fragmentation, the women’s movement" as well as "new and expanded patterns of political participation,…the changing nature of electoral behavior and electoral choice. Everywhere, it seems, new questions about the nature of democracy are developing."
[b] Liberal democracy and Neo-Conservatism.
Though the enthusiasm for liberal democracy remains high, there is a growing concern that liberal democracy is really sustained by a kind of neo-conservative hegemony. In the aftermath of failed communist and socialist experimentation, liberal democracy seems all too often, according to Toye, to have become synonymous with markets, deregulation, privatisation, supply-side economics, individualism, competition and the enterprise culture. In effect, the neo-conservatives are now associated with the view that the gamut of individual freedoms reflected in their view of liberal democracy is the sine qua non for economic growth and development.
However, in the immediate aftermath of failed socialism, many are worried that the neo-conservative link between liberal democracy and development merely provides further means to impose various conditionalities upon states and governments that are for all intents and purposes faced with no alternative. Leftwich suggests that multilateral organisations such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, increasingly are being pushed to foster and promote a particular political position, ie, to ensure the connection between multiparty democracy, pluralism and market economies.
Tandon, in his plea to "reclaim Africa’s agenda", warns that this sort of linkage is "merely a weapon to try to pry open their [African] economies to Western control." He cites not only Lawson’s work on political myths about Asia and the West to drive home his concern about the dangers inherent in the West’s approach to and promotion of liberal democracy, but he also quotes extensively from Alagappa’s analysis of the "attempt by the West to create a universal order in its image when its power and influence are ebbing."
The concern that neo-conservative values are being promoted under the guise of liberal democracy has struck a chord in the West, too. Dolebeare, Greider and Lash from various perspectives see that liberal democracy, when narrowly defined in terms of rugged individualism and market-forces, may destroy the very roots of democracy in those very countries that espouse it.
[c] Preconditions of liberal democracy.
To what extent does the development and perpetuation of liberal democracy depend upon prerequisites that are inherent in a society or at least must precede the introduction of democracy? Verba’s The Civic Culture maintains that the institutions and patterns of action in a political system must be congruent with the political culture of the nation. In other words, a nation’s political culture exerts an independent influence on social and political behaviour. Hence, according to Almond and Verba as well as Inglehart culture sets norms for behaviour that members of society generally acknowledge, even if they personally do not share these values. To that extent, the seminal works of major political analysts assume that there are indeed necessary preconditions to the development of democracy.
Are such preconditions, however, linked to a concept of modernity? Is liberal democracy in effect an outcome of socio-economic development, requiring a high level of literacy, communication, education, an established and secure middle-class, a vibrant civil society and tolerable degrees of material and social inequality? Some have suggested that the more well-to-do a nation, the greater chance that democracy will flourish, while others see that sustaining democracy is dependent upon a strong working class that will use democratic principles in order to assert working class interests.
The majority of "success stories", namely, those that are now demanding the creation or extension of democratic processes, to which Leftwich alludes [eg, Bismark’s Germany, Meiji Japan, Brazil, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand] "have not occurred under conditions remotely approximating continuous and stable democracy." Yet, the factors that influence the democratisation process may at the same time be more subtle or at least less tangible than those already mentioned. They all in one way or another relate to the debates discussed in what was earlier called the conceptual parameters of the art of governance.
Legitimacy is one such factor, so essential as Lowi states, when it comes to a government’s dealing with public policies that might require sanctions. A second is a broad basis of consensus about the political rules of the game. Opposition groups must not abandon the political process because they have been defeated, but must accept their roles as "loyal opposition." The third factor that is a prerequisite or precondition for the emergence of liberal-democratic governance is that of institutional restraint. If opposition groups must accept their roles within the broad political system, the victorious – governments, civic groups, etc. – must limit the extent to which they will assert or impose the consequences of victory.
The problem that liberal democracy – as a perceived universal prescription – imposes for theorist and practitioner alike is the temptation to promote "structural conditions for democratisation" [eg, legitimacy, basis for consensus, institutional restraint] under any circumstances. Earlier writers have expressed considerable concern that such imposition of liberal democracy will divert attention away from satisfying basic human needs in very poor countries, or alternatively that it will promote consumption over saving and investment or that it will create levels of expectations that will prove impossible to satisfy.
More recent writers, though, have tried to move practitioners away from the temptation to promote such structural conditions, and have rather suggested that democracy be fostered through emphasising the importance of leadership, choice, bargaining and coalition building. There is a growing minority that is attempting to decouple governance transitions from economic development.
[d] Old Orthodoxies and New.
What is called here the "old orthodoxies and the new" reflect two legs of a much debated "triangle", namely, the relationship between development, forms of governance and conflict. Of these three legs, two – democratisation and development – reflect a continuing source of debate and uncertainty in the world of development.
It is clear to Ersson and Lane, that, based upon extensive statistical research, the correlation between democracy and development depends upon what one means by development. The authors find a most positive correlation between the two in the area of human development. Economic growth and democracy reflect weak, if not uncertain, correlations, and the relationship between income distribution and democracy appears irrelevant. Yet, the real clash of orthodoxies is less concerned with such correlations, and far more concerned with the degree to which either democracy or development is a prerequisite of the other.
The old orthodoxy, ie, those who feel that democracy is by no means a precondition for development, go back to a well-established school sponsored by Myrdal. Fledgling democracies, he maintained, have to face political hurdles that hamper economic and social development. Some assumed, based upon a Marxist orientation, that democracy was dependent upon "an ethic of science" which in turn depended upon the development of industrialisation. Others, like Kitching, believed that "material poor societies cannot produce the democratic life which is an essential prerequisite for the creation of social democracies." Olson, though representing the new more than the old orthodoxy, nevertheless feared that democracies are too dependent upon special interest groups that all too often win at the expense of favourable conditions for economic growth.
The new orthodoxy reverses the assumptions of the old. Democracy is now regarded as a prerequisite for development. It has become the orthodoxy of multilateral organisations involved in development and for bilateral donors who support them as well as directly support countries in need of aid. That democracy (or more accurately, attributes of democracy), is essential for development reflects at least two assumptions. The first is that democracies normally have institutions that safeguard political and civil rights, an essential concomitant of economic growth. The second is that democracies indirectly tend to promote market economies.
All too often, however, such enthusiasm for the liberal-democratic precondition is countered by scepticism based upon the assumption that democracy can actually threaten development. To that extent, Przeworskic and Weede represent the more sceptical side of the debate, while Barsh meets optimists and sceptics halfway.
ATTRIBUTES OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY
Anderson, B, Imagined Communities, Verso, London, 1991
Avineri, S. and A. De-Shalit [eds], Communitarianism and Individualism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1992
Barry, B., Democracy and Power: Essays in Political Theory, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991
Budge, I. and D. McKay [ed] Developing Democracy, Sage, London, 1994
DiPalma, G., To Craft Democracies, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1990
Dowding, K. and D.S. King, Preferences, Institutions and Rational Choice, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995
Easton, D., J.G. Gunnell and M.B. Stein, [eds], Regime and Discipline: Democracy and the Development of Political Science, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1995
Fullinwider, R.K., "Citizenship, Individualism and Democratic Politics, Ethics, 105, 1995
Hardin, R., One for All: The Logic of Group Conflict, Princeton University Press, NJ., 1995
Huntington, S.P., The Third Wave: Democratisation in the Late Twentieth Century, Oklahoma University Press, Norman, 1991
Esping-Anderson, G., The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1990
Ingram, H. and S.R. Smith [eds], Public Policy for Democracy, Brookings Institution, Washington DC, 1993
Inkeles, A. [ed], On Measuring Democracy: Its Consequences and Concomitants, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, 1991
Janos, A.C., Politics and Paradigms: Changing Theories of Social Change, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1986
Klingemann, H-D, R. Hofferbert and I. Budget, Parties, Policies and Democracy, Westview Press, Boulder, 1994
Knoke, D, Political Networks, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1990
Leca, J. and Papini, Les Democraties sont-elles gouvernables?, Economica, Paris, 1985
McClain, P.D. [ed], Minority Group Influence, Greenwood Press, Westport, 1993
Migdal, J., Strong Societies and Weak States, Princeton University Press, NJ, 1988
Moon, D., Constructing Community, Princeton University Press, NJ, 1993
O’Donnell, G. and P. Schmitter [eds], Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1986
Pye, L. and M. Pye, Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Politics, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1985
Van Parijs, P., Real Freedom for All, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995
Governance and Country–Specific Analyses
The country-specific analyses that relate to governance reflect in many respects the broad thematic and theoretical issues covered in this analysis. To that extent, much of the literature on country-specific approaches to governance can be regarded as microcosms or case studies for more general governance concerns. At the same time, there is a vast historical and political science literature that is significantly less concerned with broad-based theoretical and thematic issues and far more focussed upon the "idiosyncratic behaviour" of particular societies, governments and nation-states. Much of this latter work is descriptive and "atheoretical".
Under the heading of country-specific analyses is also a literature of growing importance, namely, that concerned with regional as well as global governance and regime issues. To the extent that all three – regional and global governance and regime management – regard the nation-state as a central, if not principal actor, in such forms of governance, this review would be remiss not to cover them.
[a] Country-case studies on governance.
The literature on governance related to specific countries is extensive. As noted earlier, in recent years much of this literature has sought to demonstrate ways that the values and principles of liberal democracy can be accommodated in specific cultural, social and national contexts. There are few, if any, populated areas of the globe that seem to have avoided this sort of analytical scrutiny. From India to Botswana, from South Africa to the South Pacific islands, from Russia to the Americas, burgeoning analyses of liberal democracy in the context of specific nation-state structures cover governance at various levels, including civic society, non-governmental actors, private and public corporate sectors as well as government.
Just a few indicative examples from this abundance of rich analysis include works on China by Kent, Lawson’s The Failure of Democractic Politics in Fiji, Crocombe’s study of culture and democracy in the South Pacific, Rutland’s reflections on Russia’s business elites in the context of democratic reform as well as Higley’s analysis of democratic consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe In reality, though, it is more than a Herculean task to attempt to select representative samples from this rich vein of research. Suffice it to say, that what makes this particular aspect of the literature interesting and relevant to this study is the consistent liberal-democratic backdrop, or, the testing of this ostensibly universal set of values against the traditions, cultures and societies of different peoples around the world.
[b] Specific country analyses.
If the abundance of literature on country case studies on governance may seem overwhelming, the literature reflecting more traditional, atheoretical country analyses is even more so. It incorporates historical works, current affairs, political reviews and so on. In fact, this body of work is probably only worth mentioning in the context of this study because it gives the practitioner and analyst alike a wealth of material upon which to base country-by-country assessments of prospects for conflict, for different entryways into governance and into approaches to development.
Woodward’s work on Nasser or Mitchell’s on The Society of Muslim Brothers or Welch’s analysis of Nigeria’s military base all fit into what is an important, historically-based type of analysis of the countries, communities and issues that will determine possible sources of governance and possible sources of conflict.
GOVERNANCE AND COUNTRY SPECIFIC ANALYSES
Apter, D.E. [ed], The Legitimisation of Violence, Macmillan, London, 1996
Dalton, R., "Communists and Democrats: Attitudes Towards Democracy in the Two Germanies", British Journal of Political Science, 24, 1994
Diamond, L., J. Linz and S.M. Lipset, Democracy in Developing Countries [3 vols], Lynne Rienner, 1988
Gibson, J. and Duch, R., "Postmaterialism and the Emerging Soviet Democracy", Political Science Research, 47, 1994
Friedman, E., P.G. Pickowicz and M. Selden, M., Chinese Village, Socialist State, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1991
Horowitz, D., A Democratic South Africa: Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1991
Inoguchi, I., "Democracy and the Development of Political Science in Japan", in Easton, D. et al [eds], Regime and Discipline: Democracy and the Development of Political Science, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1995
Karl, T.L., "Dilemmas of Democratisation in Latin America", in Rustow, D.A., and K.P. Ericksen [eds], Comparative Political Dynamics, Harper-Collins, New York, 1991
Kitching, G., Class and Economic Change in Kenya, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1980
McAllister, I., Political Behaviour: Citizens, Parties and Elites in Australia, Longman, Cheshire, Sydney, 1992
[c] Issues of global governance.
In his conceptual framework of governance, Rosenau states that "governance…encompasses the activities of governments, but it also includes any actors who resort to command mechanisms to make demands, frame goals, issue directives, and pursue policies." Based upon this definition, Rosenau concludes that implicit in broadening the concept of governance is the need to include transnational relations and cross-border spillovers, because governance not only involves "flows of control consequence, and causation within systems, but also sustains flows across systems."
"Global governance" is not a new feature of international politics. To the extent that "global governance" – from issues of trade and financial stability to air traffic control and the use of international waters – all represent forms of constraint on the capacities of governments, non-state actors and others to exert their influence freely, global and domestic governance are closely bound. However, it is quite clear, as made evident by the Commission on Global Governance, that far greater international adaptation will be required to meet the ever more complex demands posed by an ever more turbulent world.
From Broadhead’s perspective, several of the predominant prescriptions proffered as part of global governance suffer from at least two fundamental failings. The first is that the liberal-democratic assumptions that sustain many such prescriptions seem to be contradicted by the free-wheeling nature and forces of economic globalisation. The second criticism is that the institutions for future "21st century global governance" seem to be merely revamped versions of those international organisations that have so painfully evolved over the past 50 years.
However, the new wave of global governance is less concerned with revamped multilateral organisations and charters, and more concerned with the ways that democracy – not based upon territorial structures, eg, states – can be promoted in what Rosenau calls "the domestic foreign frontier." For those concerned with the inter-relationship between global governance and what is in today’s politics called states’ areas of domestic competence, the governance challenge that is emerging now will be ways to control the paradoxes of simultaneously fragmenting and integrating forces.
There, too, is the very fundamental question that is tentatively being asked – sometimes from the most unusual quarters – namely, does one need to constrain present efforts to promote democracy? Has democracy given too much freedom that in turn has hampered efforts to make important, large-scale social decisions?
IV – Conflict Prevention and Resolution In the Context of Good Governance
If one looks at the sources of conflict that form the bases of present-day concerns as well as those projected in the medium-term, good governance systems and methods will have to focus upon four critical areas. These four areas overlap in many respects. Nevertheless, each reflects a body of work that will guide this portion of the survey:
Yet, before embarking upon a review of the governance-conflict related literature that pertains to these four themes, there are two abiding issues that deserve consideration. The first concerns the inter-relationship between governance, conflict management, conflict resolution and process. The second concerns what might be called governance-conflict related sequencing, viz, the conceptual and practical distinction between forms of governance in pre-conflict situations as well as during and in the aftermath of conflict.
Governance, Conflict-Management or Conflict Resolution
The relatively young but nevertheless intense history of conflict studies poses a quandary for all who seek to pursue it. Is one of the fundamental purposes of conflict analysis to find ways to manage conflict or to resolve it? To a great extent, the turbulent events of the 1960s led a growing number of scholars to question the whole premise of "conflict management". Conflict management was synonymous with the "diplomatic art" designed to avoid, by-pass, suppress or temporarily deal with conflict situations. It did not, however, address the very causes of conflict, nor was it regarded as leading to permanent resolution of conflict. Blainey, Burton, Deutsch and Hoglund were all very cognisant of this "diplomatic failing".
Nevertheless, despite the growing doubts about the value of merely managing conflict, some important works emerged that reflected ways that organisations could effectively come to grips with the immediate problems of diverting violence and upheaval. Pirage’s Managing Political Conflict, though not regarded as a strong work, at least outlines ways that institutions can respond to potential conflict. Thomas and Bennis’s reader, while mainly concerned with conflict within organisations, also is important for the links that it makes between structures and conflict management. Both Nordlinger as well as Nardin are interesting for another light that they shed on the relationship between organisations and conflict, namely, that governments are not merely "conflict managers" but also parties to domestic conflict.
In any event, conflict resolution was the ultimate objective, according to Coser in 1970. One needed to move beyond avoiding or suppressing conflict, and into the realm of dealing with the very causes of conflict. The inter-relationship between organisational structures, more often than the structures of government, and conflict resolution began to rapidly emerge from the 1970s onwards. Sherif’s conception of "super-ordinate goals", Nye’s Peace in Parts, Mouton’s analysis of conflict in industry as well as that of Douglas reflect the determination to relate the ways that organisations function to the ways that conflict can be resolved.
For a period of time, the case for greater attention to conflict resolution rather than conflict management seemed not only logical, but even took on a mantle of great moral merit. However, the complexities of an emerging number of crises – from Cyprus to Lebanon, from the Korean peninsula to Honduras and Nicaragua – increasingly reflected the complexities that resolution, per se, entailed. Conflict management as part of a process towards conflict resolution became an emerging spectre in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Azar, Anstey, Fisher and Lederach represent a growing number of scholars who regarded conflict management as a partial – and acceptable – step towards resolution.
Harris and Reilly make the point using a medical analogue: "…Any doctor
will rightly argue that treating symptoms is a vital humanitarian act, bringing short-term relief of suffering. A negotiation process that fails abysmally in its attempt to design a long-term settlement, but achieves a six month cease fire, has saved many lives." While there are those who see dangers in the use of such short-term bandages [eg, "perpetuating an injustice"], the key is in the concept of "process". The relationship between governance and process is that conflict resolution and prevention need not be linked initially to specific systems and structures but towards a process by which the cause of conflict can be resolved as the structures of governance can evolve.
The process might begin with an acceptance by an official body that there actually may be a problem within the state between different ethnic groups or with the resource allocation procedures of the state, itself. Esman in Ethnic Politics suggests how the very acknowledgement of grievances that might cause conflict is already a major public policy step in the right direction. The point is that governance structures or systems have to be able or willing to begin the process. Often the answer to such vexing problems is not to specify solutions in constitutional or institutional terms, but rather to acknowledge that the problem exists in the first instance.
To that extent, conflict management and process inter-relate. The former may be used by bodies trying to prevent and resolve conflict as intermediate steps towards a longer-term process that can result in conflict resolution. In this regard, Leftwich’s comment that it is not the system of government that matters nor is it a state’s technical and administrative arrangements which determine capability and competence. Rather what matters is what earlier was referred to as "the centrality of politics."
Governance and Conflict-Related Phases
To what extent does one need different forms of governance to deal with different phases of conflict prevention or conflict resolution? In other words, are there governance systems and structures that are more appropriate and suitable to deal with pre-crisis situations than with conflict or post-conflict situations? On the whole, there is little distinction made in the literature between types of governance and levels or stages of conflict. That by no means suggests that the pressures on governance systems and structures are the same in pre-conflict stages as they are during conflict or post-conflict phases. The lack of such a distinction could on the other hand suggest that, while there are different technical and tactical issues raised in different phases of potential or actual conflict, the broad systemic or strategic choices about appropriate governance are not affected.
In the wake of the Rwandan genocide, the fragmentation of the former Yugoslavia and a host of other fundamental state transformations, there has emerged an extensive literature on "post-conflict recovery". Of crucial importance in many of these works is the type of governance structures and systems that should develop in the aftermath of what often has been horrific intra-state violence.
The post-conflict orientation and the attention given to post-conflict forms of governance are both understandable and important. If a society has to rebuild after suffering the trauma and destruction of lives, infrastructure and property, one critical factor for recovery will be the authority through which international aid as well as local resources will be managed. In addition, a focal point will be needed to initiate, implement and monitor such post-conflict activities as demobilisation, restoration of basic services, reintegration and re-development planning.
To that extent, post-conflict recovery creates a special set of governance and conflict-related issues. These issues in a very basic sense are technical and tactical. Patricia Weiss Fagen has identified a number of works that reflect the particular problems and circumstances that governments as well as civic society face in conflict’s aftermath. Perhaps two of the most intractable problems that post-conflict governments must face are those of demobilisation and public security, subjects on which both UNDP and the World Bank have expended considerable effort and resources. These problems are compounded by the ways that post-conflict governments as well as other civil and community groups relate to the military. As Nicole Ball and others have noted, this relationship becomes a critical factor in the evolution of governance systems and governments’ relations to populations at large.
The relationship between the military, structures of government and governance also often impact directly or indirectly upon police and security forces, human rights and judicial and legal systems as well. Equally as important are the particular economic circumstances that bedevil governments in the aftermath of violent conflict. As Weiss Fagen notes, "A necessary first step to generating post-economic recovery is to understand and be able to calculate the cost of war, in terms of human resources and property", and, in this regard, she refers to Frances Stewart’s article on "War and Underdevelopment: Can Economic Analysis Help Reduce the Costs."
Yet, while such specific post-conflict problems are so much a part of the reality of a growing number of states, the approach taken in this survey is that such problems are part of a sub-set of a broader set of issues. In other words, deep-rooted conflict, power imbalances, ethnicity and eventually multicentrism are constants to which systems and structures of governance must relate at any point in the cycle of violence, ie, prevention, mitigation, resolution.
While technical and tactical facets of pre-conflict, conflict and post-conflict situations may require different approaches at different times, what is needed from a governance perspective to prevent or resolve conflicts remains relatively consistent at any stage. Hence, this survey does not distinguish between phases of conflict and types of governance required. It assumes that "good governance" relates to all conflict phases, or, conversely, that good governance effectively avoids or mitigates the sorts of situations that create or perpetuate conflict.
That said, there is no doubt that "good governance" or appropriate systems and structures would be sensitive to the types of techniques that would address various conflict phases. Here, however, the issue is one of a sequence of appropriate conflict resolution or prevention techniques, and not one of a sequence of appropriate governance systems and structures.
GOVERNANCE AND CONFLICT-RELATED PHASES
Baranyi, S., The Challenge in Guatemala: Verifying Human Rights, Strengthening Nations Institutions and Enhancing an Integrated UN Approach to Peace, London School of Economics, Centre for the Study of Global Governance, London, 1995
Boraine, A., "The Healing of A Nation?", Justice in Transition, Cape Town, 1995
Palencia, P. and Holiday, D., Towards a New Role for Civil Society in the Democratisation of Guatemala, International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development, Montreal, 1996
Cohen, S., "State Crimes of Previous Regimes", Law and Social Enquiry, March 1995 Sieder, R., Customary Law and Democratic Transition in Guatemala, Institute of Latin American Studies, London, 1997
Stavenhagen, R., Ethnic Conflicts and the Nation-State, Macmillan, London, 1996
Wilson, R., "The Sizwe Will Not Go Away: The Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Human Rights and Nation-Building in South Africa", African Studies, 55 , 1996
Governance and Four Key Areas of Conflict
The literature that relates to governance and conflict prevention or resolution in the final analysis focuses upon the four areas noted above: [i] deep-rooted conflict [ii] power inequalities and asymmetries [iii] ethnicity and [iv] multicentricity. Each of these factors tests the capacity of governance systems and structures to reconcile contending societal interests, and each in combination or individually explain why some government systems have worked [ie, avoided or resolved conflict] and why others have fomented or been unable to avoid conflict.
[a] Deep-rooted conflict.
There are few exceptions to the general assumption that democratic governance is the single most appropriate cornerstone upon which to build a system of conflict prevention or resolution. In part this conclusion is based upon the assumption that democracy "is a system by which conflicts in a society are allowed to formulate, find expression and be managed in a sustainable way, via institutional outlets such as political parties and representative parliaments, rather than being suppressed or ignored."
This assumption is particularly relevant when addressing the forces of deep-rooted conflict. There needs to be a system in which the accumulated resentments that arise from perceived misallocation of resources, be it land rights or rights to mineral resources, discrimination on the basis of gender, religion or race as well as the other myriad sources of deeply felt grievances can be aired. In the context of deep-rooted conflict, democratic institutions are more relevant for their potential ability to initiate a process for conflict prevention or resolution than for actually resolving conflicts, per se.
At the core of initiating a democratically based process that will address deep-rooted conflict are the issues of forms of representation, power-sharing and ultimately structure. To a very significant extent, such issues bring out the strengths and weaknesses of various governance concepts noted earlier in Section III/a-c, under the Conceptual Parameters of the Art of Governance. For example, if the process of managing deep-rooted conflict is so dependent upon mechanisms to articulate profoundly felt grievances, should this be through consociational or integrative structures? And, to what extent do the structural consequences of certain types of governance institutions perpetuate deeply felt grievances?
Two examples taken from recent works which inter-relate governance and conflict resolution/prevention suggest that there are various power sharing and institutional options available. However, both also demonstrate that in the final analysis appropriate choice is dependent upon the characteristics, peoples, history and desires of those engaged in the conflict resolution/prevention process:
Approaches to Power Sharing
|Characteristics||Elites co-operate after elections to form multiethnic coalitions and manage conflicts, groups are autonomous, minorities are protected||Parties encouraged to create coalitions before elections, creating broadly inclusive but majoritarian governments|
|Principles||Broad-based or "grand "coalitions", minority veto, proportionality in allocation of civil service positions and public funds, group autonomy||Dispersion and devolution of power, promotion of intraethnic competition, inducements for interethnic cooperation, policies to encourage alternative social alignments, managed distribution of resources|
|Institutions and practices to promote these principles and effects||Parliamentary government, proportional reservation of seats, proportional representation electoral system||Federalism, vote pooling, electoral systems, presidents elected by "supermajority"|
|Strengths of the approach||Provides group firm guarantees for the protection of their interests||Provides politicians with incentives for moderation – "coalitions of commitment"|
|Weaknesses||"Coalitions of convenience", elites may pursue conflict rather than try to reduce it, communal groups may not defer to their leaders, system relies on constraints against immoderate policies||Lack of whole-country empirical examples of working systems, assumptions that politicians respond to incentives and citizens will vote for parties not based on their own group|
Constituting An Executive Government
Parliamentary Presidential Semi-Presidential
The alternative forms of power-sharing arrangements and government structures laid out in the examples above already presume agreement on participation in negotiations or discussions on participating in elections. This introduces a whole spectrum of related issues, such as the question of representatives, the dilemma of divided parties, the dilemma of power-imbalances and even ways to approach and initiate talks with party representatives. It also presumes that one is agreed on the forms of elections that will take place.
Regarding the often inter-related issues of initial representation, divided parties, power-sharing and ways to initiate negotiations, there is a wide array of works that reflect for the most part the results of practical, "real life" steps towards developing governance structures that can resolve or prevent conflict stemming from deep-rooted grievances. A few examples will suggest the breadth of the available literature.
DEVELOPING GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES TO RESOLVE DEEP-ROOTED CONFLICT
Azar, E., "The Lebanon Case", in Azar, E. and J.W. Burton, International Conflict Resolution, Lynne Reiner, Boulder, 1986
Azar, E., "Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Practice in the Middle East, Journal of Palestine Studies, 8 , 1978
Boyle, K. and T. Hadden, Northern Ireland: The Choice, Penguin, London, 1994
De Villers, B., [ed], Evaluating Federal Systems, Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1994
Elazar, D., "Constitution-Making: The Preeminently Political Act", in Simeon and Banting [eds], The Politics of Constitutional Change in Industrial Nations: Redesigning the State, Macmillan, London, 1985
Hannum, H. [ed], Documents on Autonomy and Minority Rights, Martinus Nijhoff, Dorderecht, 1993
Hannum, H., Autonomy, Sovereignty and Self-Determination: The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1996
Hartlyn, J., The Politics of Coalition Rule in Colombia, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988
Horowitz, D., "Making Moderation Pay", in J. Montville [ed], Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies, Lexington Books, Lexington, 1990
Hume, C., Ending Mozambique’s War: The Role of Mediation and Good Offices, United States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC, 1994
Kampelman, M., "Secession and the Right to Self-Determination: An Urgent Need to Harmonize Principle with Pragmatism", Washington Quarterly [, 1993
Lijphart, A., "Electoral Systems, Party Systems and Conflict Management in Segmented Societies", in R. Schrire, Critical Choices for South Africa: An Agenda for the 1990s, Oxford University Press, Cape Town, 1990
Lijphart, A., and B. Grofman [eds], Choosing an Electoral System: Issues and Alternatives, Praeger, New York, 1984
Perry, M., A Fire in Zion: The Israeli-Palestinian Search for Peace, Morrow, New York, 1994
Sisk, T., Democratization in South Africa: The Elusive Social Contract, Princeton University Press, NJ, 1995
Stedman, S., Peacemaking in Civil War: International Mediation in Zimbabwe, 1974-1980, Lynne Reiner, Boulder, 1991
Stepan, A., and C. Skach, "Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation: Parliamentarism versus Presidentialism", World Politics, 6 , 1993
Suberu, R., "The Travails of Federalism in Nigeria", in L. Diamond and M. Platner [eds], Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict and Democracy, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1994
Taagepera, R. and M. Shugart, Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1989
Walker, L. and P. Sterns [eds], Balancing and Sharing Power in Multi-ethnic Societies: Summary of a Workshop, National Academy Press, Washington, DC, 1993
In the context of governance, dealing with the sources of real or potential deep-rooted conflict goes beyond government systems and structures, per se. It entails issues of community structures and a variety of linked initiatives that have been discussed [eg, "track two" negotiations] in Between Theory and Practice [See: Section Two/]. The extent to which community structures and community processes, eg, participatory development, can offset deeply held grievances among alienated groups is an issue that has attracted regrettably limited attention among scholars and analysts. The relevant literature that does exist is mainly concerned with development, and only indirectly concerned with the ways that participation, community structures and conflict resolution or prevention intertwine.
Brautigan to some extent relates participation, governance and potential conflict reduction from a theoretical perspective, while McDonald provides some very useful insights on community functions in terms of dealing with inter-group conflict in the Dominican Republic. Yet, for those who have to deal with the potential and practical consequences of deep-rooted conflict, the dearth of literature on community participation and approaches to conflict resolution and prevention is perhaps understandable, but disappointing nonetheless.
[b] Power Inequalities and Asymmetries.
As with deep-rooted conflict, the governance options for addressing power inequalities and asymmetries are very similar. The reason is clearly that in so many respects deeply-held grievances that result in deep-rooted conflict are often the result of structural power imbalances. They are asymmetries that are assumed and built into systems that usurp and dominate the rights and access of the "unequal".
That said, it nevertheless is worth focussing upon power inequalities and asymmetries because there is an important literature that has sought to bring some of the more blatant – if not universal – examples of power inequalities into the realm of promoting good governance. Gender is the mainstay of this sort of analysis. In that regard, it is interesting that race and religion, seemingly two of the most blatant reflections of potential societal asymmetries, rarely emerge in the governance context.
James’s study on the Haitian revolution as well as his work on the "sports/war intertext" introduce the theme of race in the context of potential conflict and governance in a more Marxist sense. Similarly, Rodney and Sivanandan introduce race as a category of power inequality along Marxist lines. However, there is no literature that inter-relates governance and power inequalities with the same depth as that involved in gender symmetries. One reason for this may be because "ethnicity" now subsumes religious as well as racial categories. In that context, it is interesting to note that McGarry and O’Leary as editors of The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation incorporate various sorts of religious conflict in India, the former Yugoslavia and in Northern Ireland under the rubric of "ethnicity".
Gender inequality, while never seeming to have been the source of conflict in modern history, at least serves as a possible platform or test case for governance approaches to offset other sorts of power inequalities. Gasa’s view, though, is even more limited than that. He feels that gender inequalities should be addressed as a bi-product of addressing far more fundamental asymmetries, an opportunity for good governance to deal not only with conflict but also injustice.
Yet, there are perhaps more important lessons to be learned from the literature that links governance with the power inequality of gender. One such lesson is that, as in all situations of power inequality, the key is to have the issue, the asymmetry, itself, recognised. To what extent can focal points be established within institutions that can keep injustices, such as gender and other inequalities, on the agenda? In what ways can non-governmental structures effectively promote anti-discrimination or related measures that offset power inequalities, and what sort of government system will be responsive to such special pleadings?
[c] Ethnic Conflict and Governance.
Perhaps the single most important difference between groups that are unempowered or hold deeply held grievances and ethnic groupings, is that the latter for the most part seek to break away from the state or at least the form of state governance to which that ethnic group is tied. Unless governance structures can reconcile what Shehadi has called "the drive towards ethnic-national self-determination", the ultimate objective of ethnic groups in conflict is to change the basis of their relations with the state or states.
Such ethnic determination poses a host of complex issues for governments and governance structures. Governments that ignore even the most radical demands of a states’ ethnic minorities are in danger of losing their legitimacy. Thus, the literature concerned with ethnicity and governance more often than not is concerned with ways either to meet the demands of ethnic groupings through major public policy initiatives, accede to certain kinds of territorial arrangements or alter constitutional structures in ways that will satisfy the self-identity objectives of the ethnic grouping.
Sisk maintains that when it comes to meeting the demands of ethnic groupings through a public policy process, "the answer to such vexing problems is not to specify their solution in constitutional terms, but to set up new institutions and procedures to which all groups can subscribe." One such way is to ensure that an all encompassing human rights agenda is established with institutional force to promote compliance. This has been seen by several analysts as an acceptable basis for dealing directly with certain kinds of ethnic demands.
Ethnic demands can also be met through territorial concessions. In some respects, the recent peaceful separation of Czechoslovakia into two distinct entities reflects what might be regarded as a most positive though extreme approach for dealing with ethnic territorial/constitutional demands. Confederal or polycommunal federal arrangements can be created, leaving ethnic groups with their own territory but within a larger state construct. It has benefits, according to Duchacek, as well as serious drawbacks, according to Hermans. A key variable for governments willing to take the longer term view is the extent to which such semi-autonomous territorial concessions can be linked with other parts of the state through functional, eg, trade, economic and infrastructural, relations.
The sorts of constitutional issues that need to be addressed to deal with the threat or resolution of ethnic conflict include many of the issues noted in the chart on Approaches to Power-Sharing, above. However, within those structures decisions about law and adjudication, education and language as well as security issues and "international relations" will all have to be agreed under the heading of "constitutional issues", particularly within a confederal or polycommunal federal system.
PREVENTING AND RESOLVING ETHNIC CONFLICT THROUGH GOVERNANCE
Barry, B., "Political accommodation and consociational democracy", in Democracy and Power: Essays in Political Theory, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1991
Chalk, F. and Jonassohn, K., The History and Sociology of Genocide: Analyses and Case Studies, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1990
Esman, M.J., "Ethnic Politics and Economic Power, Comparative Politics, 19 , 1987
Kulinski, A. [ed], Polarised Development and Regional Policies, Mouton, New York, 1981
McGarry, J., "A Consociational Settlement for Northern Ireland?", Plural Societies, 20 , 1990
McGarry, J., "The Prospects for a Consociational Democracy in South Africa", Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Studies, 27 , 1989
Markrides, K., The Rise and Fall of the Cyprus Republic, Yale University Press, new Haven, 1977
Means, G.P., "Special Rights as a Strategy for Development: The Case of Malaysia", Comparative Politics, 5, 1972
Obler, J. and S. Clarke [eds], Urban Ethnic Conflict: A Comparative Perspective, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 1976
O’Donnell, G., Bureaucratic Authoritarianism, University of California Press, Berkley, 1988
Olzak, S. and J. Nagel [eds], Competitive Ethnic Relations, Academic Press, Boston, 1986
Phadnis, U., Ethnicity and Nation-State Building in South Asia, Sage, New Delhi, 1990
Roosens, E. [ed], Creating Ethnicity: The Process of Ethnogenesis, Sage, London, 1989
Rudolph, J. and Thompson, R., Ethnoterritorial Politics: Policy and the Western World, Rienner, Boulder, 1989
Saffran, W., "Ethnicity and Pluralism: Comparative and Thoretical Perspectives", Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism 18 [1-2], 1991
Smith, M., Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity, Zed Press, London, 1991
Van Dyke, Vernon, Human Rights, Ethnicity and Discrimination, Greenwood Press, Westport
[d] Multicentrism in a fragmented world.
The nature of violence and conflict in certain respects may be changing, in other respects becoming more intense. At the same time, the relevance of present models of government and governance for the future is being increasingly subject to scrutiny and in many instances undergoing very fundamental re-evaluation. The issue, as Simai stresses in The Future of Global Governance, is that there is very little certainty about the consequence of major transformations upon the global system and their impact upon present state systems and structures, let alone their effect upon the burgeoning population that all anticipate.
The speculation about the consequence of change proceeds mainly from the area of technology driven economic globalisation. Hopkins and Wallerstein have mapped out potential broad social consequences of economic change up through 2025, and Kennedy has in a fairly linear sort of way suggested what might be, as the world steps over the millennial boundary. Chatham House has taken a very practical look at economic globalisation with something less than cosmic vision, but nevertheless Chatham House provides a very sound practical picture of the sorts of policy fragmentation to which Rosenau alludes from his more global perspective.
Duffield has paid considerable attention to "post-modern conflict" and its impact upon warlords, "post-adjustment states" and private protection. He, like an increasing number of people, concludes that the "changing competence of the nation-state, especially the emergence of non-state centres of authority, is an important feature of post-modern conflict." For organisations that are concerned about governance, particularly of a liberal-democratic kind, and conflict, his analysis is particularly apposite:
In both the North and the South, new supranational, international and local actors have qualified this competence. While both northern and southern rulers face this problem, the opportunities open to each differ. The former have increasingly formed competitive states and entered into de jure or de facto transnational regional arrangements in an attempt to retain and expand the formal economy. Southern rulers have also used the opportunities of globalisation to rework political authority by forming new external and internal alliances. In contrast to regional integration, however, illiberal processes of political exclusion, including ethnic or religious particularism, are more prevalent. Rather than curb such trends, democratisation has frequently contributed to this development.
V – A Survey of Relevant Research Organisations
The universe of organisations and institutions that contribute to research and analysis, advocacy and training in the fields of governance and conflict is enormous. In principle, the range of relevant organisations would encompass virtually all universities, many research institutions and probably most national governments as well as a host of multilateral organisations.
The universe of relevant institutions that is discussed below has in some senses been arbitrarily defined. That is to say, that expert opinion suggests that there are "around 500" institutions that are directly concerned with conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peace research around the world. There are various lists of relevant conflict-related institutions. The number of institutions rages from between 475 and 1000, with considerable degrees of overlap among the institutions, particularly when it comes to the "developed world".
There are few institutions that are solely devoted to governance, per se. Those that do exist seem often to be more concerned with advocacy, principally in the realm of democratic values of a conservative or liberal bent, and less concerned with so-called scholarly research. [Obviously this statement does not apply to the numerous university departments that concentrate on political science and government.] When compared to the number of institutions engaged in aspects of conflict and peace research, the number of institutions concerned directly with issues of governance are relatively few.
Yet, in so saying, one runs directly into definitional problems as well as those of demarcation.
The problem of definition poses certain categorisation difficulties. To what extent, for example, does the study of conflict inevitably overlap with that of governance? The West African Network for Peace-building [WANEP] reflects a case in point. Recently created to facilitate cooperation among peace-building practitioners in eight countries of the Sub-continent, WANEP brings officials from these countries together to "establish personal and functional relationships". Does this sort of initiative suggest a kind of "backdoor" governance programme? In other words, issues of governance may not be part of an organisation’s official interest, but by the very approach taken to the subject of conflict, governance may be included in one way or another. Hence, in attempting to catalogue those institutions involved in conflict research and in governance, it can be difficult to disentangle the two.
Then there is the problem of demarcation. What for the purposes of this study does one mean by "institution" or "organisation". Entities such as WANEP or the Peace and Human Rights Network [PHRN] in Mogadishu or Somalia’s Coalition of Grassroots Women’s Organisations [COGWO] are not conventional organisations. They are though distinct groups that have specific objectives and a modicum of structure. However, for the purposes of this study, they at this stage do not have the sort of capacity that would meet the requirements for this exercise. More specifically, such groups, while important, do not necessarily fulfil this study’s relatively arbitrary criteria of research and communications capacity and institutional sustainability.
The universe chosen for the purposes of this survey assumes that each organisation noted in this section has a proven and on-going capacity to undertake research in areas that directly impact upon conflict, governance and in a few instances relate one or both to issues of development. They also have in one way or another the seeming capacity to disseminate the results of their work and provide related services such as training, teaching or advocacy over time.
To the extent possible, there has been an effort to establish a representative geographical balance, though even that is difficult to define. For example, some organisations have what might be described as a "global remit", or, in other words, the study of conflict or governance from a broad international perspective. Others might have a more regionally-specific set of concerns. Both, however, might be in the same geographical location. Therefore, to deal with this potential conundrum, this exercise groups all organisations under geographical headings, whatever their remit.
There is no doubt that many very good organisations are not mentioned in this study, and that the demarcation on some occasions is random. In the final analysis, however, this survey should be regarded as an overview of what is presently available and in so doing to suggest indirectly those research gaps that might need to be filled.
The universe of relevant research organisations
[a] By Region:
Academic Associates PeaceWorks. Based in Lagos, Nigeria, the Academic Associates PeaceWorks focuses principally on conflict management and peace education training. Its emphasis is to target students who will become future leaders, and in so doing, it works with seven of the main universities in Nigeria. The training for community and local government leaders led in 1997 to the creation of a Nigerian Conflict Peace Network, and during that same year a Corps of Mediators was formed to deal with conflicts at the community level. [Flt 8, Lisa Court, 61 Oduduwa Crescent, GRA Ikeja, Lagos, Nigeria. Tel: (2341) 492 5535/ Fax: 492 5535 / Email: email@example.com]
African Association of Political Science. As its name suggests, this association principally of academics is engaged in the study and application of political science in an African context. The AAPS serves as a conduit for research and also for expertise to governments on a range of matters including governance and conflict. [Mount Pleasant
Harare, Zimbabwe, Tel/Fax: (263) 4-730403 / Email: firstname.lastname@example.org / http://www.ucd.ie/~ipsa/aaps/]
All Africa Conference of Churches. Supported by churches throughout the world, the AACC is involved in the fields of conflict prevention and resolution, including mediation, citizen diplomacy, fact-finding and early warning. Normally the Conference responds to the requests of local churches, and has focussed its efforts in the area of the Great Lakes, Sudan, Sierra Leone and Lesotho. [PO Box 14205, Nairobi, Kenya. Tel: (2542) 441-483/441 338/ Fax: (2542) 443-241/ Email: email@example.com]
Arab Organisation for Human Rights. Mainly concerned with issues of human rights, the Arab Organisation for Human Rights nevertheless gets involved in conflict prevention and resolution activities in countries such as Somalia. The organisation has extensive contacts throughout the Arab world, and focuses its resources on the Arab region. [91 Al-Marghany, Heliopolis, Cairo, 11341 Egypt. Tel: (20 2) 418-1396/ Fax: 418-5346]
Centre for Action-oriented Research on African Development. Cameroon-based, academic non-governmental organisation that has interests in governance, conflict prevention and resolution, as well as in development. Not only does it serve as a research body, but it also provides educational and consultancy services on conflict prevention. Its budget is relatively small, eg, less than $25,000, but the Centre has a recognised capacity. [Central Post Office, BP 13429, Yaounde, Cameroon. Tel: (237) 231 825/ Fax: 231 825]
Centre for Conflict Resolution. An independent institute linked to the University of Cape Town, the Centre concentrates on conflict management training, promotion of democratic values, disarmament and demilitarisation. Recently the Centre has developed programmes for training senior African officials in conflict management as well as for students, community leaders, teachers and others in peace-building. [University of Cape Town, Private Bag, 7700 Rondebosch, South Africa. Tel: (2721) 222-512/ Fax: 222-622/ Email: firstname.lastname@example.org]
FONGA [Forum of Angolan Non-Governmental Organisations]. FONGA comprises an estimated 150 member organisations, and is principally concerned with community development and conflict resolution. Its capacity compared with others in this list is limited, but it nevertheless plays an important peace support role within Angola. [Rua D. Manuel 1 No.35, Apt F, CP 10797, Luanda, Angola. Tel: (2442) 395-608/ Fax: (2442) 343-256]
Inter-Africa Group. Essentially focussed on the Horn of Africa, the Inter-Africa Group is principally concerned with conflict prevention and resolution as well as development. Its programmes include research, advocacy and public education, and it has been engaged in work relating to so-called "complex emergencies". [PO Box 1631, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Tel: (2511) 518-790/ Fax: 510-064/ http://www.interafrica.org]
Inter-governmental Authority on Development [IGAD]. Presently engaged in peace facilitation efforts for the Sudan and Somalia, IGAD focuses upon capacity-building and awareness as well as early-warning systems. Though its mandate is quite extensive within the Horn of Africa context, its resources are normally quite limited. That said, it could play a useful network role if ways were found to enhance its research and dissemination capacity. [PO Box 2653, Djibouti. Tel: (253) 354-050/ Fax: 356-994/ Email: email@example.com]
International Resource Group. The IRG combines research on conflict resolution and alternative security systems with development and humanitarian concerns. While it has produced publications on peace and security in the Horn of Africa and on the flow of small arms in the Horn, its main thrust appears to be to engage relevant actors, including NGOs, in dialogue about conflict prevention and resolution. [PO Box 76621, Nairobi, Kenya. Tel: (2542) 574-092 / Email: firstname.lastname@example.org]
Malawi Institute of Democratic and Economic Affairs. Principally concerned with democratic education and training as well as economic research, the Institute over the past seven years has begun to focus increasingly upon conflict related issues. Now its Department of Conflict Resolution and Training develops and administers programmes on conflict resolution, conducts early warning monitoring and co-ordinates fact-finding missions. [PO Box 30465, Lilongwe 3, Malawi. Tel: (26461) 236-183/ Fax: 234-286/ http://www.iwwn.com.na/nshr]
Organisation of African Unity [OAU]. While not a research organisation, per se, the OAU has made major strides to develop a response capacity for dealing with conflict prevention and resolution. Lack of funds and the well-known constraints that all too often affect multilateral organisations limits the full potential of the OAU in the fields of governance and conflict. [PO Box 3243, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Tel: (251 1) 513-822/ Fax: 519-274]
Southern African Regional Institute for Policy Studies. This Harare-based organisation specialises in data collection, research and fact-finding in the field of conflict prevention, principally for the SADC countries. The organisation has recently established a peace and security database, one aspect of its intention to promote peace policies in the region. [PO Box MP 111, Mount Pleasant, Harare, Zimbabwe/ Tel: (263 4) 727-875/ Fax: 732-735/ Email: email@example.com]
North America [including Canada & USA]
Canadian Council for International Peace and Security. An Ottawa-based research organisation that is concerned with a wide range of conflict-related issues, most recently in terms of sanctions policies and arms exports. The organisation attempts to promote dialogue within the Canadian government and across the Canadian public at large on more effective ways to promote peace. [1 Nicholas Street, Suite 300, Ottawa, Ontario KIN 7B7, Canada. Tel: (613) 562-2736/ Fax: 562-2741/ http://www.web.net/~ccips]
Canadian Institute for Conflict Resolution. Principally interested in fostering negotiating and conflict resolution skills, the CICR undertakes field initiatives, eg, Rwanda, in order to promote peace-building skills among local communities as well as at government levels. [St. Paul University, 233 Main Street, Ottawa, Ontario K1S 1C5, Canada. Tel: (613) 235-5800/ Fax: 235-5801/ Email: firstname.lastname@example.org]
Canadian Peace-building Coordinating Committee. Established around a core of non-governmental organisations, the CPCC covers a range of inter-related issues, including conflict resolution, peace support, humanitarian assistance, human rights and development. The major thrust of its work most recently has been to improve the NGO community’s approach to peace-building. [145 Spruce Street, Suite 208, Ottawa, Ontario K1R 6P1, Canada. Tel: (613) 233 8621/ Fax: 233-9028/ http://www.cpcc.ottawa.on.ca]
Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies. The CISS has most recently focussed upon conflict resolution, arms control and peacekeeping in the context of the Balkans, the Middle East and the Pacific Rim. Its principal function is to stimulate national and international debate on such issues through research and dialogue through public as well as private fora. [Box 2321, 2300 Young Street, Suite 402, Toronto, Ontario M4P 1E4, Canada. Tel: (1 416) 322 8128/ Fax: 322-8129/ http://www.ciss.ca]
Canadian International Institute of Applied Negotiation. The Institute conducts research in conflict resolution, and is principally concerned with promoting alternative dispute resolution procedures. It has geographical programmes, eg, Romania, as well as thematic concerns, eg, women’s role in conflict. [Suite 1422, 50 O’Connor Street, Ottawa, Ontario K1P6L2, Canada. Tel: (613) 237-9050/ Fax: 230-1651/ http://www. canadr.com]
International Centre for the Advancement of Community Based Rehabilitation. Concerned amongst other conflict-related issues with capacity-building, the ICACBR has focussed most recently upon ways to promote capacity building among vulnerable groups in times of conflict. [Queens University, Kingston, Ontario K7L 3N6, Canada. Tel: (1 613) 545-6881/ Fax: 545-6882/ http://meds.queensu.ca/icabr/]
International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development. Involved with the promotion of so-called indigenous democracies, the International Centre works with local organisations in the field of conflict resolution. In so doing, it also supports NGO efforts to promote political, civil and economic rights through inter alia community-based organisations. [63 rue des Bresoles, Montreal, Quebec H2Y 1V7, Canada. Tel: (1 514) 283-6073/ Fax: 283-3792/ http://www.ichrdd.ca]
International Development Research Centre. Created by the government of Canada, the IDRC was created to undertake research that would lead to solutions to social, economic and environmental problems faced by communities in the developing world. Among its areas of research are also those that relate to conflict and community-based approaches to resolve the source of such conflicts. [12th floor, 250 Albert Street, Ottawa, Ontario, K1P 6M1, Canada. Tel: (1 613) 236-6163/ Fax: 238-7230/ http://www.idrc.ca]
Lester B. Pearson Peacekeeping Training Centre. The Pearson Centre is further indication of Canada’s growing involvement in peacekeeping and conflict resolution. Not only does the Centre train mid-level and senior management in bilateral and multilateral organisations in conflict mediation, negotiation, etc., but it also has programmes that link local groups with international mediators. [Cornwallis Park, PO Box 100, Clementsport, Nova Scotia B0S 1E0, Canada. Tel: (1 902) 638-8611/ Fax: 638-8888/ http://www.cdnpeacekeeping.ns.ca]
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. The Center, part of Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, has over the past decade been concerned with, inter alia, nations in transition. In that context, it has focussed upon issues of democratic reform, economic adjustment and conflict prevention. [John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 79 John F. Kennedy Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138, USA. Tel: (617) 495-1400/ Fax: 495-8793/ http://ksgwww.harvard.edu/bcsia]
Brookings Institution. Brookings has developed extensive foreign policy study programmes, including support for the UN’s Representative on Internally Displaced Persons, conflict resolution in Africa, collapsed or failed states and public policy making. [1775 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20036, USA. Tel: (202) 797-6000/ Fax: 797-6004/ http://www.brook.edu]
Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict. The Commission is principally concerned with the consequences of mass violence and ways that the international community can support conflict prevention and resolution. Its work has however not focussed solely on appropriate international responses, but also upon the actions that governments of countries in crisis should take. [1779 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Suite 715, Washington DC 20036-2103, USA/ Tel: (202) 332-7900/ Fax: 332-1919/ http://www.ccpdc.org]
The Carter Centre. Perhaps one of the most prestigious conflict resolution programmes coming out of North America, the Carter Centre focuses among other things upon the internal dynamics of countries in crisis to assist in peace processes. Because of the prestige of former President Jimmy Carter, the Center has on occasion acted as a surrogate for state mediation. [One Copenhill, 453 Freedom Parkway, Atlanta, Georgia 30307, USA. Tel: (404) 420 5100/ Fax: 420-5196/ http://www.emory.edu/carter_center]
CDR Associates. Through consultations, assistance in dispute systems designs and specialist seminars, CDR promotes cross-cultural problem-solving and dispute resolution. One of its major objectives is to transfer information about democratic decision-making and conflict management. [100 Arapahoe Avenue, Suite 12, Boulder, Colorado 80302, USA. Tel: (303) 442-7367/ Fax: 442-7442/ http://www.mediate.org]
Center for International Development and Conflict Management. Run out of the University of Maryland, the CIDCM principally focuses upon university programmes in the field of conflict management and mediation. Its Partners in Conflict programme brings together officials and scholars from the Caucasus to discuss peace initiatives, and the Center’s Minority at Risk programme has done innovative work on ethnicity and conflict. [University of Maryland, 0145 Tydings Hall, College Park, Maryland 20742, USA. Tel: (301) 314-7703/ Fax: 314-9256/ http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm]
Centre for Strategic and International Studies. CSIS, well known for its public policy research programme, has recently initiated a Preventive Diplomacy Programme that consists mainly of research and training on conflict resolution. The preventive diplomacy programme focuses mainly on the former Yugoslavia, the Middle East and Slovakia. [1800 K Street NW, Washington DC 20006, USA. Tel: (202) 775-3277/ Fax: 775-3190/ http://www.csis.org]
Collaborative for Development Action. An innovative programme targeted mainly on national governments, NGOs and multilateral agencies, CDA published the heralded "Do No Harm" report in 1996. Since then it has concentrated on spreading the word through the Local Capacities for Peace Project on ways to use aid as an instrument for conflict resolution.
Conflict Management Group. CMG combines training with multilateral and bilateral diplomacy initiatives in order to foster conflict prevention, resolution, mediation and consensus-building processes. Its practical initiatives extend from Cyprus to Colombia, from Canada to the former Soviet Union. In the context of the OSCE, it has undertaken activities to develop institutional methods for conducting early warning and preventive action. [20 University Road, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138, USA. Tel: (617) 354-5444/ Fax: 354-8467/ Email: email@example.com]
Conflict Resolution Center International. Essentially a network of experts active in conflict resolution, and produces a quarterly publication entitled Conflict Resolution Notes and a Resource Directory that includes "interveners" as well as trainers. [204 37th Street, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15201-1859, USA. Tel: (412) 687-6210/ Fax: 687-6232/ http://www.conflictnet.org/crii]
Conflict Resolution, Research and Resource Institute. CRI is a non-profit
Corporation, formally organised in 1991, and is engaged in conflict prevention, management and resolution research and training in Central America, Russia and Eastern Europe. [705 South 9th Street, Suite 206, Tacoma, Washington 98405, USA. Tel: (253) 597-8100/ Fax: (253) 597-8103/ http://www.cri.cc]
Council on Foreign Relations. Principally through its Centre for Preventive Action, the Council is assessing the effectiveness of conflict prevention through a series of case study projects. The Centre for Preventive Action will distribute its findings – Preventive Action Reports – through various bodies, including the Carnegie Commission. [58 East 56th Street, New York, New York 10021, USA. Tel: (212) 434-9400/ Fax: 517-4967/ http://www.foreignrelations.org]
Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution. The Institute’s main objective is to analyse systematically the nature and origins of various types of conflict. Its staff also takes an active part in attempting to assist in the conflict resolution and prevention process. Within the Institute there are two important networks. One is the Consortium of Peace Research, Education and Development [COPRED] which serves as a hub for over 1000 activists and researchers a second is the National Conference on Peacemaking and Conflict Resolution which promotes the use and acceptance of non-violent methods to conflict resolution. [George Mason University, Fairfax, Virginia 22032-4444, USA. Tel: (703) 993-1305/ Fax: 993-1302/ http://www.gmu.edu/departments/ICAR]
Institute for Multi-track Diplomacy. In addition to its research and regional studies, the Institute seeks to promote unofficial, non-governmental involvement in conflict situations requiring multi-sectoral and multidisciplinary approaches to conflict resolution. It has been increasingly interested in creating partnerships with the business community as an added means to promote peace-building. [1819 H Street, NW, Suite 1200, Washington DC 20006, USA. Tel: (202) 466-4605/ Fax: 466-4607/ http://www.igc.apc.org/imtd]
Institute of War and Peace Studies. Part of New York’s Columbia University, the IWPS takes a very broad view of its remit to analyse the military dimensions of international relations. Over the past five years, the Institute has undertaken projects that seek to link the problems as well as benefits of democratisation with potential and real conflict. [13th Floor, International Affairs Building, 420 West 118th Street, New York, New York 10027, USA. Tel: (212) 854-4616/ Fax: 864-1686/ http://www.columbia.edu/cy/iwps]
Institute of World Affairs. The Institute has recently developed the International Conflict Initiatives Clearing House, designed to provide an overview of programmes in the field of conflict resolution. The Institute is principally concerned with training, including training for diplomats and other types of government officials, in the areas of conflict resolution and negotiation, civil society, public policy, the environment and development. [Pennsylvania Avenue, SE, Washington DC 20003-3027, USA. Tel: (202) 544-4141/ Fax: 544-5115/ http://www.iwa.org]
International Peace Academy. The IPA has over a quarter of a century’s experience in the field of peacemaking and peacekeeping, and more recently has undertaken an initiative to support Africa’s OAU in the field of conflict prevention. At the same time, the IPA is also supporting indigenous efforts in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union to develop conflict prevention and management capacities. [777 United Nations Plaza, New York City, New York 10017-3521, USA. Tel: (212) 687-4300/ Fax: 983-8246/ Email: firstname.lastname@example.org]
National Peace Foundation. Education in the areas of conflict prevention and resolution as well as democracy is a fundamental feature of the NPF. The Foundation sponsors peace and democracy-building programmes, through seminars, conflict resolution training and mediation, in the former Soviet Union, particularly in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. [1835 K Street NW, Suite 620, Washington, DC 20006, USA. Tel: (202) 223-1770/ Fax: 223-1718/ http://www.nationalpeace.org/]
Partners for Democratic Change. PDC’s principal function is to work with governmental, non-governmental and corporate sector partners as well as ethnic groups and local communities to promote conflict resolution in emerging democracies and market economies. PDC has developed a network of Conciliation Centers in Central and Eastern Europe as well as Market Mediation Centers. [823 Ulloa Street, San Francisco, California 94127, USA. Tel: (415) 665-0652/ Fax: 665-2732/ http://www.partners-intl.org]
Search for Common Ground. Search for Common Ground has developed a "tool box" with 18 different tools for conflict resolution, including the use of television and radio. It regards its "permanent presence" in conflict areas as an important aspect of its work, and to date, have offices in Angola, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Burundi, Jordan, Liberia, Macedonia, Ukraine, and the West Bank/Gaza. [1601 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 200, Washington DC 20009, USA. Tel: (202) 265-4300/ Fax: 232-6718/ http://www.searchforcommonground.org]
Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution. Essentially a professional association that attracts those with experience in or aspirations to promote conflict resolution. Membership is principally concerned with conflict resolution in North America. [1621 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 400, Washington DC 20009, USA. Tel: (202) 783-7277/ Fax: 783-7281/ http://www.spidr.org]
Soros Foundation. The Open Society Fund, established by the Soros Foundation, promotes the development of "open societies", including work on human rights, civil societies and legal and economic reform, in 24 countries principally in Central and Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, South Africa and Haiti. [888 7th Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, New York 10106, USA. Tel: (2120 887-0693/ Fax: 397-3944/ http://www.soros.org]
Thomas J. Watson Institute for International Studies. The Watson Institute, amongst other areas of interest, concentrates upon prevention, resolution of global conflicts, preventive diplomacy, negotiations and mediation. It has produced a series of studies on peacekeeping operations, the relationship between the military and humanitarian affairs and "lessons-learned" from international intervention in conflict areas. These studies were conducted as part of the humanitarian-war project, a multi-donor initiative [Brown University, Box 1970, 2 Stimson Avenue, Providence, Rhode Island 02912, USA. Tel: (401) 863-2809/ Fax: 863-1270/ http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Watson_Institute]
United States Institute of Peace. The Institute focuses upon ways to support policy-makers in the latter’s efforts to deal with conflict situations. It focuses upon "track-two" approaches to conflict resolution, and has supported or initiated various training activities in conflict management and resolution techniques. The Institute has a number of so-called Special Initiatives, including Peace and Security in Africa, treatment of war crimes in the post-Cold War world, and conflict and the media. [1200 17th Street NW, Suite 200, Washington DC 20036, USA. Tel: (202) 457-1700/ Fax: 429-6063/ http://www.usip.org]
World Peace Foundation. One of the oldest institutes dedicated to peace research, the WPF has increasingly paid attention to internal conflict and intercommunal tensions. Its overall objectives are to promote world peace through advocacy as well as study and analysis. [104 Mt Auburn Street, 3rd Floor, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138, USA. Tel: (617) 491 5085/ Fax: 491-8588/ http://www.hiid.harvard.edu/pro]
South and Central America
Arias Foundation for Peace and Human Progress. One of three main components of the Foundation is its Center for Peace and Reconciliation. Initially based upon a project to analyse the causes of conflict in three regions of the developed world. This programme will now be extended to create new mechanisms for early warning systems as well as conflict prevention and resolution dialogue. [PO Box 86410-1000, Costa Rica. Tel: (506) 255-2955/ Fax: 255-2244/ http://www.arias.or.cr]
Centre of Quaker Friends for Peace. The Center’s objective is to promote peace and social justice throughout Central America. Towards that end, it offers mediation services and publishes periodic journals, etc., in part to promote discussion on its methods. [Calle 15, Avenida 6 bis cr, Apartado Postal 1507-1000, San Jose, Costa Rica. Tel/Fax: (506) 233-6168/ Email: email@example.com]
Centre for International Study [CIE]. The CIE has expended considerable effort in promoting community stability in post-conflict situations. These efforts have been directed through its Education and Peace Programme which focuses upon problems of demobilisation, promotion of police forces and the provision of peace education in schools. The CIE’s programmes are directed solely towards Nicaraguan society. [PO Box 1747, Managua, Nicaragua. Tel: (505 2) 785-413/ Fax: 670-517/ http://www.nicarao.org.ni]
Cuban Movement for Peace and People’s Sovereignty [CUPAZ]. Dedicated to promoting peace, disarmament, national independence, development and democracy, CUPAZ seeks to support the principles of the World Peace Council and the Charter of the United Nations. [Linea No.556,e/CyD, Vedado, Havana, Cuba. Tel:(53 7) 320 490/Fax: 321-492/ Email: firstname.lastname@example.org]
Ibero-American Conference on Peace and the Treatment of Conflicts [CIAPTC]. Mainly a network of concerned individuals and organisations, the CIAPTC is a relatively new initiative that puts on bi-annual conferences on conflict resolution, security and human rights. [Ciencias Sociales, ILADES, Universidad Alberto Hurtado, Casilla 14446 Correo 21, Santiago, Chile. Tel: (56 2) 671-7499/ Fax: 698-6873/ Email: email@example.com]
Institute of Peace [IPAZ]. Part of the University of the Pacific in Peru, the Peace Institute deals extensively with the political-sociology of the military in the realm of conflict prevention and resolution, military-civilian relations and human rights. IPAZ is part of the peace institutes of UNESCO. [Apartado 4683, Avenida Salaverry 2020, Jesus Maria, Lima II, Peru. Tel: (51 1) 471 2277/ Fax: 470-6121]
Inter-American Development Bank. Though concerned with a broad range of social and economic issues, the Inter-American Development Bank has taken a keen interest in various aspects of conflict in Latin America. In some instances it has funded networks and organisations to look at creative ways of dealing with conflict, at the grass-roots level and at the level of the workplace, for example. [1300 New York Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20577, US, Tel: (202) 623-1000 / http://www.iadb.org]
International Centre for Study and Promotion of Peace Zones. The Centre’s efforts to promote peace, democracy and human rights are directed towards establishing "peace zones". It regards the prospect of functional integration in many areas of Central America as a major step towards preventing conflict and promoting social justice. [3a Calle Poniente #3831, San Salvador, El Salvador. Tel: (503) 245-1579/ Fax: 223-7459]
Mexican Academy of Human Rights. Though principally concerned with the promotion of human rights, the Academy offers a range of forums in which dialogue and training are provided for civil and community leaders on matters relating to conflict and democracy. [Apartado Postal 70-473, Mexico 04360 DF. Tel/Fax: (52 5) 658-7279/ Email: firstname.lastname@example.org]
Peruvian Association for Negotiation, Arbitration and Reconciliation [APENAC]. Created by the Inter-American Development Bank, APENAC is perhaps a symbol of what can be done by linking the resources of an international organisation with the will of an essentially community-based organisation to promote peace and alternative mean for conflict resolution. [General Silva 524, Urbanisacion San Antonio, Lima 18, Peru. Tel: (51 1) 445-8826/ Fax: 242-9794/ http://www.rcp.net.pe/APENAC/]
Service for Peace and Justice [Serpaj]. Concerned with promoting non-exploitive society, human rights and non-violent struggles for freedom and development, Serpaj is headquartered in Ecuador. It also has offices in Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama and Paraguay, as well as a European secretariat. [Casilla 09-01-8667, Guayaquil, Ecuador. Tel: (593 4) 201 451/ Fax: 230 600]
South American Peace Committee [COMDEPAZ]. COMDEPAZ is primarily concerned with promoting democracy and equitable development. It offers workshops, conferences and discussion groups as well as regular bulletins on areas encompassed under "social justice". It maintains an extensive database on areas related to social justice concerns. [Juan Williams Noon 643, Santiago, Providencia, Chile. Tel: (56 502) 235-3073/ Fax: 236-0279/ Email: email@example.com]
University for Peace. Created by the General Assembly in 1980, the University for Peace was designed to promote peace through education. The International Center of Documentation and Information for Peace as well as Radio for Peace International are part of the University. It is at present implementing a programme on the Culture of Peace and Democracy in Central America. [PO Box 138, Ciudad Colon, San Jose, Costa Rica. Tel: (506) 249-1072/ Fax: 249-1929/ http://www.centralplaza.net/upaz]
South, Central and South East Asia
Asian Cultural Forum on Development [ACFOD]. The Forum is principally engaged in research and training. It focuses on the impact of conflicts upon groups such as Burmese refugees in Bangladesh, the separatist movements in Nepal and the guerrillas in Sri Lanka. It undertakes workshops and other forms of training activities mainly for groups related to its research. [GPO Box 4047, Dhaka, Bangladesh. Tel: (880 2) 120 677/ Fax: 813 014/ Email: firstname.lastname@example.org]
Bangladesh Interreligious Council for Peace and Justice [BICPA]. BICPA serves as both a consultative as well as negotiation and mediation forum on matters relating to conflict and peace. It also has programmes that relate to poverty alleviation, religious freedom and the relationship between peace and literacy. [14/20 Iqbal Road, Mohammadpur, Dhaka-1207, Bangladesh. Tel: (880 2) 323 630/Fax: 816 614/ http://www3.itu.ch/ibp/members/infor/babicpaj]
Cooperation for Peace Unity Network. The Network is linked to the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief [ACBAR], and consists of Afghans, working with NGOs, involved in assistance programmes in Afghanistan. It is engaged in training, research and data collection that relates to ways that one can provide aid and at the same time support peace processes. [University PO Box 1084, University Town, Peshawar, Pakistan. Tel: (92 91) 44392/ Fax: 840-471/ Email Director@ACBAR.psh.brain.net.pk]
Indian Institute for Peace, Disarmament and Environmental Protection. Essentially a research and training/education organisation, the Institute has a separate section dedicated to conflict resolution dealing with ethnic and regional conflicts. [537 Sakkardara Road, Nagpur 440 009, India. Tel: (91 712) 745-806/ Fax: 722 337]
International Network of Engaged Buddhists. INEB focuses upon the promotion of non-violent methods for ending conflict and alternative development approaches throughout South East Asia. The Network has over 400 members and local and regional working groups in 33 countries. [Mahadthai Post Office, PO Box 19, Bangkok 102 06, Thailand. Tel/Fax: (66 2) 433-7169/ http://www.igc.apc.org/bpf/ineb]
Kazakhstan Centre for Conflict Management. Established in 1995, the Centre was the first non-governmental organisation in Central Asia dedicated to helping prevent social and ethnic conflicts in the region. The Centre is engaged in conflict resolution training and disseminates its research findings in various ways, including through the media. [57 "V" Timiryazez Street, Apt 23, Almaty 480070, Kazakhstan. Tel: (7 3272) 437 417/ Fax: 479-449/ Email: email@example.com]
Kyrgyz Bureau on Human Rights and Rule of Law. The Bureau, founded in the early 1990s, monitors the ethno-political situation in Central Asia, with a political focus upon human rights violations. It is reportedly looking for ways to expand networking activities to include information exchange on conflict prevention. [40 Manas Avenue. Office 77, Bishkek 720 001, Kyrgyzstan. Tel: (7 3312) 211 874/ Fax: 223 924/ Email: firstname.lastname@example.org]
National Peace Council. The NPC is dedicated to supporting a negotiated political settlement in Sri Lanka. It is non-partisan and secular, and seeks to act as a focal point for community leaders and activists as well as political and church leaders interested in finding practical ways to have an equitable peace settlement. [291/50 Havelock Gardens, Colombo 6, Sri Lanka. Tel: (94 1) 502 522/ Fax: 502/522/ http://www.peace-srilanka.org]
Uzbekistan Institute of Strategic Studies. The Institute focuses on, amongst other things, ethnic conflicts, patterns of economic development and regional security. It is an independent research organisation that also states that it is engaged in training and education. [2 Khalkar Dostigli Street, Tashkent 700 027, Uzbekistan. Tel: (7 3712) 451 941/ Fax: 450 545]
Far East Asia and the Pacific
Cambodian Centre for Conflict Resolution. The Centre organises workshops and conflict prevention programmes for policy-makers and conflict-resolution practitioners. It has been given support by governmental as well as non-governmental organisations. [PO Box 622, Phnom Penh 1, Cambodia. Tel: (855 23) 367-115/ Fax: 366-094/ Email: email@example.com]
Chinese People’s Association for Peace and Disarmament. Principally concerned with a global perspective on peace and security, the Association focuses on such broad thematic issues as prevention of new world wars, promotion of economic development and environmental protection. The Association has links with 300 peace-oriented NGOs, research institutes and universities in over 90 countries. [PO Box 188, 15 Wanshou Road, Haidian District, Beijing 10036, China. Tel: (86 1) 6827 1736/ Fax: 6827 3675]
Conflict Resolution Network. Based upon the assumption that conflict in many ways shares the same characteristics at different levels – from the personal to the global – CRN’s Conflict-Resolving Game approach is used as a research as well as training tool for the use of practitioners, journalists, researchers and academics. [PO Box 1016, Chatswood NSW, 2057 Australia. Tel: (61 2) 9419 8500/ Fax: 9413 1148/ http://www.crnhq.org]
Forum of Democratic Leaders in the Asia-Pacific. The Forum was conceived principally to promote democracy in the Asian Pacific. It has 12 offices in the region, and presently is seized with the issue of Burma. The Forum holds annual workshops to promote democracy, attracting political figures and NGOs from around the region. [Aryung Building, Suite 501, Changchun-dong, Seodaemun-ku, Seoul 120-180, South Korea. Tel: (82 2) 322-4491/ Fax: 322-4494/ http://web.kyoto-inet.or.jp/org/bigkarma/fdlap]
Foundation for Peace Studies. The Foundation works in the area of conflict resolution, social justice, disarmament and security. While it focuses a considerable amount of its efforts on conflict prevention and resolution in New Zealand, it also has a more global perspective when it comes to nuclear issues. [29 Princes Street, PO Box 4110, Auckland 1015, Aotearoa/New Zealand. Tel: (64 9) 373-2379/ Fax: 379-3017/ Email: firstname.lastname@example.org]
Gastion Z. Ortigas Peace Institute. The Institute has recently created a Peace, Education and Capacity Building Unit that undertakes research, training and dissemination activities in the field of conflict prevention. Mainly focussed upon conflict within the Philippines, the Institute brings together non-governmental, church and academic organisations. [Cardinal Hoeffner Building, Ateneo De Manila University, Loyola Heights, Quezon City, 1108, Philippines. Tel/Fax: (63) 924-4557/ Email: email@example.com]
Indonesian Committee on Religion and Peace. Intended to serve the interests of the peoples of Indonesia, the Committee is concerned with training and education in the fields of reconciliation and inter-faith tolerance and understanding. The composition of the Committee is drawn from both the political and religious wings of the society. [Jalan Sukabumi II, Jakarta Pusat 10310, Indonesia. Tel/Fax: (62 21) 315-2343]
Institute for Peace Science. Based at Hiroshima University, the Institute performs research activities as well as training and education. It seeks to promote inter-disciplinary approaches to the study of conflict resolution and prevention, and is committed to disseminating its findings internationally. [1-1-89 Higashi-sendamachi, Naka-ku, Hiroshima 730, Japan. Tel: (81 82) 542-6975/ Fax: 245-0585/ Email: firstname.lastname@example.org]
International Conflict Resolution Centre. The Centre is principally concerned with conflict resolution in the Asia-Pacific region. Linked to the University of Melbourne, its research and training work emphasises the cultural aspects of conflict resolution. ICRC also offers consultancy services for mediation and negotiation. [School of Behavioural Science, University of Melbourne, Parkville Victoria 3052, Australia. Tel: (61 3) 9344-7035/ Fax: 9347-6618/ http://www.psych.unimelb.edu.au/ICRC.html]
Japan Forum on International Relations. Through its International Study Group on Preventive Diplomacy, the Forum offers facilities for research and consultations on conflict prevention and related issues. [17-12-1301, Akasaka 2-Chome, Minato-ku, Tokyo, Japan. Tel: (81 3) 3584 2190/ Fax: 3589 5120/ Email: email@example.com]
Peace Research Cooperative. This NGO is dedicated to research and education that will give the Japanese in particular a clearer understanding about issues such as nuclear proliferation and East Asian and Pacific security. It works closely with the Pacific Campaign for Disarmament and Security to fulfil its objectives. [3-3-1 Minowa-cho, Kohuku-ku, 223-0051 Yokohama, Japan. Tel: (81 45) 563-5101/Fax: 563-9907/ Email: firstname.lastname@example.org]
University of the Philippines. The University’s Center for Integrative and Development Studies is committed to a very proactive approach to conflict resolution as well as human rights promotion. Through policy advice, public education and research, the Center seeks to become an active participant in the conflict resolution process. [PCED Hostel, University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines. Tel: (63 2) 928-9691/ Fax: 920-5428]
Agency for Cooperation and Research in Development [ACORD]. Consisting of 155 NGOs from Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the UK, ACORD is principally concerned with development and conflict resolution in Africa. Fundamental to ACORD’s approach is the need to engage local communities in any search for solutions regarding conflict. [Dean Bradley House, 52 Horseferry Road, London SW1P 2AF, UK. Tel: (44 171) 227 8600/ Fax: 799-1868/ Email: email@example.com]
Armenian Centre for National and International Studies. Predominantly concerned with the Transcaucasus region, the Centre invariably is engaged in extensive research on political development in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan and arms trade issues. Beyond policy-oriented research, the Centre also offers training opportunities. [4 Khorhrdarani Street, Yerevan 375001, Armenia. Tel: (3742) 528-780/ Fax: 524 846/ Email: firstname.lastname@example.org]
Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution. The Center provides training programmes and university courses in peace research and peace education. Under its wing, the International Civilian Peacekeeping and Peace-building Training Programme offers training to professionals wishing to become engaged in various aspects of peace-building. The Center also undertakes research on peace politics in Europe, peace movements and peace education. [Rochusplatz 1 (Burg) 7461 Stadtschlaining, Austria. Tel: (43 3355) 2498/ Fax: 2662/ http://www.aspr.ac.at]
Balkan Peace Team Coordination Office. Based in Germany, the Balkan Peace Team is an international organisation founded upon 11 international non-governmental organisations. It takes active initiatives to bring grassroots organisations and government officials into peace activities. These activities are directed mainly towards Balkan countries. [Ringsrasse 9a, 32427 Minden, Germany. Tel: (49571) 20776/ Fax: 23019/ http://www.ig.apc.org/pbi/bpt.html]
Balkans Peace Centre. Part of the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Skopje, the Centre is an independent research facility in the field of peace studies and conflict management. Data-gathering, analysis and training are its staple activities, but in addition it also prepares media events as well as exhibitions. [PO Box 576, Bulevar Krste Misirkov b.b., 91000 Skopje, FYR Macedonia. Tel: (38991) 116 520]
Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management. The Center is known for its action-oriented research that it undertakes in collaboration with counterparts in the field. Such activities have led the Center to become involved in developing conflict management models with regard to Romanian-Hungarian relations and in developing procedures for dealing with intercultural conflicts. [Altensteinstrasse 48a, 14195 Berlin, Germany. Tel: (4930) 831-8090/ Fax: 831-5985/ http://www.b.shuttle.de/berghof/]
Caucasia Research and Information for Human Rights and Conflict Studies Center. Created to promote democratic values, human rights and peace in the Caucasus, the Centre coordinates and develops the region’s human rights movement and undertakes research on patterns of conflict in the Transcaucasus and the Northern Caucasus. [PO Box 228, 380 008 Tiblisi, Georgia. Tel: (995 32) 374530/ Fax: 293488/ Email: email@example.com]
Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development. Founded in 1992, the Institute’s objectives are to promote democratic and free-market values and to undertake research on conflictual problems in Georgia and the Caucasus more generally. It runs an independent publishing house, and has extensive links with Western European organisations. [David Agmashenebeli Avenue 89/24,
PO Box 4 (158), Tiblisi, Georgia 380008. Tel: (995 32) 954-723/ Fax: 954 497/ http://www.geuniverse.com.org/cipdd]
Centre for Dispute Resolution. Primarily concerned with dispute resolution between businesses in Europe, CEDR is a non-profit organisation that has expanded to deal with a wide range of conflicts around the world. It uses its Alternative Dispute Resolution methods as a key instrument for its intervention as well as training methods. [7 St. Katharine’s Way, London E1 9LB, UK. Tel: (44 171) 481-4441/ Fax: 481-4442]
Center for International Studies. Part of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, the Center runs projects on ethnic conflicts in the former Soviet Union and provides policy recommendations to the Russian government and others on conflict trends and conflict prevention. [76 Vernadsky Avenue, Moscow 117 454, Russia. Tel: (7095) 434-9174/ Fax: 434-9066]
Centre for Peace and Development Studies. This Ireland-based organisation covers conflict in Eastern Europe, the Developing World in general and in Northern Ireland, specifically. Based at the University of Limerick, the Centre is concerned with the causes of conflict and ways that they may be resolved from a practical perspective. [University of Limerick, Limerick, Ireland. Tel: (353 61) 202-633/ Fax: 202952/ http://www.ul.ie/~ipirc]
Centre for Peace, Conversion and Conflict Resolution Studies. Based in Kiev, the Centre is engaged in research and training in Central and Eastern Europe but mainly in the Ukraine. Its activities are focused on conflict resolution in ethnically mixed regions, military reform and the move from centralised socialist forms of government to democratic, market-force driven systems. [5 Leontovich Street, Office 406, Kiev 252 030, Ukraine. Tel: (380 44) 444-3665/ Fax: 484-3819/ Email: firstname.lastname@example.org]
Centre for Peace Research and Strategic Studies. Part of the Catholic University of Leuven, the Center undertakes research and development programmes that relate to conflict prevention related issues. More specific areas include conflict-profiteering, early warning of genocidal conflict and democratic peace-building. [Van Evenstraat 2B, Leuven 3000, Belgium. Tel: (32 16) 323 257 / Fax: 323 088/ http://www. Kuleuven.ac.be/facdep/social/pol/cvo/cvo]
Centre for the Study and Management of Conflict. Based in Moscow, the Centre has established what it calls a Network for Ethnological Monitoring and Early Warning of Conflict. The Centre actively collaborates with multilateral and academic institutions, including UNESCO, UNHCR and Harvard University. [Leninsky Prospekt 32 a, Moscow 117 334, Russia. Tel/Fax: (7 095) 938 0043/ Email: email@example.com / http://eawarb.tower.ras.ru]
Centre for the Study of Conflict. Based at the University of Ulster, the Centre undertakes research and training in conflict prevention, mediation and peace studies. It focuses particularly on conflict issues in South Africa, the Middle East, Quebec and Northern Ireland. [University of Ulster, Coleraine BT52 1SA, Northern Ireland, UK. Tel: (44 1265) 324 666/ Fax: 324 917/ http://www.cain.ulst.ac.uk/cs]
Centre for the Study of Peace. The Madrid-based centre is a research institute engaged in studies in the field of peace and conflict, security, the environment and humanitarian intervention. The centre maintains a database on conflict and potential conflicts, and focuses much of its attention on the links between development and conflict prevention. [Duque de Sesto 40, 28009 Madrid, Spain. Tel: (34 1) 431-0280/ Fax: 577-9550/ http://www.cip.fuhem.es/portada.htm]
Citizens’ Security Council [KATU]. A Finnish conflict prevention forum and network that focuses principally upon Africa, KATU provides information and education on various levels. It bases much of its work on the conflict prevention efforts of approximately 25 Finnish NGOs working in various fields. KATU at the same time provides policy recommendations, and works on common projects with the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. [Unioninkatu 45B, 00100 Helsinki, Finland. Tel: (358 9) 6220 1223/ Fax: 135 2173/ http://www.ykliitto.fi/katu]
Conflict Prevention Network. CPN consists of a network of research institutes, NGOs and individual experts, and is tasked with providing the European Commission and European Parliament with analyses of policy options regarding potential conflicts. It executes some of its tasks in cooperation with the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) in Ebenhausen, Germany. [Chaussée de Vleurgat 159, B-1050 Brussels, Belgium/ Tel: 32 (2) 646 0491/ Fax: 32 (2) 640 6355/ Email: firstname.lastname@example.org]
Copenhagen Peace Research Institute. The Institute organises peace research projects principally concerned with the former Soviet Union, the former Yugoslavia and Western Europe. Of particular importance is a recently initiated project on intra-state conflict, their causes and strategies for resolution. The Institute is also interested in issues of global governance and the UN system. [Fredericiagade 18, 1310 Copenhagen K, Denmark. Tel: (45 33) 326-432/ Fax: 326-554/ http://www.fsk.dk/locations/copri.index.htm]
COSPE. Over one-third of the resources of this Italian development NGO goes towards conflict prevention and resolution activities in the developing world. It has programmes in post-conflict rehabilitation in Rwanda, Angola and Niger. In other countries such as Somalia and Guatemala it provides institutional support and training to other organisations that are involved in peace building and human rights. [Via Slataper 10, Firenze 501 34, Italy. Tel: (3955) 473-556/ Fax: 472-806/ http://www.cospe.it]
Cyprus Peace Centre. Solely concerned with conflict in Cyprus, the CPC brings together Greek and Turkish Cypriots to develop strategies of peace resolution. The Centre brings a wealth of experience as well as frustrations to the international community, while at the same time using much that those conflict researchers outside Cyprus have been able to offer. [PO Box 1827, Nicosia, Cyprus/ Tel: (357 2) 378 108/ Email: email@example.com]
Danish Centre for Conflict Resolution. The DCCR undertakes research, training and active participation in conflicts principally found in the former Yugoslavia and Tibet. In some of its activities, it works directly with governments [eg, government of Montenegro], and provides workshops and training to a range of organisations in Denmark and abroad. [Birkegade 10, 2200 Copenhagen N, Denmark. Tel: (45 3) 537-1052/ Fax: 537-9052/ Email: firstname.lastname@example.org]
Department of Peace and Conflict Research. Based in Uppsala University, the Department is one of the oldest of its kind to focus upon research and education in peace and conflict studies. Its geographical areas of interest covers South-east Asia, Africa, Central Asia and the Middle East. The Department’s research is divided into the origins of conflict, conflict resolution and international security issues, and the Department maintains an extensive database on armed conflicts. [PO Box 514, 751 20 Uppsala, Sweden. Tel: (4618) 471-0000/ Fax: 695 102/ http://www.peace.uu.se]
Department of Peace Studies. Based at Bradford University, the Department is seen as the largest university centre for peace studies in the world. Among the areas covered in its research and training activities are development and peace, regions in conflict, politics and society, and international politics and the environment. [Department of Peace Studies, Richmond Road, Bradford, West Yorkshire BD7 1DP, UK. Tel: (441274) 384 171/ Fax: 385 240/ http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/peace]
Development and Peace Foundation. The Foundation is concerned with the links between development and peace, particularly in relation to developing countries. While principally a public awareness organisation, the Foundation does undertake research and organises a yearly symposium on North-South issues that attracts prominent experts from both worlds. [Gotenstrasse 153, 53175 Bonn, Germany. Tel: (49 228) 959-250/ Fax: 959-2599/ Email: email@example.com]
ELIAMEP. The Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, or, ELIAMEP, works with various foreign research institutes to promote conflict resolution training for representatives of international organisations, NGOs and senior policy-makers. The area of focus of the Foundation is Europe, the former Soviet Union and the Mediterranean. [4 Xenophontos Street, 10557 Athens, Greece. Tel: (30 1) 331-5022/ Fax: 364-2139/ http://www.eliamep.gr]
Emergency Group for Rehabilitation and Development. This France-based consortium of French and international NGOs is principally concerned with ways to promote development as a means to support conflict prevention and resolution. URD combines discussion groups to increase understanding of development-conflict linkages with advocacy and advisory functions. [Le Cypres-Les-Guards, 26110 Nyons, France. Tel: (33 4) 7526-2271/ Fax: 7526-6427/ Email: firstname.lastname@example.org]
ENCORE. The European Negotiation and Conflict Resolution organisation started initially as a source of expert mediation in Danish labour disputes. It has now expanded its activities to international mediation and negotiations, offering both training and support services to resolve conflict situations mainly in Europe. [SDR. Fasanvej 10, 2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark. Tel: (45 38) 884-949/ Fax: 880-875/ http://www.amphion.dk]
European Institute for Research and Information on Peace and Security [GRIP]. GRIP is an independent research institute based in Brussels and focussing principally upon issues of defence, security and disarmament. It has recently given considerable attention to conflicts in Africa, and ways to promote conflict prevention in Africa. [Van Hoordestraat 33, B-1030, Brussels, Belgium. Tel: (322) 241-8420/ Fax: 245-1933/ http://www.ib.be/grip]
European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation. One of the core organisations for promoting a network of key organisations in the field of conflict resolution and prevention, the Utrecht-based Platform has four main activities: the development of clearinghouse functions, educational and awareness raising activities, lobby and advocacy activities and media activities. [PO Box 14069, 3508 SC Utrecht, Netherlands. Tel: (31 30) 253-7528/ Fax: 253-7529/ http://www.oneworld.org/eurostep]
Eurostep. Based in Brussels, Eurostep, or the European Solidarity Towards Equal Participation of People, comprises development NGOs from 15 countries which formulate common positions on issues of conflict prevention and management. These positions form the basis for Eurostep’s advocacy with the European Commission and governments in Europe. [Stevinstraat 115, 1000 Brussels, Belgium. Tel: (32 2) 231-1659/ Fax: 230-3780/ Email: email@example.com]
European Union Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit. Soon to be opened, the new unit has been developed to act as a conduit of information for EU and WEU member states on potential conflict situations and to offer options for common foreign policy strategies. The unit, therefore, will serve both advisory and research functions. [Rue de la Loi 175, B-1048 Brussels, Belgium. Tel: (32 2) 285-6111/ Fax: 285-7397/ http://www.ue.eu.int/]
Foundation for Democratic Change. Founded in 1995, the Foundation aims to develop models for mediation and conflict resolution that are culturally appropriate for Romania. The Foundation organises seminars to promote concepts of mediation and conflict management, and works closely with Canadian and European Union counterparts. [PO Box 56-1, 77750 Bucharest, Romania. Tel/Fax: (40 1) 659-2126/ Email: firstname.lastname@example.org]
Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research. The Institute maintains a comprehensive database, called KOSIMO, concerning all international and national conflicts since 1945. This is an important research asset since it compiles all efforts at conflict resolution, patterns of escalation and de-escalation. [Institute of Political Science, University of Heidelberg, Marstallstrasse 6, 69117 Heidelberg, Germany. Tel: (49 6221) 543172/ Fax: 542-896]
Helsinki Citizen’s Assembly. The HCA is a transnational network of peace and human rights NGOs concerned with promoting democratic values principally in the former Soviet Union, the former Yugoslavia and the southern Balkans. It actively engages in conflict resolution situations by establishing forums for discussion and for developing common projects among potential or actual contending groups. [Veletrzni 24, 1700 Prague 7, Czech Republic. Tel: (420 2) 2039-7301/ Fax: 2039 7310/ Email: email@example.com]
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA). The International IDEA’s mission is to promote and advance sustainable democracy and to improve and consolidate electoral processes worldwide. Independent of specific national interests, International IDEA provides a forum for interaction and exchange of experiences among a variety of global actors involved in promotion of democracy.
[Strömsborg, S-103 34 Stockholm, Sweden. Tel: (46) 8 698 3700 / Fax: (46) 8 20 24 22 / Email: firstname.lastname@example.org ]
INCORE. A joint initiative of the United Nations University and the University of Ulster, INCORE undertakes and co-ordinates research of a multidisciplinary nature. Amongst the various networks it provides, the Conflict Data Service provides an annotated bibliography of all internet resources relevant to the study of ethnic conflict in more than 27 different nations or areas of conflict. [Aberfoyle House, Northland Road, Derry/Londonderry BT48 7JA, Northern Ireland, UK. Tel: (441 504) 375-500/ Fax: 375-510/ http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk]
Institute of Peace and Democracy. This Azerbaijan-based institute is three years old, but already collaborates with a number of international NGOs, including Amnesty International and Helsinki Watch. Its conflict focus is principally upon events within Azerbaijan. At the same time, it has developed expanding research interests in conflicts affecting the Transcaucasus in general. [Rasul Rza Street, Baku 370000, Azerbaijan. Tel: (994 12) 983 173/ Email email@example.com]
Interchurch Peace Council. Essentially an organisation of Dutch Christian churches, the IPC undertakes a full range of research, advisory, training and project functions in the region of the Balkans, Caucasus, Turkey and North Africa. A considerable portion of its projects is devoted to supporting peace institutions in those areas. [Celebesstraat 60, 2508 CN The Hague, The Netherlands. Tel: (31 70) 350 7100/ Fax: 354-2611/ Email: HCA@antenna.nl]
International Alert. Activist, research and training oriented, IA attempts to link all of its conflict-related activities to the promotion of justice. While global in orientation, most recently IA has focussed upon conflicts in West Africa, the Great Lakes region, the former Soviet Union and Sri Lanka. [1 Glyn Street, London SE11 5HT, UK. Tel: (44171) 793-8383/ Fax: 793-7975/ http://www.international.org]
International Crisis Group. The ICG was created to provide early warning and strategic analysis to assist the international community to respond effectively to the threat of conflict-driven "complex emergencies". The organisation has to date focussed its research as well as its action-oriented analysis upon countries in the Balkans and in Africa. [Minienenstraat 26, 1000 Brussels, Belgium. Tel: (32 2) 502-9038/ Fax: 502-5038/ http:/www.intl-crisis-group.org]
International Peace Research Institute, Oslo. The Institute’s work can be described in three clusters of activities: ethnic and nationalists conflicts foreign and security policies and the conditions of war and peace. One of the oldest of its kind in the world, it offers various types of conflict resolution training programmes and is responsible for the prestigious quarterly, Journal of Peace Research. [Fuglehaugatta 11, 0260 Oslo 2, Norway. Tel: (47 2) 254-7700/ Fax: 254-7701/ http://www.prio.no]
Life and Peace Institute. This Swedish institute increasingly focuses upon action-research which incorporates research on conflict and peace related issues that serves as the basis for advocacy and policy recommendations. Africa, the former Yugoslavia and the Middle East mainly define the Institute’s geographical focus. [PO Box 1520,Uppsala, Sweden. Tel: (46 18) 169-500/ Fax: 693-059/ http://www.nordnet.se/lpi]
Negotiation and Conflict Resolution Foundation. Based in Sofia, the Foundation is concerned with developing intervention strategies for resolving ethnic, environmental and social disputes. It is part of an extensive network that includes national and university institutions in Poland, Russia, the Czech Republic and Hungary. [10 Jagoda Street, Sofia 1126, Bulgaria. Tel: (359 2) 522 592/ Fax: 627-865]
Netherlands Institute of International Relations. The Institute provides courses on international negotiations for diplomats, civil servants, academics and the business community from around the world. It also undertakes policy-oriented research in such areas as causes of conflict in the Third World, and serves as a policy advisor to the Dutch government, parliament and social organisations. [PO Box 93080, 2509 AB The Hague, Netherlands. Tel: (31 70) 324-5384/ Fax: 328-2002/ http:www.clingendael.nl]
Netherlands Organisation for International Development [NOVIB]. The organisation’s main function is to champion the cause of the poor in developing countries. One of the central activities of NOVIB is to support conflict prevention and resolution activities of advocacy and research groups, such as the Inter Africa Group in Ethiopia or the South African Council for Conflict Resolution. [PO Bix 30919, 2500 GX The Hague, Netherlands. Tel: (31 70) 3421 621/ Fax: 3614 461/ Email: firstname.lastname@example.org]
North-South Centre. Based in Lisbon, the North-South Centre mainly performs advocacy and advisory functions. More specifically, the Centre’s aim is to enhance public awareness around Europe on a range of issues, including conflict prevention. Recently it has been particularly engaged in efforts to promote democratic security in the region of the Great Lakes and the Mediterranean. [Avenida da Liberdade 229-4, 1250 Lisbon, Portugal. Tel: (351 1) 352-4954/ Fax: 353-1329/ http:www.nscentre.org]
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE]. Early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management are the three mainstays of the OSCE’s newfound role. The OSCE has taken particular interest in the issue of ethnicity-based conflict through its Foundation on Inter-Ethnic Relations, and continues to be actively involved at the highest political levels in area of the former Yugoslavia, the former Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe. [OSCE Secretariat, Kartner Ring 5-7, 1010, Vienna, Austria. Tel: (43 1) 5143 6113/ Fax: 5143 694/ http://www.osceprag.cz]
Peace Implementation Network (PIN). PIN is a network created to tap the knowledge and experience gathered in the field of conflict prevention and to promote the sharing of experiences by practitioners in the field in a systematic and policy-oriented way across geographical, professional, and institutional boundaries. Financial support for PIN has been provided by the Government of Norway, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and the Government of Canada. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and McGill University of Montreal, Canada are also supporting the project. [Institute for Applied Social Science, P.O. Box 2947, Tøyen N-0608 Oslo, Norway. Tel: (47) 22088641/ Fax: (47) 22088700/ Email: email@example.com]
Peace Research Information Unit Bonn. The PRIUB serves as an education and training as well as research facility. It provides information, contacts and advice across the whole range of peace and conflict research, and maintains a database on peace and conflict research organisations in Germany and elsewhere. [Beethovenalle 4, 53173 Bonn, Germany. Tel: (49 228) 356032/ Fax: 356050/ http://www.bonn.iz-soz.de/afb]
Peace Research Institute Frankfurt. The Frankfurt-based institute is principally concerned with the causes of war and violence, and through its Bonn extension [See: PRIUB, immediately above] is able to maintain contacts with a wide network of interested organisations that serve in part as its advocacy base. [Leimenrode 29, 60322 Frankfurt, Germany. Tel: (49 69) 959-1040/ Fax: 558 481/ http://www.rz.uni-frankfurt.de/hsfk]
Saferworld. A research-based organisation, Saferworld sees the object of its efforts as alerting governments and educating publics about the need for more effective approaches to preventing armed conflicts. One of its main activities at this stage is analysis of conflict management and the arms trade. [33/34 Alfred Place, London WC1E 7DP, UK. Tel: (44 171) 580-8886/ Fax: 631-1444/ Email: Sworld@gn.apc.org]
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute [SIPRI]. SIPRI is increasingly concentrating on conflict prevention, management and resolution. More and more, its global orientation is focussing upon peacekeeping and regional security issues, as reflected in its internally renown publications, particularly the SIPRI Yearbook. [Frosunda, 17153 Solna, Sweden. Tel: (46 8) 655-9700/ Fax: 655-9733/ http://www.sipri.se]
Synergies Africa. A Geneva-based organisation, Synergies Africa is guided by the objective of enhancing African capacities to manage their own conflicts. Towards this end, the organisation establishes consultative bodies to support the efforts of local communities, local NGOs and community-based organisations as well as traditional leaders to prevent or resolve conflict. [PO Box 2100, 1211 Geneva, Switzerland. Tel: (41 22) 788-8586/ Fax: 788-8590/ Email: firstname.lastname@example.org]
Umut Foundation. Ankara-based, the Umut Foundation focuses upon peace-building and conflict resolution mainly in Europe, the Middle East and in Turkey, itself. Linked to the US-based organisation Search for Common Ground, the Foundation has looked at ways NGOs can promote democracy and the impact of terrorism and crime on democracy and conflict generally. [Resit Galip Cad., Hereke Sokak 10, 06700 Gaziosmanpasa, Ankara, Turkey. Tel: (90 312) 446-1728/ Fax: 446-1036/ http://www.umut.org.tr]
VOICE. One of the main areas of interest for this important European network of NGOs is conflict prevention. Beyond the specific conflict prevention and resolution activities of its individual members, Voice's principal value in this area is its links with the European Union. [10 Square Ambiorix, 1040 Brussels, Belgium. Tel: (32 2) 743-8775/ Fax: 732-1934/ http://www.oneworld.org/voice]
Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies. More involved with traditional approaches to strategy than with new approaches to conflict studies, the Center is nevertheless recognised as an important source of research on Middle East security in the region. The Center sponsors conferences, lectures and briefings for international as well as local audiences. [Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan 52900, Israel. Tel: (972 3) 531-8959/ Fax: 535-9195/ http://www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa]
Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies. Principally engaged in research on security problems and their links with conflict resolution, the Jaffee Center seeks to promote dialogue with Arab colleagues and greater understanding about the nature of the complexities facing those who seek peace in the Middle East. [Guilman Building, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv 69978, Israel. Tel: (972 3) 640-9926/ Fax: 642-2404/ http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/jcss.html]
Palestinian Centre for Peace and Democracy. The Centre seeks to promote democracy as well as equitable peace in the Middle East. It is both a research organisation and an activist group. The latter is pursued mainly through efforts to promote understanding and peace through involvement with public forums, eg, schools, training courses. [PO Box 25166, Shu’fat, Jerusalem, Israel. Tel: (972 2) 574-7271/ Fax: 574-7283/ http://www.arts.mcgill.ca/MEPP/ngoproject/pcpd]
Center for Research on Arms Control and Security. The center is fully engaged in actively promoting conflict resolution in the Middle East. It is at present seeking to establish the basis for a Regional Council for Conflict Resolution in the Middle East. Towards this end, the center is hosting a series of conferences and related meetings. [PO Box 141 939, Amman, Jordan. Tel: (962 79) 693 17/ Fax: 818 062/ Email: Hostmaster@jo.rdg.ac.uk]
Lebanon Conflict Resolution Network. Solely engaged in promoting national reconciliation in Lebanon, the network links in all relevant NGOs that are engaged in conflict resolution training, research, advocacy and practical problem solving. [c/o Lebanese Center for Policy Studies, Tayar Center Sin el-Fil, Box 55215, Beirut, Lebanon. Tel: (691 1) 490 561/ Fax: 601-787/ Email: email@example.com]
[b] Global institutions:
United Nations & UN Agencies and Programmes
United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations [DPKO]. Responsible for establishing peacekeeping and peacemaking operations mandated by the UN Security Council, DPKO also monitors actual and potential conflict areas, and assesses the effectiveness of UN peace initiatives through its Lessons-learned Unit. [UN Secretariat, New York City, New York 10017. Tel: (212) 963-3745 / http://www.un.org]
United Nations Department of Political Affairs [DPA]. DPA is the strategic arm of the UN Secretary-General for monitoring political conditions throughout the world, and providing proposals for appropriate responses. DPA deals among other things with assisting countries with elections and also is the Secretary-General’s link with human rights activities within the Secretariat. [UN Secretariat, New York City, New York 10017. Tel: (212) 963-1234/ Fax: 963-1312 / http://www.un.org]
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs [OCHA]. OCHA’s wide ranging mandate includes promoting disaster prevention, preparedness and relief-to-development activities. OCHA’s Under-Secretary-General is also the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator, responsible for, amongst other things, coordinating and facilitating the efforts of the UN system to deal with the immediate post-conflict situations in crisis-affected countries and for monitoring potential crisis areas through its Humanitarian Early Warning System. [UN Secretariat, New York City, New York 10017. Tel: (212) 963-1234/ Fax: 963-1312 / http://www.reliefweb.int/ocha_ol/index.html www.un.org]
United Nations Development Programme [UNDP]. UNDP helps countries in their efforts to achieve sustainable human development by assisting them to build their capacity to design and carry out development programmes in poverty eradication, employment creation and sustainable livelihoods, the empowerment of women and the protection and regeneration of the environment. Through the Emergency Response Division, the Human Development Reports, the Management Development and Governance Division, Regional Bureaux and a network of offices in 137 countries, UNDP also seeks to avert conflict and/or help countries reconstruct after conflict, by contributing to the reshaping of basic social services, administrations, civil services and political processes and the fostering of good governance through assistance to education, support for credible elections and backing for decentralisation, local government, land reform, judicial reform and the observance of human rights. [UNDP, One United Nations Plaza, NY, New York 10017. Tel: (212) 906-5324/ Fax: 906-5364 / http://www.undp.org / http://magnet.undp.org]
United Nations Volunteers [UNV]. To promote efforts to address some of the causes of conflict at the community level, UNV has launched since 1994 projects which aim to enhance effectively inter-communal confidence-building activities through the use of experienced conflict resolution facilitators with a proven record in non-violent conflict resolution and confidence-building activities. The activities under these projects focus on a) building a nucleus of local capacity through training of trainers in conflict resolution / transformation skills b) support to third sector and local NGOs c) youth activities, and d) support to the dialogue process between the opposing groups. [UNV, Humanitarian Relief Unit and Liaison Office, 11-13 Chemin des Anémones, 1219 Chatelaine, Geneva, Switzerland. Tel: 0041-22-917 8325 / Fax: 0041-22-917 8065 / http://www.unv.org]
United Nations Institute for Training and Research [UNITAR]. UNITAR is an autonomous body within the United Nations with a mandate to enhance the effectiveness of the UN through training and research. To meet this aim, UNITAR provides training to assist member states, conducts research to explore innovative training and capacity building approaches, and forms partnerships within and outside of the UN system in order to build upon existing networks and expertise. With a diverse range of programmes to offer, each year UNITAR reaches out to a large number of individuals and institutions of Member States. One programme area is training in multilateral diplomacy and international affairs management. [UNITAR, Palais des Nations, CH 1211 Geneva 10 Switzerland. Tel: (41-22) 917 12 34/ Fax: (41-22) 917 80 47/ Email: firstname.lastname@example.org/ http://www.unitar.org]
United Nations Children’s Fund [UNICEF]. UNICEF’s considerable range of child-oriented relief and development programmes deal with various aspects of conflict resolution activities, including demilitarisation of child soldiers, post-conflict trauma counselling and post-conflict reconciliation activities. UNICEF’s efforts to promote "Days of Tranquillity" – which allows for mass immunisation of children during agreed pauses in conflict situations – also serve to sustain dialogue between contending combatants. [UNICEF, UNICEF House, 3 UN Plaza, New York NY 10017 / http://www.unicef.org]
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation [UNESCO]. UNESCO promotes conflict prevention, resolution and sustainable peace through its Culture of Peace Programme and its multi-disciplinary project, Towards a Culture of Peace. [UNESCO, 7 Place de Fontenoy, 75352 Paris 07 SP, France. Tel: (33 1) 4568-0877/ Fax: 4568-5557 / http://www.unesco.org]
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights [UNHCHR]. The UN’s focal point for human rights activities, UNHCHR encourages international cooperation in promoting respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, gender, language or religion as well as those freedoms accepted in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Through these activities, UNHCHR hopes that durable conditions for peace, development and security can be established. [UNHCHR, Palais des Nations, 8-14 Avenue de la Paix, CH-1211 Geneva 10, Switzerland. Tel: (41 22) 917-3930/ Fax: 917-0092 / http://www.unhchr.ch/]
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR]. UNHCR leads and coordinates international action for the world-wide protection of refugees and the resolution of refugee problems. By assisting refugees to return to their own country or to settle in another country, UNHCR also seeks lasting solutions to their plight. [UNHCR, Rue de Montbrillant, CH-1202, Geneva 2. Tel: (41 22) 739-8111/ Fax: 731-9546 / http://www.unhcr.ch/welcome.htm]
United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research [UNIDIR]. UNIDIR is principally concerned with disarmament negotiations and research in the nuclear field. However, that orientation is changing with a growing interest in small arms and weapons that relate to intra-state conflict. [UNIDIR, Palais des Nations, 8-14 Avenue de la Paix, CH-1211 Geneva 10, Switzerland. Tel: (41 22) 917-3186/ Fax: 917-0176 / http://www.unog.ch/unidir/]
United Nations University. The United Nations University has recently launched a Peace and Governance Programme designed to relate a range of United Nations contemporary work to these two abiding issues. [UNU, 53-70, Jingumae 5-chome, Shibuya-ku, Tokyo 150, Japan. Tel: (03) 3499 2811 / Fax: 3499 2828 / http://www.unu.edu]
International Labour Organisation [ILO]. The ILO is the UN specialised agency that seeks to promote social justice and internationally recognised human and labour rights. In so doing, the ILO directly addresses inequalities that can in turn lead to conflict and violence. ILO is also involved in demobilisation initiatives [ILO, 4, route des Morillons, CH-1211, Geneva 22, Switzerland. Tel: (41 22) 799-6111/ Fax: 798-8685 / http://www.ilo.org/]
World Bank. The World Bank has become increasingly involved in looking for ways to integrate its traditional development activities with those of conflict prevention. Through its Transitional Support Strategy, the Bank’s Post-Conflict Unit seeks to support conflict prevention and resolution oriented development. Increasingly, the Bank seeks to work with community-based organisations as part of its conflict resolution efforts, and regularly undertakes assessments of possible sources of social conflict. [World Bank, Post Conflict Unit, 1818 H Street, Washington, DC. Tel: (202) 473-4528/Fax:(202) 522-3247 / http://www.worldbank.org/]
Global non-governmental actors
International Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC]. The ICRC acts as a neutral intermediary between parties concerned in war, civil war or internal disturbance, attempting to ensure that civilian and military victims of conflict are afforded protection and assistance and that humanitarian principles, as set out in the Geneva conventions, are observed. [ICRC, 19 Avenue de la Paix, CH-1202 Geneva, Switzerland. Tel: (41 22) 734-6001/ Fax: 734-2057 / http://www.icrc.org]
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies [IFRC/RC]. The main conflict-related activities undertaken by the IFRC/RC are in partnership with the International Committee of the Red Cross. National Societies, part of the IFRC/RC, often represent the continuing "field presence" once the ICRC completes its initial intervention. [IFRC/RC, 17 Chemin des Crets, CH-1211 Geneva 19, Switzerland. Tel: (41 22) 730-4222/ Fax: 733-0395 / http://www.ifrc.org/]
Inter-Parliamentary Union. [IPU]. The IPU is the international organisation that brings together the world’s parliaments. In so doing, the IPU seeks to secure the full participation of member countries to establish and strengthen representative institutions and to promote international peace and cooperation. [IPU, Place du Petit Saconnex, CH-1211 Geneva 19, Switzerland. Tel: (41 22) 734-4150/ Fax: 733-3141 / http://www.ipu.org/]
World Council of Churches. The World Council of Churches is a fellowship of some 330 Christian-based churches with a total membership of about 400 million in over 100 countries. The WCC’s Special Unit for Justice, Peace and Creation is intended to engage churches and a wider community to build "a culture of peace with justice at different levels of society." [WCC, PO Box 2100, Route de Ferney, CH1211 Geneva 2, Switzerland. Tel: (41 22) 791-6111/ Fax: 791-0361 / http://wcc-coe.org/rsb/cover.html]
World Economic Forum. The World Economic Forum seeks to promote reconciliation processes in regions of conflict or tension, and towards that end it organises high-level meetings and summits [eg, the Davos meetings]. The Forum’s membership includes leaders of governments, business, academia and the arts. [World Economic Forum, 53 Chemin des Hauts-Crets, CH 1223 Cologny, Geneva. Tel: (41 22) 869-1212/ Fax: 786-2744 / www.weforum.org]
[c] Governments’ official development assistance [ODA] to conflict analysis and governance
Most governments in one way or another are involved in issues of conflict and conflict management as well as in ways to enhance governance. Yet, there is a smaller number of governments that over the years has actively supported extensive research and analysis in governance and conflict-related areas through overseas development assistance:
Australia. The Australian Agency for International Development [AusAID] within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade is responsible for the management of the Australian government’s overseas aid programme. AusAID uses its aid programme in part as an instrument to prevent or resolve conflict and to promote effective governance. [Australian Agency for International Development, GPO Box 887, Canberra City, ACT 2601 Australia. Tel: (612) 6206-4000/ http://www.ausad.gov.au]
Austria. The Department of Development Cooperation (DDC), located in the Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs, is responsible for policy questions and contributions to UNDP, UNIDO, UNFPA, UNICEF and smaller UN funds and programmes. Other ministries responsible for multilateral development institutions include the Federal Ministry for Finance (responsible for international financial institutions) the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) the Federal Ministry of Agriculture (WFP, FAO) and the Federal Ministry of the Interior (UN High Commissioner for Refugees). Austria works closely within the European Union and with the UNHCHR to conduct peacebuilding, conflict prevention and rule of law initiatives in developing countries. Austria also features several important institutions that undertake or support research, training, advisory and advocacy work related to conflict and governance issues. These include the Austrian Study Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution (ASPR) the Institute for International Politics and the Institute for Peace. The ASPR supports UN-led peacekeeping efforts through training and other activities. [Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs/Development Cooperation Department, Minoritenplatz 9, 1014 Vienna, Austria. Tel: (43-1) 531150/ Fax: 53185-270/271. Austrian Study Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution (ASPR), Rochusplatz 1, 7461 Stadtschlaining, Austria. Tel: (43) 3355-2498 / Fax: 3355-2662. Institute for International Politics/Schlossplatz 13, 2361 Laxenburg, Austria. Tel: 43-2236-71575. Institute for Peace, Mollwaldplatz 5, 1040 Vienna, Austria. Tel: 43-1-504-6437]
Belgium. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Development Aid is the main focal point for issues of conflict and good governance. In order to coordinate Belgium’s foreign assistance programmes, an Interdepartmental Working Group for Development Cooperation was established, with conflict prevention as one of its prime objectives. Belgium provides considerable assistance for governance and conflict-related activities in many countries. A considerable proportion of the technical aspects of this assistance is channelled through NGOs and private research organisations. [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Aid, Rue des Petits Carmes/Karmelietenstraat 15, 1000 Brussels, Belgium. Tel: (32 2) 501-8211/ Fax: 511-6385/ http://www.diplobel.org/]
Canada. Within the Canadian government, the Canadian International Development Agency [CIDA], under the Minister for International Cooperation, is responsible for operational support to conflict prevention, conflict resolution and governance initiatives. Issues of governance are of major interest to CIDA, and its support for conflict prevention and resolution is often linked to governance, a major area among CIDA’s intervention types and, within this area, conflict prevention and resolution are often included as objectives of individual governance programmes. The Canadian government has also created the International Development Research Centre [IDRC], a public corporation designed to "help communities in the developing world find solutions to social, economic, and environmental problems through research." [CIDA, 200 Promenade du Portage, Hull, QC, KIA OG4, Canada. Tel: (819) 997-5006/ Fax: 953-6088/ http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/index-e.htm
Denmark. The Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its development wing, the Danish International Development Agency [Danida], support an extensive range of conflict resolution and governance related activities. These activities range from security policy and conflict prevention cooperation programmes at the regional level, eg, Southern African Development Council [SADC] to social restructuring programmes involving popular participation systems in specific countries. [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Asiatisk Plads 2, DK-1448 Kobenhaven K, Denmark. Tel: (45 33) 920000/ Fax: 540533/ http://www.um.dk/english/]
Finland. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Department for International Cooperation implements Finland’s development policies, including humanitarian assistance. Through an internal Working Group on Humanitarian Assistance, decisions are made about ways to use humanitarian aid to deal with crisis control and also to foster peace processes, conflict prevention and settlement and refugee administration. Aid for prevention accounted for 10 percent of all humanitarian assistance budgeted by the Finish government. [Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Department for International Cooperation, Kanavakatu 4a, FIN-00160, Helsinki, Finland. Tel: (358 9) 134-151/ Fax: 1341 6375/ http://www.vn.fi/vn/um/kyo/english/]
France. France’s assistance to conflict resolution, governance and development is delivered through the Agence Française de Développement (AFD), the Ministère des Affaires étrangères and the Secrétariat d'Etat à l'Outre-mer. The most significant geographic region of French foreign assistance of all kinds continues to be sub-Saharan Africa. France is also a founding member of the Francophonie, a network of 51 states and governments in Europe, Africa, the Middle East, the Caribbean, the Americas, and Asia, which was created on the basis of French as a common language. The Francophonie contributes to peace initiatives on a country, regional and global basis. It also observes elections in developing countries, having sent 22 observer missions and 10 exploratory missions 1992 and 1995, in 13 member states. [AFD, 5, rue Roland Barthes, 75598 PARIS Cedex 12, France. Tel: (33 1) 22.214.171.124/ Fax: 126.96.36.199/ http://www.afd.fr/]
Germany. Germany has two main ministries that are involved in conflict prevention, conflict resolution and good governance at national, regional and global levels. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for example for providing election observers as part of its good governance initiatives. The Ministry for International Cooperation and Development, through the Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit [GTZ] and the Kreditansatalt fur Wiederaufbau [KfW], focuses upon technical means to deal with post-conflict situations, support inter-ethnic reconciliation and revive local, conflict-affected economies. [GTZ, Dag-Hammarskjold-Weg 15, 65760 Eschborn, Germany. Tel: (49 6) 96790/ Fax: 9679-11/15/ http://www.gtz.de/]
Ireland. Irish Aid funds are distributed in two main ways. Bilateral Aid is given directly by the Irish Government to projects in a developing country. Multilateral Aid is channelled through international organisations. Contributions are made to funds such as the European Development Fund (EDF) and UN development and relief agencies. Irish Aid is administered by the Development Co-operation Division of the Department of Foreign Affairs, which has six regional offices in Africa. The Minister of State at the Department of Foreign Affairs has special responsibility for Overseas Development Assistance and Human Rights. Irish Aid supports institutions and mechanisms that empower people, especially the poor and women, and encourages the development and empowerment of civil society in general. Respect for human rights and freedom to participate in the development process are key issues for Irish Aid. [Irish Aid, Department of Foreign Affairs, 76-78 Harcourt Street, Dublin 2, Ireland. Tel: (353-1) 478-0822/ http://www.irlgov.ie/iveagh/]
Japan. Conflict resolution and good governance programmes are supported through Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its International Cooperation Agency [JICA]. The former has launched a variety of initiatives including a series of international conferences on issues such as post-conflict reconstruction, and projects that range from crisis early warning systems and cross-regional, gender-sensitive peace-building programmes. JICA provides amongst other things human resource development for nation-building programmes. [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2-2-1 Kasumigaseki Chiyoda-ku,100 Toyko Japan. Tel: (011) 81-3358-03311/ http://www.mofa.go.jp/. JICA, Shinki-Saiyou/Shakaijin-Saiyou, Shinjuku Maynds Tower,2-1-1 Yoyogi, Shibuya-ku,Tokyo 151-8558, Japan. http://www.jica.go.jp/]
Luxembourg. Approximately 80 percent of Luxembourg’s ODA is channelled through its Ministry of Foreign Affairs, although other ministries such as the Ministry of Education provide reconciliation and conflict prevention elements in individual programmes. The government also provides considerable conflict and governance related assistance through multilateral channels. [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Direction de la Coopération, 6, rue de la Congrégation, L-1352 Luxembourg. Tel: (011) 352 4781/ Fax: 352 223144]
Netherlands. The main institutional focal point on governance and conflict is the Directorate General for International Cooperation [DGIS] within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. While the Netherlands has had a Minister for Development Cooperation since 1965, this person remains "a minister without portfolio" since there is no specific ministry, and development cooperation falls under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Foreign ministry staff – mainly in the DGIS – help the Minister for Development Cooperation prepare and implement development policy. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs assistance to developing countries includes special thematic areas such as security, conflict management, human rights, good governance as well as humanitarian aid and conflict prevention. [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Directorate General for International Cooperation, Bezuidenhoutseweg 67, The Hague, Netherlands. Tel: (31 70) 348-6486/ Fax: 348-4848/ http://www.bz.minbuza.nl/English/]
New Zealand. The Development Cooperation Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade [MFA] manages New Zealand’s official development assistance. While New Zealand’s assistance is global, 53 percent covers the developing countries of East and South East Asia. New Zealand’s ODA tends to focus on rural development, mine clearance and health. However, in the south Pacific, New Zealand has several on-going conflict/governance initiatives. The MFA at the same time sponsors a worldwide good governance programme that makes grants at global, regional and national levels to NGOs and other organisations concerned with promoting good governance and human rights. [Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Development Cooperation Division, Private Bag 18901, Wellington, New Zealand. Tel: (64 4) 494-8500/ Fax: 494-8514/ http://www.mft.govt.nz/]
Norway. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Norway is the key agency in the area of conflict and governance. Within the Ministry, there are two other main institutions involved: the Ministry of Development Cooperation and the Ministry of International Development and Human Rights. Together, these three constitute the policy component of the government’s contribution. Operationally, the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation [NORAD] is the technical agency concerned with bilateral assistance. The Ministry is responsible for outlining the policy for cooperation with developing countries, while the specific programmes are planned and administered by NORAD. [Ministry for Foreign Affairs,7. juni plass 1, Postbox 8114 Dep, N-0032 Oslo, Norway. Tel: (47 22) 24 36 00/ Fax: 24 95 80/ http://odin.dep.no/ud/eng/]
Sweden. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the policy-oriented actor in the field of conflict prevention/resolution and governance. Within the Ministry, there are two key departments with mandates in these areas: the Department for Global Cooperation [and, within this Department, the Humanitarian and Conflict Prevention Issues Section] and the Department for Global Security. The key implementing and operational agency remains the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency [SIDA]. SIDA finances development cooperation across a wide range of development topics, including peace support activities. Its approach is that long-term development perspectives need to be included in planning for emergency relief. [Ministry for Foreign Affairs, SE-103 39 Stockholm Sweden. Tel: (46 8) 405 10 00/ Fax: 723 11 76/ http://www.ud.se/english/index.htm/. SIDA, S-10525 Stockholm Sweden. Tel: (46) 86985000/ Fax: 8208864/ http://www.sida.se/Sida/dyn/Crosslink.dyn?d=107]
Switzerland. Swiss international assistance is unique in the sense that it is based conceptually on Switzerland’s traditional role as an international humanitarian intermediary. Swiss development cooperation in the area of conflict and governance is administered by the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs’ Directorate for Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid [SDC]. Usually the Government has a job-sharing relationship with NGOs, and project preparation, implementation and evaluation are mainly carried out by NGOs and private organisations. [Directorate for Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Berne, Switzerland. Tel: (41 31) 323-0255/ Fax: 324-1692]
United Kingdom. The Department for International Development [DFID] is the British government’s main focal point for providing poverty alleviation assistance directed in part at conflict mitigation, conflict resolution and good governance. Within DFID, the Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department [CHAD] is the primary operational actor that deals with countries in crisis. However, the Government’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office [FCO] also has specific sections dedicated to conflict analysis and prevention. [Department for International Development, 94 Victoria Street, London SW1E 5JL UK. Tel: (44171) 917 7000/ Fax: 917 0019/ http://www.dfid.gov.uk/]
United States. Peaceful conflict resolution and democratic governance reflect two strategic objectives of the United States. US Government assistance for conflict prevention and resolution within the context of good governance is normally provided through the US Agency for International Development (USAID), specifically, through its Democracy and Governance Center and its Office for Transitional Initiatives. The range of US activities in this area is extensive, and includes support for electoral reform, civic-wide education programmes, human rights monitoring as well as conflict-resolution and mediation initiatives at local, national and regional levels. [US Agency for International Development, Ronald Reagan Building, Washington, DC 20523-0016, USA. Tel: (202) 712-4810/ Fax: 216-3524/ http://www.infor.usaid.gov/]
VI – Conclusions Arising from the Survey
The scope of the literature on conflict and governance is considerable. This survey has merely touched the surface of both. Yet even so, the range of subjects and the depth of analysis that the study of both conflict and governance has generated should at least impress the reader.
That said, conflict and governance studies reflect dynamic and ever-expanding disciplines. By the time that this survey is published, new analyses, concepts and paradigms may well have been launched. They may be disseminated electronically or in conventional print they may be part of "virtual reality" training courses or part of an inter-active conflict-governance network. However, if these future studies and initiatives are to be of substantive use to policy-makers and practitioners, there are certain gaps reflected in the present literature that they will have to fill. These gaps are discussed in subsection #1, below.
The final portion of this concluding section raises an equally fundamental issue, namely, the purpose of this survey from the perspective of the policy-maker and practitioner. In an age where the flow and volume of information and levels of specialisations often complicate rather than facilitate understanding, why might this sort of survey be useful to the practitioner and policy-maker, and how might it be used by them? Some reflections on this last point are noted in subsection #2.
Gaps in Governance-Related Conflict Prevention and Resolution Literature and Research
This survey has identified four broad gaps in the literature and in present research. However, in research environments as active as those in which issues of conflict and governance are explored, one needs to be wary of being overly didactic. Nevertheless, there appears to be [i] few if any works that really bring together governance and conflict-related issues with issues of development [ii] insufficient efforts to synthesise the disparate lessons-learned [iii] a dearth of works that give practical guidance on ways that governance systems and structures can address power inequalities and [iv] few if any works that bring the major transitions so rapidly transforming the global community into the context of future governance.
[a] Relating governance, conflict analysis and development.
The inter-relationship between poverty, conflict and governance is all too often treated as a given. There is in any event a reasonable range of works – identified earlier in this survey – that directly and indirectly deal with the inter-relationships among these three factors. However, the links between these factors and development practices have not as yet been adequately explored. It is clear that much greater research and analysis need to be given to ways that development practices can address the poverty, conflict, governance nexus.
[b] Synthesising lessons-learned.
Where can be little doubt that over the past two decades an enormous amount of conceptual analysis as well as specific case studies have emerged in the fields of governance and conflict. However, there seems to have been little attempt to synthesise these lessons into a single compendium that relates a broad range of "lessons-learned" and practical case studies with major governance and conflict prevention/resolution concepts and theories. This sort of work should usefully link the work of researchers with the world of the practitioner, and should in that regard result in a set of conclusions that will result in advantages to the intended beneficiaries of international assistance.
[c] Relating governance systems to power inequalities.
Perhaps one of the most significant gaps in the literature to date is that between power inequalities and systems of governance. While the literature abounds with analyses of poverty, gender, ethnic and religious discrimination, there is all too little practical analysis about the specific types of governance systems and the sorts of actions that such systems should undertake to rectify these sorts of inequalities. This is not to deny the excellent efforts of authors such as Harris and Reilly who have attempted, for example, to propose election systems that may reconcile different types of contending interests. Nevertheless, there remains a significant void when it comes to specific types of actions required for "elected officials" to deal with issues of inequalities through governance systems.
[d] Global transitions, conflict and governance.
Many traditional assumptions about the nation-state system, its institutions and approaches to governance, are being challenged. Economic globalisation, technological change and a host of related factors are directly and indirectly forcing policy-makers, researchers and practitioners alike to consider the viability of present governance systems and approaches and their alternatives. Unfortunately, the research base and literature to guide these considerations in the context of governance and conflict is at best limited. It veers from the rather non-prescriptive anarchy of Robert Kaplan to the doom-watch of "futurologists" such as Meadows.
The survey’s relevance for the policy-maker and practitioner
The international system abounds with uncertainties. Some of the most basic assumptions about the nature of governance and conflict are coming under increased scrutiny. One such assumption is that there is a direct correlation between poverty, intra and inter-state violence and systems’ collapse. What has been a mainstay of some firmly held beliefs about the very inter-relationship between development, poverty, conflict and governance is being challenged by a number of scholars.
This point is not to open a debate at this stage about which contending views are right or wrong. Rather it is merely to emphasise that there is an ever increasing need to be aware that much so-called conventional wisdom is increasingly uncertain presumptions. To that extent, this survey has attempted to reflect at least some of the alternative concepts and paradigms that frame the present debates.
Perhaps even more important than the contending schools of thought that frame the present debate are those that are providing some insights into a future that is rapidly upon us. Rapid change and transitions will be an inherent feature of the international system in the foreseeable future. Here, the survey may give some sense to all who need to understand at least some of the dynamics that underpin these changes and transitions over the coming decades, for inevitably such changes will determine types of potential conflict and violence as well as governance structures in the future.
Yet beyond just informing the debate, the survey should also clearly underscore two inter-related points. In the first place, there is an increasingly urgent need to ensure that the concepts, theories and analyses of researchers benefit from the insights, experience and wisdom of practitioners. There needs to be closer interaction between the two. Hence, the second point is that the practitioner has to feed into the world of the researcher and vice versa. This survey suggests areas where conceptually this interaction might best take place.